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The Reproduction of Elite Structures in Finance 
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Supervisor:  Christine Williams 
 
This dissertation is a study of how and why the “1 percent” remains a bastion of 
male domination. My focus is the hedge fund industry, a case study of the top earners. 
Women and minority men are drastically underrepresented in this industry, which is 
consistent with other high-paying professions. For this research, I conducted in-depth 
interviews with 45 hedge fund workers and field observations at over 30 workplaces and 
industry events over a 4-year period in Texas and New York. I find that gender and race, 
as systems of inequality, allow for the concentration of economic resources among 
financial elites in this industry. An ideology of masculinity legitimizes and organizes 
relationships among elite white men that largely restrict women and minority men from 
accessing the benefits of working in a highly lucrative industry. This helps to explain 
how the “old boys’ club” that dominates the upper echelons of finance becomes 
established and persists over time. My research demonstrates how the rising income and 
wealth gap is directly tied to gender and race inequality.  
 vii 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables ...........................................................................................................x	
List of Figures ........................................................................................................ xi	
Chapter 1: The “Old Boys’ Club” ............................................................................1	
Literature Review ............................................................................................3	
Rising Income Inequality .......................................................................3	
Work in the New Economy ....................................................................6	
Workplace Inequality in the Financial Services Industry ......................9	
Patrimonialism: Trust, Loyalty, and Tradition ....................................12	
Case Study ....................................................................................................16	
The History of the Hedge Fund Industry ......................................................18	
Methods.........................................................................................................22	
Overview of Dissertation ..............................................................................27	
Conclusion ....................................................................................................29	
Chapter 2: From Financial Steward to Flash Boy ..................................................31	
Community Banking: 1945-1979 .................................................................32	
Investment Banking: 1980-1999 ...................................................................35	
Shadow Banking: 2000-present ....................................................................38	
Conclusion ....................................................................................................41	
Chapter 3: The Voucher for Hedgemonic Masculinity ..........................................43	
Motivations: An Ability to Move Markets ...................................................44	
The Hiring Process ........................................................................................48	
Inclusion: The Chemistry Aspect .........................................................49	
Exclusion: Not A “Good Mix” ............................................................52	
Paths to a Hedge Fund ..................................................................................55	
The Social Circle Track .......................................................................58	
The Investment Banking Track ............................................................64	
The Trading Track ...............................................................................70	
 viii 
The Academic Track ............................................................................74	
Conclusion ....................................................................................................77	
Chapter 4: The Financialized Ideal Worker ...........................................................79	
The Financialized Ideal .................................................................................80	
Cultural Values: A Passion for Investing .............................................84	
Norms: Taking Big Leaps ....................................................................86	
Identity: Personal Brand ......................................................................91	
Social Capital: Loyalty to Networks ....................................................96	
Compensation: The Wage vs. The Wager .........................................104	
Conclusion ..................................................................................................110	
Chapter 5: Reaching the Top ...............................................................................113	
Financial Security .......................................................................................114	
Necessary Conditions ..................................................................................118	
1. Personal Ties ..................................................................................118	
2. Patrimonial Firms...........................................................................124	
3. Financial Distress ...........................................................................127	
Conclusion ..................................................................................................130	
Chapter 6: The Ideology of the Flat Organization ...............................................132	
1. Gender and the Nexus of Contracts ........................................................133	
2. Gender and the Division of Labor ..........................................................141	
3. Gender Ideology ......................................................................................146	
4. Gender and Performance Evaluation ......................................................154	
5. Gender and Networks .............................................................................162	
Conclusion ..................................................................................................166	
Chapter 7: Conclusion ..........................................................................................168	
The Aftermath: Who “Wins” and Who “Loses” .........................................170	
Patrimonialism ...................................................................................171	
The “Flat” Organization .....................................................................174	
Hedgemonic Masculinity ...................................................................176	
 ix 
Contributions to the Literature ....................................................................178	
Limitations and Future Research ................................................................179	
Conclusion ..................................................................................................181	
Appendix ..............................................................................................................182	
References ............................................................................................................184	
 x 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1:	 Respondents’ Characteristics. ...............................................................26	
Table 2:	 Three Eras of Masculinity in Finance. ..................................................32	
Table 3:	 The White-Collar Ideal vs. The Financialized Ideal. ............................84	
Table 4:	 Discourses of Hedgemonic Masculinity, and Marginalized Masculinity and 
Femininity. ......................................................................................147	
 xi 
List of Figures 
Figure 1:	 Midsize Hedge Fund “Flat” Organizational Chart. ...........................135	
Figure 2:	 Traditional and Flat Organizations. ...................................................140	
Figure 3:	 Collectivist Organization. ..................................................................141	
1 
Chapter 1: The “Old Boys’ Club” 
The United States has reached a level of inequality that is fundamentally unjust. In the 
wealthiest nation in the world, one and a half million American families—including 
roughly three million children—live on less than $2 a day (Edin and Shaefer 2015). Over 
the past 30 years, wages for the middle class have stagnated while those of the working 
class have declined by 5 percent (Mishel, Gould, and Bivens 2015); meanwhile, the top 1 
percent of earners saw their annual wages grow by 138 percent.    
 Families who live on $2 a day and those who fall in the “1 percent” may appear to 
have little in common, yet they both are part of a deeply ingrained system of inequality. 
This system is equally the product of tax cuts for the wealthy and the deregulation of 
financial services as it is the outcome of scaled-back protections for workers and welfare 
reform policies that penalize poor working mothers (Collins and Mayer 2010; Galbraith 
2000; Kalleberg 2011).  
It is no coincidence that the “1 percent” is predominantly white, male, and 
married (Guvenen, Kaplan, and Song 2014; Keister 2014). In 2010, men’s share of the 1 
percent was 97.8 percent, and 90.9 percent of the top 1 percent were white (Keister 
2014). Among the top 10 percent of earners, 95.3 percent were men and 84.9 percent 
were white. Yet most studies of economic inequality do not consider gender and race, 
except for those who focus on the implications for the low income and poor.  
My research focuses on gender and racial inequality among top earners. Gender 
scholars identify how the upper echelons of business and government are dominated by 
an “old boys’ club” that excludes women and non-elite men (Connell 2005; Enloe 2013). 
While the processes driving this exclusion has been well-documented (Bielby 2012; 
Blair-Loy 2005; Fisher 2012; Gorman 2005; Roth 2006b), the literature does not identify 
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how workplace inequality is rooted within a broader structural system of inequality 
among elites. By investigating this system, I account for how the “old boys’ club” 
becomes established and persists over time. I argue that an ideology of masculinity 
legitimizes relationships among white men that restrict access for women and minority 
men to the benefits of working in a highly lucrative career path.  
My focus is the hedge fund industry. Hedge funds are private investment firms 
that pool money from wealthy investors to generate high profits. As a rapidly growing 
area of finance, the hedge fund industry is a crucial part of the financial sector 
contributing to both the increasing number of high-paying jobs and their ever-escalating 
earnings. It is part of the “shadow-banking industry”—credit intermediaries that are less 
regulated than banks—which has grown over the past 30 years at the expense of the 
traditional banking sector (Antill, Hou, and Sarkar 2014). Government interventions in 
failing investment banks during the 2008 financial crisis led investors to transfer funds to 
this industry (IMF 2014), even though it contributed to bringing about the crisis 
(Lysandrou 2011). Despite heavy scrutiny in the media (Cassidy 2014), investment in the 
industry continues to grow.   
Hedge fund managers are well represented in the top 1 percent of earners with 
average pay of $2.4 million (Harjani 2014). Even entry-level analysts at established firms 
earn $372,000 on average. White men make up the vast majority—97 percent—of 
executives at hedge funds (Barclays Global 2011). As in other high-paying sectors of the 
economy, women and minority men are drastically underrepresented. My research for 
this study uses qualitative methods to demonstrate how the rising income and wealth gap 
is directly tied to gender and race inequality. 
To answer the question of how and why gender and race, as systems of inequality, 
help to account for the increasing income and wealth of top earners in the financial 
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sector, I first turn to the literature on economic inequality in the U.S. This research 
explains the institutional context in which elite workers consolidate their power and 
interests. To reach a deeper understanding of why this concentration of income and 
wealth has occurred over the last 30 years, one must examine the broader structural 
changes to the economy and its implications for workers. This helps to contextualize 
growth in the financial sector. Finally, I bring together the research on gender and racial 
inequality at work in the financial services industry and the theory of patrimonialism, 
which provides a theoretical framework for conceptualizing how the social organization 
of elites is reproduced over time. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Rising Income Inequality 
The rising incomes and wealth among the top one percent of earners drive current trends 
in economic inequality in the U.S. (Galbraith 2000; Piketty 2014). There are three leading 
explanations for this phenomenon. The first argues that high earners have benefitted the 
most from technology, causing their income and wealth to rise. The second examines 
how policy changes that favor deregulation and that scale back worker protections have 
led to an increase in jobs at the top and bottom of the earnings distribution, widening the 
spread of the distribution. Finally, the third identifies how workers with higher status 
have more resources to dictate the terms of their employment. In effect, they charge a 
rent on their social position (Sorenson 2000).  
According to the leading explanation for widening income inequality, 
advancements in technology have privileged highly-skilled workers (Acemoglu et al. 
2014). This perspective rests on the idea that wages are tied to productivity: As skill level 
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increases, productivity rises, which elevates wages. This line of thinking deems jobs in 
the low-wage service sector to be “unskilled” and considers high-wage service jobs, such 
as those in financial services, as more skilled and, thus, more productive (Autor, Katz, 
and Kearney 2006; Liu and Grusky 2013). With technological innovation, according to 
this logic, highly technical jobs will outpace low-skill jobs in gains in efficiency, 
warranting more rapid growth in wages. However, the pace of technological change does 
not match trends in inequality nor does it explain the distribution of inequality throughout 
the economy (Galbraith 2000; Lin 2015).  
A second explanation identifies how a neoliberal policy agenda deregulated 
industry and removed worker protections. First, policies designed to fight inflation in the 
1970s and 1980s removed a whole host of protections for the most disadvantaged and 
vulnerable workers, who now face job options with fewer hours and lower earnings 
(Galbraith 2000). Second, barriers to international trade and global financial markets 
have been reduced or eliminated, allowing firms to outsource manufacturing jobs and 
invest in stock markets worldwide (Kalleberg 2013; Western and Rosenfeld 2011). 
Finally, a movement to deregulate the financial sector, intended to democratize access to 
capital, instead resulted in the concentration of capital in the hands of a select few 
(Philippon and Reshef 2012; Piketty 2014). As a result, jobs have become more polarized 
over the last 30 years: Low-wage and high-wage jobs have proliferated, yet middle class 
jobs that once paid decent wages have waned (Autor and Dorn 2013). 
A third explanation argues that those with higher status and greater resources have 
more bargaining power than other workers. In a sense, these people charge a rent on the 
value of their social and economic status (Morgan and Cha 2007; Sorenson 2000; 
Weeden 2002). This is done through a variety of channels. Social and legal barriers to 
entering certain professional fields minimize the competition and maximize access to 
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resources and earnings for people within that labor market (Weeden 2002). Legal barriers 
include licensing, voluntary certification, and formal education requirements. Informal 
networking and interactions allow for the formation of social barriers that close off access 
to workers of lower socioeconomic status. Other examples include harassment, 
discrimination, and bullying, which disproportionately impact women and minority men 
(Roscigno, Hodson, and Lopez 2009; Tomaskovic‐Devey and Skaggs 2002).  
Barriers to access help to account for why the financial sector’s share of U.S. 
corporate profits has tripled over the last 60 years, averaging 15 percent in the post-war 
era and growing to over to 45 percent before the 2008 financial crisis (Krippner 2005; 
Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). During this same period, however, finance’s share of 
employment in the U.S. economy only increased from about 4 percent in 1950 to just 
over 7 percent in 2001 (Krippner 2005), suggesting that a smaller share of U.S. workers 
benefit from the rewards of growth in the financial sector than did in the manufacturing 
sector’s heyday. The ability of financial actors to influence politics to favor deregulation, 
leverage bargaining power within the industry, and stimulate market demand for their 
products has transferred significant amounts of income to this sector (Hacker and Pierson 
2010; Lin 2015; Lin and Neely 2017; Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). 
The previous research suggests that the institutional privileges of the hedge fund 
industry may help to account for the industry’s exceedingly high incomes, even relative 
to other firms in finance. Hedge funds encounter fewer regulations relative to other 
financial firms and low tax rates on income from investment returns, and meanwhile 
benefit from barriers that restrict access to non-elite workers. This creates an environment 
where the people in higher-level positions wield considerable power over the terms of 
their employment, including pay. These highly paid workers also determine who gains 
access to jobs and promotions at their organizations. The social closure account identifies 
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several key mechanisms, such as credentials, networks, and harassment, through which 
high-status workers close off access to other workers, allowing them to demand higher 
wages. A closer examination of hedge fund workers’ interactions, beliefs, and 
organizational context illuminates how these mechanisms channel financial resources 
into the hands of an elite group of predominantly white men.  
   
Work in the New Economy 
The growth of the hedge fund industry did not occur in a vacuum. Rather, the industry is 
the product of broader changes in the U.S. economy that transformed relations between 
corporations and their employees. In designing this project, I sought to conceptualize the 
riches of this industry in relation to a substantial body of literature that has documented 
the rise of precarious working conditions for low-wage, contingent, and contract workers 
(Kalleberg 2009; Lambert 2008; Pedulla 2013). Financial firms like hedge funds are both 
cause and consequence of these changes, as their investments influence workers 
throughout the workforce. In this section, I provide an overview of research on the 
changing nature of work in the new economy to contextualize employment at hedge 
funds.  
Work transformation refers to the organizational practices of restructuring, 
frequent downsizing, flexible scheduling, and eliminating management (DiMaggio 2001; 
Lambert 2008; Vallas 2011). These practices have resulted in a transfer of risks from 
employers to workers, who are no longer guaranteed lifelong employment in return for 
hard work and loyal service (Appelbaum, Bernhardt, and Murnane 2003; Hacker 2006). 
In the so-called “new economy,” career advancement happens outside the firm, rather 
than through internal career ladders (Arthur and Rousseau 1996; Cappelli 1999; Hall 
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2004; Rousseau 2005). Many workers forge entire careers as consultants, contractors, and 
portfolio workers (Handy 1989; Kalleberg 2000).  
Anticipating changes in the workplace, Charles Handy (1989) advised workers to 
trade stable employment for independence in a “portfolio career,” characterized by 
diverse skills, achievements, and positions with changing employers. The literature on 
human resources joined the portfolio bandwagon, advising workers to adapt to insecure 
employment by pursuing protean (Hall 1996) or boundaryless careers (Arthur and 
Rousseau 1996). This approach calls on workers to manage professional trajectories, 
develop skillsets, and cultivate vocations to become entrepreneurial “career capitalists” 
(Inkson and Arthur 2001; Rousseau 2005). Scholars attribute this mindset to a pervasive 
enterprise culture, a product of a neoliberal economy that renders individuals as 
unfettered, rational, self-interested agents (Du Gay 1996).  
Sociologists find that workers are now responsible for advancement, self-
management, extended work-weeks, and ongoing development in the new economy 
(Brumley 2014; Vallas and Prener 2012; Williams, Muller, and Kilanski 2012). Allison 
Pugh (2015) finds that a culture of insecurity conceptualizes workers as autonomous, 
independent actors who are expected to build broad networks, take professional risks, and 
be highly dedicated. Job seekers are expected to brand themselves as products to generate 
demand for their employment (Vallas and Cummins 2015). This requires additional, 
unpaid work to enhance employability (Smith 2010). Foucault’s (1978) homo 
economicus—a neoliberal subject who is a capitalized product—has found new meaning 
in this literature (Vallas and Cummins 2015). 
The remarkable growth of the financial sector has been a pivotal driver of work 
transformation, making it an apt case to study the new economy. Financial services in 
particular has played a central role in transforming the organization of work and relations 
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between firms and workers (Davis 2009; Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000; Lin and 
Tomaskovic-Devey 2013). Financial investors encourage flexible production, 
outsourcing, and downsizing, all of which are corporate policies that result in more 
precarious conditions for workers in a wide variety of occupations (Appelbaum and Batt 
2014; Zorn et al. 2006). As a result of these initiatives, workers in finance also 
increasingly encounter instability in their own workplaces (Ho 2009).  
In an ethnography of Wall Street, Karen Ho (2009) finds that investment bankers 
justify employment insecurity as an outcome of an efficient market. The dominant 
discourse of insecurity reinforces an ideology that legitimizes the high incomes in 
finance: The high risks involved are understood to justify the high rewards. According to 
this mindset, those who put their jobs and money on the line to take risks in the stock 
market deserve higher incomes than people who play it safe in secure jobs. Ho explains 
how these investment bankers embody a Wall Street habitus—a collection of group 
beliefs and practices—that is both a product of working in finance and a construct that 
helps to maintain the industry’s social organization. 
Karen Ho theorizes how the ethics and practices of investment bankers shape 
finance capitalism; however, gender and race are largely absent from her account, aside 
from a discussion of discriminatory practices at investment banks. I find that gender and 
race shape the beliefs, norms, and enactments of the Wall Street habitus. Gender and race 
are also embedded in the industry’s social organization, which helps to explain the 
dominant discourses and ideologies that legitimize the employment insecurity and high 
earnings in finance.  
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Workplace Inequality in the Financial Services Industry 
Theories of inequality in the workplace inform this dissertation. Scholars have identified 
the processes that create gender and racial inequality in the financial services industry 
(Bielby 2012; Blair-Loy 2009; Roth 2006b). The existing research attributes inequality to 
the following processes: compensation, hiring, scheduling, networking, and promotions. 
Furthermore, beliefs about gender rationalize these processes. In this section, I will 
provide an overview of this literature and demonstrate how it presents a theoretical 
framework for understanding the “old boys’ club” in finance. 
Finance has the largest gender wage gap of any industry (Catalyst 2015; U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013): Women in finance earn 70.5 percent of men’s earnings 
(Catalyst 2015). Scholars attribute these pay discrepancies to a number of factors. At the 
organization level, firms sort women into lower-paying departments (Madden 2012; Roth 
2006b). Formalized policies like pay structures and evaluation procedures may appear 
gender-neutral, yet their ability to eliminate bias depends on the organizational context 
(Castilla 2008; Madden 2012; Stainback, Tomaskovic-Devey, and Skaggs 2010). 
Performance evaluation systems allow for subjective decision-making practices that 
contribute to the gender and racial pay gaps in this industry (Bielby 2012; Castilla 2008; 
Roth 2006a). Performance pay—often commission based—negatively impacts the 
earnings of women stockbrokers, who receive inadequate sales support and lower-grade 
assignments (Madden 2012). These systems especially penalize racial/ethnic minority 
women and men, who struggle to raise wealth from racially-typed client assignments and 
segregated networks (Bielby 2012). 
In the hiring process, elite firms rely on beliefs about gender, race, and class when 
they select employees (Elliott and Smith 2004; Gorman 2005; Rivera 2015b). Lauren 
Rivera (2015) finds that high-status credentials, such as graduating from an Ivy League 
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school, provide institutionalized forms of social and cultural capital that open up access 
to elite firms. Social capital refers to a person’s social ties generated through familial, 
educational, and professional connections, while cultural capital refers to a person’s soft 
skills, dispositions, and knowledge that serve as markers of social class (Bourdieu 1986). 
In hiring processes, social and cultural capital provide signals that solicit recognition—
often on a subconscious, emotional level—from prospective employers (Rivera 2012, 
2015b, 2015a). Gender norms and beliefs also influence hiring decisions on Wall Street 
(Roth 2006b). For example, managers and coworkers view women with children as less 
dedicated to work, yet deem fathers to be more serious and accountable (Blair-Loy 2009; 
Roth 2006b). The recruitment, hiring, negotiation, and training practices also feature 
overt and subtle forms of discrimination (Babcock and Laschever 2003; Roth 2006b).  
Once a person is hired, his or her ability to network is perhaps the strongest 
determinant of success on Wall Street (Godechot 2014). Yet, women and minority men 
struggle to access powerful networks (Ho 2009; Roth 2006b), which denies them 
valuable resources like mentorship and professional development (Bielby 2012). A 
fraternity environment and a “machismo” culture dominate the industry, limiting 
women’s abilities to find mentors and networks (Roth 2006:72). Colleagues are less 
likely to invest in relationships with women, because they are viewed as less valuable 
(McGuire 2002). Informal networking provides no accountability for discriminatory 
practices and, instead, can exacerbate gender and race inequality (Roth 2006b). The 
networks created by women and minority men are perceived as lower status and less 
powerful than white men’s networks (McGuire 2000; Wingfield 2014). Exclusion from 
networks further disadvantages women and minority men as they advance in the industry. 
Jobs with higher status and pay often arise from changing firms rather than through 
internal career ladders (Vallas 2011; Williams et al. 2012), which privileges employees 
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who bring profitable networks of former colleagues and customers (Godechot 2014).  
Another job requirement that contributes to social inequality in finance is the 
expectation of long working weeks. Working hours have accelerated in the era of 
electronic markets (Blair-Loy and Jacobs 2003): Schedules previously coincided with the 
market hours of 9:30 a.m. to 4 p.m., but now trades can happen around the clock due to 
global markets and electronic trading. The demands are particularly high in investment 
banking, the entry point for many careers on Wall Street, where analysts work up to 120 
hours a week (Ho 2009). These demanding hours penalize women with families (Blair-
Loy 1999; Cha 2013). Women who use flextime, maternity leave, and other family 
policies compromise their positions at workplaces with demanding hours and incur 
penalties in wages (Glass 2004; Roth 2006b). Meanwhile, women at firms with more 
rigid 9-to-5 schedules report less work-to-family conflict (Blair-Loy 2009).  
These demands intensify as financial workers advance in their careers. Launching 
an investment firm epitomizes success in this industry; however, prospective investors 
are more likely to invest in a founder’s startup when the person is perceived to have 
strong social ties and access to financial capital (Godechot 2014). Racial and ethnic 
minority men and women struggle to access white wealth (Bielby 2012), limiting their 
future options for becoming entrepreneurs and launching their own firms. Women 
entrepreneurs are also less likely to be evaluated as capable of success (Thébaud 2015), 
because gendered ideas about risk-taking influence perceptions of investment managers 
(Delaney 2012; Fisher 2012). Men and women alike tend to view women as more risk-
averse (Fisher 2012). In contexts like hedge funds where competitiveness and high risk-
tolerance are associated with higher profits, masculinity confers credibility and benefits 
men (Niederle and Vesterlund 2008; Riach and Cutcher 2014). This may help to explain 
why men earn more than woman in high-paying positions such as stockbrokers and 
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investment bankers (Roth 2006b), despite comparable performance outcomes (Green, 
Jegadeesh, and Tang 2009).  
Finally, beliefs about gender and masculinity legitimize the domination of white 
men among the upper echelons of Wall Street. Particular performances of masculinity—
captured by the icons of the stately, financial patriarch and the macho, plebian trader—
are valorized and rewarded (McDowell 1997, 2010). Competitive workplaces like the 
trade floor create barriers for women who struggle to comply with masculine norms 
(Levin 2001; Zaloom 2006). These environments feature gendered repertoires for being 
aggressive, getting physical, and handling pressure (Levin 2001). Women face a double 
bind because they are expected to conform to norms for men and masculinity, yet are 
penalized for not acting in accordance to expectations for femininity (Roth 2006b). 
The previous research identifies the norms, beliefs, and practices that contribute 
to gender and racial inequality in workplaces in the financial services industry. I argue 
that these discriminatory practices are part of a broader structural system of 
patrimonialism. By applying the theory of patrimonialism to understanding workplace 
inequality in finance, I contribute to the previous research to account for how the “old 
boys’ club” in finance is established and reproduced over time.  
 
Patrimonialism: Trust, Loyalty, and Tradition 
Weber’s theory of patrimonialism provides a framework for understanding how financial 
elites contribute to rising income and wealth inequality. Patrimonialism refers to an 
organization of authority in which a leader assumes power through networks based on 
trust, loyalty, and tradition (Weber 2012). Trust, a central organizing factor of 
patrimonialism, is defined as a willingness to be vulnerable in the face of risk or 
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uncertainty (Luhmann 1990; Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995; Rousseau et al. 1998). 
Trust derives from a sense of similarity or shared interest (Luhmann 1990), involves a 
perception of reciprocity (Schoorman, Mayer, and Davis 2007), and depends on 
institutional context (Driver 2015; Maguire and Phillips 2008). In patron/client 
relationships, trust provides a foundation for collaboration among non-familial actors 
(Gambetta 1996).  
 Gender, race, and class influence whether people perceive one another as 
trustworthy (Gambetta and Hamill 2005; Harrington 2016; S. S. Smith 2010), due to 
deeply ingrained beliefs that external markers of one’s social position correspond to 
certain innate qualities, characteristics, and propensities (Lorber 1993). People tend to 
more easily trust and invest in people who share their race and ethnicity (Glaeser et al. 
2000; Simpson, McGrimmon, and Irwin 2007). This helps to explain racial and ethnic 
disparities in home loans and consumer credit (Rugh and Massey 2010), as institutional 
lending is an organizational extension of trust and loyalty (Lapavitsas 2006; Schimank 
2011).  
Loyalty is the second feature of a patrimonial system. The leader provides 
educational training in exchange for the apprentice’s loyalty (Weber 2012). This system 
of apprenticeship-style education cultivates allegiances, either familial or non-familial, 
between the leader and protégé. The benefits that the apprentices receive from the 
training deters them from leaving the organization (Brody and Rubin 2011; Hirschman 
1970). Meanwhile, in exchange for providing training, the leader benefits from the 
rewards of the apprentices’ labor, which the leader views as “privately appropriated 
economic advantages” (Weber 2012:252-3). In other words, the leader feels a sense of 
entitlement to the rewards generated from training the apprentice. Weber classified this 
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feature as a form of patriarchy, where resources are controlled by and passed down 
among men. 
  The third feature of patrimonialism is tradition. Tradition legitimizes a leader’s 
personal authority and the bonds among group members (Weber 2012). Tradition is 
evident when participants take the structures and practices for granted. Tradition 
normalizes the patrimonial system leading participants to perceive it as natural or 
organic. Furthermore, the tradition of inheritance in patrimonial firms is explicitly 
gendered (Weber 2012). For example, Céline Bessière (2010, 2014) finds that on family 
farms parents assign young girls and boys to different tasks, leading boys to develop 
skills deemed of greater value and higher status. Sons are then preferred over daughters 
for inheriting the family enterprise. 
While the previous research mostly applies Weber’s theory of patrimonialism to 
historical or non-Western societies, Mounira Charrad and Julia Adams (2011) have 
identified the need to examine how patrimonialism arises within industrialized 
capitalism. Weber predicted that as states modernize, patrimonialism would be replaced 
with rational bureaucracy. To date, the literature applying patrimonialism to Western 
contexts examines how it persists in spite of modernization, as a remnant of a bygone era 
(Collins 2011).  
Can patrimonialism characterize modern-day capitalist enterprises in the U.S.? 
Thomas Piketty (2014) has argued that recent growth in privately-owned capital implies 
the resurgence of patrimonial capitalism, a system where economic and political power-
holders access their positions through inherited wealth. Other research references 
executive influence on stock dividends and compensation as evidence of the existence of 
patrimonial capitalist firms today (Lachmann 2011). For example, private enterprises like 
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brokerage houses and hedge funds amass wealth due to low capital gains taxes, fewer 
regulatory restrictions, and offshore accounts.  
I argue that the proliferation of less-regulated firms like hedge funds has enabled 
the resurgence of patrimonialism. Deregulation of the financial sector has resulted in 
greater uncertainty and instability (Galbraith 2012; Harvey 2011). Contexts of 
uncertainty heighten the importance of trust-based networks (Cook 2005; Tilly 2001), 
which are indicative of patrimonialism. Patrimonialism limits the distribution of 
resources in society, generating a spike in inequality (Piketty 2014). This helps to explain 
why the financial sector has contributed to widening economic inequality over the past 30 
years (Godechot 2012; Lin 2015).  
The hedge fund industry is an appropriate case to study patrimonialism within the 
financial sector. Hedge fund managers are embedded within an institutional context in 
which social capital and organizational politics guide investment decisions, which leads 
to rapid stock market fluctuations that generate instability (Godechot 2008; MacKenzie 
2003). At hedge funds, high turnover in employees, entire teams, and firms make workers 
vulnerable and reliant on personal networks (Godechot 2014; MacKenzie 2003). In 
contexts of instability and uncertainty, like the hedge fund industry, people restrict access 
to their networks and place their trust in traditional forms of social organization, such as 
familial, religious, and ethnic communities (Cook 2005; Tilly 2001).  
While other research attributes financial activities in this context to organizational 
politics and social capital (Godechot 2008), I argue that gender and race influence 
interpersonal networks and, therefore, impact the distribution of resources. This helps to 
account for why 97 percent of industry assets are managed by white men (Barclays 
Global 2011). Applying the theory of patrimonialism to the hedge fund industry identifies 
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how gender and race are part of industry-wide mechanisms that restrict access to 
opportunities, rewards, and resources. 
 
CASE STUDY 
Hedge funds are private investment firms that pool investor funds to generate higher 
returns. They produce revenue by using strategies like betting against the asset (“short 
selling”) and borrowing to increase exposure and risk (“leveraging”) when investing in 
stocks, bonds, commodities, and derivatives. Alfred W. Jones, a sociologist, founded the 
first hedge fund in 1949. He used statistical models to develop low-risk strategies 
combining leverage and short-selling. Today, hedge funds invest money for a wide 
segment of society: Over half of their investors are pension funds, governments, 
universities, and other non-profit endowments (Preqin 2015). Hedge fund investments 
impact states, organizations, and workers worldwide.  
Hedge fund managers charge high fees that are taxed as capital gains rather than 
income. This allows for extremely high earnings. With annual incomes of over one 
billion dollars, hedge fund managers Steven Cohen and George Soros were the highest 
industry earners in 2014 (Vardi 2015). Yet these high earnings are unevenly distributed 
within the financial services industry, which has the widest gender wage gap of any 
industry (Catalyst 2015) and substantial disparities between whites and racial/ethnic 
minorities (Alden 2011). 
Patronage is an ingrained feature of the hedge fund industry. Investors become 
patrons, passing on their wealth to carefully groomed protégés. For example, Julian 
Robertson of Tiger Management, the most successful hedge fund worldwide in the 1980s 
and 1990s, seeded an empire of investment firms that manages over $250 billion in assets 
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(Altshuller, Peta, and Jordan 2014). Referred to as the “Tiger Cubs” and “Grand Cubs,” 
these firms share similar investment philosophies, strategies, and returns, revealing a 
system of patronage where one fund manager starts a lineage of firms formed by trust-
based ties that are cultivated through an investment tradition. What is less understood is 
how this system of patronage is both gendered and racialized. In this dissertation, I argue 
that the patrimonial structures in this industry play a crucial role in privileging white male 
workers while precluding access to others, predominantly women and minority men. 
For examining the reproduction of elite structures among top earners, the hedge 
fund industry is an ideal case of study for three reasons. First, the high fees and low taxes 
at hedge funds result in average employee incomes among the top one percent of earners 
(Glocap 2014). The compensation structures make the industry a relevant case for 
studying economic inequality in an era when the rewards are concentrated in finance 
(Godechot 2012; Lin 2015).  
Second, the industry is one of the fastest growing and highly profitable areas of 
financial services because it is less regulated than other areas (IMF 2014). In the U.S., the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.) requires that a hedge fund investor has a 
minimum net worth of $1 million and an annual income of at least $200,000. The S.E.C. 
considers these wealthy investors to be knowledgeable and less in need of legal 
protection, so hedge funds receive less regulatory oversight than other investment firms. 
 Less oversight allows hedge funds to pursue riskier investment strategies—like 
short selling and leveraging—to generate higher returns, which has led to tremendous 
growth in the industry. In 1990, only 610 funds managed just over $40 billion in assets 
(Hedge Fund Research 1990-2014). Today, the industry has $2.8 trillion in assets under 
management, and is projected to grow to $4.8 trillion by 2018 (Citi Investor Services 
2014). 
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Third, the industry is extremely male-dominated. Although there is no available 
information on the demographic composition of employees in this industry, research has 
found that white men manage nearly all assets in the industry (Barclays Global 2011; 
Rothstein Kass 2013) and overwhelmingly dominate leadership positions. Therefore, it is 
a relevant case for investigating the mechanisms that allow power and authority to 
become concentrated among elite white men. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY  
The origin of the hedge fund industry lies in the field of sociology. After completing a 
Ph.D. in sociology at Columbia University in the 1930s, Alfred Winslow Jones channeled 
his academic training into mastering financial markets. With a background in Marxist 
organizing in Europe, Jones wrote his dissertation on labor and conflict in Akron, Ohio 
([1941] 1999).1 Later, while working as a financial journalist during World War II, Jones 
developed an interest in technical market analysis and stock market predictions. Driven 
by a sense of skepticism that investors could accurately predict the future, he focused his 
attention instead on the techniques used to mitigate risks that result from unexpected 
market swings. Jones developed a measure for stock market risk that allowed him to 
adjust risk in his portfolio, using statistical skills that he developed as a sociologist. 
Jones founded A.W. Jones & Co. in 1949, which would later become known 
within finance as the world’s first hedge fund (Mallaby 2011). Today, his firm would be 
called an opportunistic long/short equity fund, because it made short-term and long-term 
investments in the stock market (Jaeger 2002). Jones simultaneously made investments in 
                                                
1 Akron had been a site of recent labor strikes and featured a stark class divide. For his dissertation, Jones 
interviewed 1,705 residents about their views on labor rights. Jones examined the changing public attitudes 
about big business, big government, and democracy in the aftermath of the Great Recession. Jones’ 
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some stocks that he expected to appreciate over time and in other stocks that he predicted 
would decrease in value, using financial instruments that allowed him to profit from both. 
By reconsidering the market and questioning neoclassical economic theory, Jones 
developed strategies that allowed him to hedge exposure to potential market losses and 
profit from the stock market even during market downturns. Hedge funds call these 
“absolute returns,” because their investment performance is not tied to upturns and 
downturns in the stock market. 
Jones called this strategy a hedge because he combined a risk-averse technique of 
investing in assets that will slowly appreciate over time with two risky and speculative 
investment techniques: leverage and short selling. Short selling is when an investment 
manager bets against a security expecting it to fall. For example, in 2014, the global oil 
markets underwent a major meltdown. In June 2014 oil cost $115 a barrel; by February of 
2016, oil hit a thirty year low of $26 a barrel. Imagine that back in early 2014, an investor 
anticipates the oil crash and prepares to short oil. To do this, first she takes out a loan in 
the form of a barrel of oil2 from a bank or other lender. She then sells the oil barrel when 
she thinks it has reached its peak prices, in this case $115. Then the investor waits for the 
stock to drop in value. Once the barrel reaches what she thinks is the bottom price—$26 
in 2016—she buys the barrel at the lower price and pays her lender back in kind, the 
barrel of oil. From this exchange, she makes the difference—$89—on each barrel. This is 
how investors can make considerable profits even when the market falls. 
The other technique that Jones developed is called leverage. Leverage refers to a 
technique in which an investor borrows capital or uses other financial techniques to 
                                                
2 I use the example of a barrel of oil to make the analogy more tangible. In practice, the investor would 
short a crude oil futures contract, which is a promise to buy a barrel of oil at some point in the future. 
Investors who trade futures do not actually buy a real barrel of oil, but just buy and sell the futures contract.  
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increase the scope of the investment.3 Using the analogy from before, imagine that the 
price of oil rebounds in the second half of 2017. The investor above anticipates that oil 
prices will rise, so she invests $100 in oil and then takes out a loan from the bank for 
$1000 at an interest rate of 6 percent to maximize her investment. At the end of the year, 
if oil prices increase by 15 percent, the value of her investment will rise to $1265, an 
increase of $165. If she decided to sell the oil stock, she would pay back the bank $1000 
plus $60 in interest. This would leave her with $105 in profits, even though she only 
invested $100 of her own money. Although leveraging can increase profits, it involves 
higher levels of risk. If oil prices had dropped by 15 percent, she would have 
compounded her losses. A hedge fund that is “highly leveraged” has more debt relative to 
equity, which accelerates its profits or losses.  
Within the industry, Jones is identified as the founding father of the hedge fund 
industry, even though other firms before and during Jones’ time used similar strategies. 
Jones’ history as a sociologist and Marxist captures the contrarian mindset valued in this 
industry. Jones’ primary financial innovations pertained to risk management. He 
combined less risky investment strategies like hedging with higher-risk techniques—like 
short selling and leverage—as a way to generate consistently high profits. Traditional 
hedge fund strategies feature both risk-averse and high-risk techniques. Jones’ 
innovations remain at the core of hedge fund investments today.  
Alfred Winslow Jones laid the groundwork for a new era of turning money into 
money, divorced from physical commodities. Central to Jones’ investment philosophy is 
an ability to anticipate shifts in the stock market by analyzing the social dynamics of 
                                                
3 Leverage can be obtained through futures, options, margin, and other financial instruments. Futures are a 
contract between a buyer and seller to make a transaction at a future date and time. Options are a security 
on a futures contract: An option gives the buyers the right to buy or sell the security, with no obligation. 
Finally, buying on margin means that an investor buys an asset using a loan from a bank or broker, which 
requires a down payment, i.e., margin, on the loan. 
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markets: how manias and panics among investors shape their activity.4 He used social 
theory to understand the changing direction of financial markets, and then applied 
technical and mathematical methods to capitalize on social phenomena.  
While hedge fund strategies today are loosely based on Jones’ initial innovations, 
technological advances in the financial sector have made hedge fund investments more 
theoretically and mathematically complex. New financial technologies like electronic 
trades, automated credit scores, and virtual contracts enabled financial firms to bundle 
assets into complex securities—like collateralized debt obligations, credit default swaps, 
and mortgage-backed securities—to sell in capital markets. This process is called 
securitization (Davis 2009).  
Securitization allows lenders to redistribute assets to other firms like hedge funds 
and, thus, reduce liabilities on their balance sheets. This has led to a substantial increase 
in the overall amount of credit in circulation. It has also allowed for the development of 
more complex financial futures and derivatives vehicles. While securitization decreased 
the amount of risk involved for each particular entity, it redistributed risk worldwide 
resulting in unexpected and unprecedented systemic risks that led to the 2008 financial 
crisis and ensuing global recession (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011; Grusky, 
Western, and Wimer 2011; Reinhart and Rogoff 2011). 
The advent of securitization fundamentally transformed the nature of capital. In 
the 19th century, social theorist Karl Marx (1978) identified how capital is created through 
the sale of commodities. He denoted the circuit M-C-M’ to capture how money (M) is 
invested to create commodities (C) that are sold to generate more money (M’). This 
                                                
4 Jones’ ideas echo the late economist Hyman Minsky who understood financial markets as fundamentally 
unstable and prone to crisis (Reinhart and Rogoff 2011). He explains how social manias create market 
bubbles: stocks whose popularity among investors leads to inflated prices relative to the stocks’ underlying 
value in the real economy. Eventually these bubbles pop, causing investor panic that drives a sharp crash in 
the stock price as investors scramble to sell their shares. 
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money becomes the capital that allows a capitalist to produce more commodities. 
Securitization has allowed investors like hedge fund managers to transform money 
through an M-M°-M°° circuit. The creation of capital is no longer tied to physical 
commodities. Money (M) can now be invested into abstract financial derivatives (M°)—a 
security that represents a contract for the exchange of underlying assets—that generate 
more money (M°°).  
The increasing size and complexity of the U.S. financial sector has revolutionized 
the possibilities for generating money. However, these innovations have presented a 
paradox in risk. Hedge fund investments are designed to measure and mitigate the risks 
posed by upturns and downturns in the stock market. In this sense, hedge funds minimize 
possible financial risks for their investors. Yet, hedge fund investments generate systemic 
risks by contributing to variability both in the stock market and in the labor market.  
Although hedge fund managers market themselves as using complex strategies to protect 
their investors from exposure to risk in the stock market, it is not their job to evaluate 
potential economic and societal risks, like manias and crashes in the stock market. Hedge 
fund investments contribute to the bubbles (e.g., inflated stock market prices) that lead to 
financial crises. 
 
METHODS 
This dissertation has two central aims: 1) to understand why the “one percent” remains a 
bastion of male domination, and 2) to examine how an ideology of masculinity 
legitimizes and facilitates income inequality among the top one-percent. Following the 
model of previous research on elites (Harrington 2016; Khan 2011; Rivera 2015b), I use 
qualitative methods to study the inner workings of how firms distribute resources, 
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rewards, and opportunities. While quantitative data can identify the changing size and 
composition of elites, qualitative methods are better suited to understand how elite 
structures are reproduced in everyday life. Quantitative research clearly demonstrates that 
top earners are predominantly white and male, while qualitative research illuminates how 
and why white men dominate the one percent. In-depth interviews and field observations 
provide insight into the everyday practices and processes that produce social inequality.  
I conducted in-depth interviews with 45 hedge fund workers and field 
observations at over 30 workplaces and industry events, ranging from 1.5 hours to 3 days, 
over a 4-year period. Qualitative data collection began with preliminary research in the 
summer of 2013 and follow-up research from August 2014 to April 2016. I collected data 
in Texas and New York. I selected Texas and New York as sites to conduct fieldwork 
because of their significance in the industry. Over one-third of all global hedge fund 
assets are managed in New York, making it the capital of the hedge fund world. I selected 
Texas as a second site to ensure my findings are not particular to the Northeast and 
because Texas is a major industry hub with over 200 firms.   
The interviews provide a general account of the individual’s professional 
experience and trajectory as a means to investigate how work is gendered, racialized, and 
classed among high earners in the new economy. Qualitative methods are best suited to 
address this aim, as they provide insight into the cultural meanings, ideals, and discourses 
that people employ to make sense of their experiences (Orbuch 1997; Pugh 2013). 
Michèle Lamont and Ann Swidler (2014:153) identify how people’s accounts of their 
lives illustrate how “the construction of social categories, boundaries, and status 
hierarchies organize human experience,” which demonstrates how an ideology of 
masculinity rationalizes inequality.  
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Interview questions concerned the following topics: career paths, workplace 
culture and organization, and general industry practices. Respondents detailed their 
educational background, employment history, internal promotions, firm transitions, firm 
organization, social relationships, current job responsibilities, work schedule, and 
professional aspirations.  
I recruited respondents via the mailing lists, conferences, and networking events 
of professional associations; industry forums on LinkedIn; and snowball sampling 
techniques. Snowball sampling involves recruiting through established relationships with 
respondents, which is helpful for reaching hard-to-access populations who may not 
respond to other recruiting strategies (Lofland et al. 2005). It facilitated contact with 
respondents who were unresponsive to other recruiting techniques.  
These recruitment techniques provided a diverse sample of respondents (see 
appendix). The sample has a balanced number of men (n = 23) and women (n = 22). I 
oversampled women and minority men to collect comprehensive data reflecting a diverse 
range of experiences. The sample features thirty-three respondents who are white. Thirty-
eight respondents were U.S. born, and eleven are either first- or second-generation 
immigrants. The sample also includes two non-U.S. nationals who live and work abroad. 
Twenty-four respondents are over forty years old. Thirty-three have more than a decade 
of industry experience, of which fourteen have tenures of over twenty years. Respondents 
have been employed in the industry for a minimum of three years, except two, who had 
recently launched funds based on professional experience in fields related to their 
strategies. A majority of the sample manages investments or works with investors in the 
“front office,” while six have support positions in what is called the “back office.” The 
latter mostly work in operations, accounting, and administrative positions. Respondents 
reflect a range of firm sizes, types, and strategies, from large investment banks to single-
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employee firms. Considerable breadth in terms of experiences in the industry is captured 
by this sample’s diversity in gender, race/ethnicity, nationality, age, experience, and job 
function. 
To be considered for the study, prospective respondents were asked whether they 
were currently or previously employed at a “hedge fund.” Within the industry, what 
constitutes a “hedge fund” is open for debate, a topic of discussion that often arose in my 
field observation and interviews. This is because a traditional hedging strategy refers to a 
type of investment that hedges risk. Today, however, hedge funds employ a range of 
strategies. The S.E.C. defines a hedge fund as a limited partnership that pools money 
from high-net-worth investors to invest in stocks, real estate, land, currencies, or virtually 
any other investment (S.E.C. 2012). Because of this distinction, I allowed people to self-
identify as currently working or having worked at a hedge fund. Then, before our 
interview, I conducted online research to verify their employment history and firm type. 
When necessary, I searched the S.E.C. to verify the firm type.  
Interviews were conducted in person or over the phone, were audio-recorded, and 
lasted between one and three hours. The respondent selected the location, which included 
cafes, homes, or offices. For respondents located outside of New York and Texas, I 
conducted interviews over the phone, a common mode for meetings in this industry.  
Immediately after the interview, I wrote field notes that detailed the person’s 
appearance, mannerisms, demeanor, and tone. I also included details on our interactions 
before and after the interview as well as described the context of the interview. Finally, I 
reflected on my initial response to the interview, including details about the wording of 
questions, the relevance of emerging themes, and the need for elaboration or follow up in 
future interviews.  
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Characteristic  Number 
Age   
     20-29 6 
     30-39 15 
     40-49 16 
     50-59 7 
     60-69 1 
Education    
     Doctorate 9 
     Masters  13 
     Bachelors 23 
Gender    
     Women  22 
     Men 23 
Race/Ethnicity   
     Other/Multiracial 1 
     Middle Eastern American 1 
     Black/African American 2 
     Hispanic/Latina/o 4 
     Asian American 5 
     White 32 
Role   
     Investments 24 
     Sales  15 
     Support 6 
Tenure    
     Less than 10 years 12 
     11-20 years 19 
     More than 20 years 14 
Table 1: Respondents’ Characteristics. 
Field observations are necessary to gain a deep understanding of informal norms 
and practices. I first acquired knowledge of and access to hedge funds through three years 
of professional experience conducting industry research for a large investment firm. 
Returning to the field with a sociologist’s perspective provided fresh insights on a rapidly 
changing industry. By acquiring a nuanced understanding of the industry’s social world, I 
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was able to contextualize data from interviews and surveys. I conducted fieldwork at 
industry social events like conferences, investor panels, and networking functions. 
Opportunities to take field observations also arose during interviews. For example, 10 
respondents allowed me to observe the social organization and physical environment at 
their workplaces.  
All transcripts and field notes were coded and analyzed following an inductive 
approach (Charmaz 2006). Coding began with identifying fragmentary data to 
characterize and label analytical themes. Next, I implemented a series of focused coding 
to further investigate theoretically significant themes (Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 2011). 
Primary themes initially emerged around professional goals, training, self-presentation, 
reputation, motivation, building relationships, compensation, career planning, and job 
transitions. From here, secondary themes concerned network closure, fraternal bonding, 
mentorship and apprenticeship, familial investor bases, and monetary flows among firms. 
To ensure anonymity, I assigned each respondent a pseudonym, removed all firm 
identifiers, and altered minor details like school names.  
 
OVERVIEW OF DISSERTATION 
This dissertation investigates how gender and race facilitate the concentration of 
economic resources among the working rich. Chapter 2 provides the historical context for 
how the financial sector has contributed to the recent boom in income and wealth 
inequality. Specifically, I examine the changing context of masculinity on Wall Street: 
from the community-banking model of the 1950s and 1960s to the investment-banking 
era of the 1980s and 1990s. I contextualize the proliferation of hedge funds within the 
rise of “shadow banking” in the early 2000s, which brought about a new masculinity on 
 
 
 
 
 
 28 
Wall Street that I call hedgemonic masculinity. Each era corresponds to different 
archetypes of masculinity. I argue that changing beliefs about masculinity rationalize the 
higher and higher incomes garnered in the financial services industry. 
 The next four chapters follow the narrative arc of a career in the hedge fund 
industry: getting in, moving up, reaching the top, and running a firm. Chapter 3 examines 
how people find opportunities to work at a hedge fund. I find that hiring committees 
vouch for new hires based on shared social networks and cultural capital, which more 
easily ensures and legitimizes the hiring of white men, while hindering the advancement 
of women and minority men. I call this phenomenon a “voucher for hedgemonic 
masculinity.” The prevalent discourse in the industry is a rags-to-riches story of upward 
class mobility; however, behind this discourse are accounts of the importance of elite 
networks, prestigious credentials, and family ties. I provide an overview of four primary 
tracks to the industry and how each is based on designations of “fit,” which is almost 
wholly determined by gender, race, and class. 
In Chapter 4, I examine how people advance in the hedge fund industry and 
update the masculine worker ideal to account for work transformation in the 21st century. 
On Wall Street, work transformation has shaped cultural values, norms, identity, social 
capital, and compensation. Gendered cultural ideals for elite finance workers include 
expressing a passion for the work, upholding norms for professional risk-taking, 
identifying as a portfolio worker, demonstrating a sense of loyalty to personal networks, 
and partaking in a compensation schema that reflects a risky wager between an employer 
and employee. I argue that these workers manage their careers like an asset. While this 
ideal worker schema appears gender neutral, it reflects a set of discourses that reinforce 
an ideology of hedgemonic masculinity and legitimize the underlying system of 
patrimonialism that organizes the industry.  
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Chapter 5 examines the necessary condition for someone to launch their own 
hedge funds, allowing them to reach the “top” of their careers. I find that hedge fund 
managers express a goal of achieving financial security. Opportunities arise from 
personal ties to wealthy investors, a manager at a previous employer who provides the 
training and funding, and financial distress at one’s previous employer. I argue that 
gender structures access to these opportunities.  
Chapter 6 examines how hedge fund managers organize their firms. I apply Joan 
Acker’s (1990) theory of gendered organizations to understand the implications of 
transformations in corporate governance for gender inequality in a so-called flat 
organization, i.e., one with little management and bureaucracy. I examine how the 
organizational logic of “flat” firms contributes to the construction and legitimization of 
gender hierarchies in five ways: through the streamlined “nexus of contracts,” the 
standard division of labor, the dominant ideologies, the performance evaluation norms, 
and the trust-based networks. 
 
CONCLUSION  
In this dissertation, I identify the processes through which an ideology of masculinity 
legitimizes the dominant relationships among white men and the uneven distribution of 
opportunities and rewards in this industry. While gender and race structure social ties 
among white men, they simultaneously contribute to the exclusion of women and 
minority men. The theory of patrimonialism provides a framework for understanding how 
gender and race are part of industry-wide mechanisms that account for the role of 
financial elites in rising income and wealth inequality. I argue that gender and race, 
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factors largely omitted from the existing research on rising income and wealth inequality, 
are crucial for understanding dynamics among the working rich.  
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Chapter 2: From Financial Steward to Flash Boy 
Masculinity refers to the social ideals and expectations for men in a particular context. 
Gender scholars identify how masculinity confers status and privileges to certain men, 
which helps to explain why gender inequality persists (Carrigan, Connell, and Lee 1985; 
Connell 2005; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; Cooper 2000; Messner 2007).  
Hegemonic masculinity refers to a social organization that asserts, upholds, and 
legitimizes the dominate position of certain men in society (Connell 2005). Raewyn 
Connell introduced the concept to capture “the configuration of gender practice which 
embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of legitimacy of patriarchy, which 
guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination 
of women” (p. 77). The theory identifies how masculinity and femininity are varied, 
contextual, and relational, rather than fixed constructs. Hegemonic masculinity refers to 
both ideal types—the cultural ideals for masculinity in a particular context—as well as to 
how gender hierarchies are formed through various forms of masculinity and femininity. 
In this chapter, I trace three eras of change in the financial sector and the 
corresponding hegemonic ideology of masculinity. I begin in the era following World 
War II when community banks dominated the financial sector. In this era the ideal for 
masculinity was the community banker as financial steward: A figure whose local 
knowledge guided investments in small business and home ownership. Then I examine 
the rise of investment banking in the early 1980s and 1990s. During this era, the shrewd 
investment banker who made corporations “lean and mean” was the archetype of 
masculinity. Finally, I investigate the current era and the rise of shadow banks, which 
have brought an ideology of hedgemonic masculinity. Each era of masculinity 
corresponds to a different ideology that rationalizes the increasing incomes. 
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  Community Banking Investment Banking Shadow Banking 
 Scale Local Global  Global 
 Persona  Financial Steward Master of the Universe Flash Boy 
Movie It's a Wonderful Life Wall Street The Big Short 
 
Method Commercial &  
Home Loans 
Junk Bonds &  
Leveraged Buyouts 
Derivatives &  
Electronic Trading 
Table 2: Three Eras of Masculinity in Finance. 
 
COMMUNITY BANKING: 1945-1979  
Community banking reigned during the era of “shared prosperity” following World War 
II. In this model of banking, community banks, rather than large retail and commercial 
banks, took deposits and gave loans to local businesses and consumers in exchange for a 
transaction fee and interest-rate charge. Laws prohibited banks from establishing 
branches in other states, so community banks were small relative to the retail banks of 
today. Instead of targeting large customer bases, these banks catered to the local 
community’s needs, as interpreted by bank managers and loan officers.  
The community banker was the archetype for masculinity in finance during the 
post-war era: A financial steward committed to preserving what he believes is the local 
community’s social and economic wellbeing. As C. Wright Mills (1956) detailed in The 
Power Elite, men from the old upper-class oversaw the banks, while those with upper-
class aspirations worked as high-level “operations” men of the banks. These upper-class 
men controlled access to credit based on their idea of how to best cultivate economic 
growth in local neighborhoods and business communities. The hegemonic masculinity of 
the era upheld upper-class men’s monopoly as credit lenders, casting them as prudent 
stewards of capital.   
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This community banker ideal for masculinity in finance is captured in the 1946 
classic movie It’s a Wonderful Life, whose widespread critical acclaim and popular 
reception speaks to its lasting cultural resonance. The protagonist, George Bailey, inherits 
his family’s building and loan company—a depository financial firm designed to provide 
residential mortgages and promote home ownership. Feeling overburdened from his 
responsibilities to his family and community, Bailey attempts suicide after the local bank-
owner, the greedy Henry Potter, absconds with a deposit large enough to bankrupt 
Bailey’s lending company. A guardian angel shows Bailey the potential aftermath of his 
death: His hometown becomes overrun by predatory lending and corruption. After 
realizing his role in providing valuable credit necessary for the community’s wellbeing, 
Bailey prays to return to life and his prayers are answered. The film highlights the central 
figure of the community bank and banker in providing loans to deserving small 
businesses and prospective homeowners.  
The preeminent role of men as gatekeepers in the community-banking model is 
accounted for in Raewyn Connell’s (1987) classic book Gender and Power. According to 
Connell, gender inequality persists through men’s dominant position in the labor market, 
in the government, and in the heterosexual nuclear family. Connell identifies the role of 
creditworthiness in delineating social value in a capitalist economy, which renders 
women in a subordinate economic position because they are less likely to be deemed 
credit-worthy by lenders. Men’s command over community banking contributed to the 
prevailing gendered division of labor of the time.  
A credit-fueled suburban lifestyle organized the gendered division of household 
labor in the post-war era. Lenders privileged heterosexual families who upheld a 
breadwinner/homemaker model, in which a father performed wage labor outside the 
home and the mother performed unpaid labor within the home. These middle-class 
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households, primarily white families, became homeowners through loans subsidized by 
the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) and the Veteran’s Association (VA). Consumer 
debt also grew tremendously during this era: In 1958, only 27 banks offered credit cards, 
but by 1967 1,500 banks serviced an estimated 11-13 million active accounts (Trumbull 
2012).  
This gendered division of labor, however, was largely restricted to white families, 
both due to job discrimination and to discriminatory lending practices that denied access 
to credit for families of color (Hyman 2012). During the post-war era, the FHA and VA 
insured home loans to make them more affordable and accessible to white Americans, yet 
systematically denied insurance for mortgages held by people of color and other 
borrowers in neighborhoods dominated by racial/ethnic minorities (Katznelson 2005). 
For example, racial and ethnic minorities held less than 100 of the 67,000 G.I. insured 
mortgages in New York and New Jersey. Despite efforts to combat and prohibit 
discriminatory lending—spearheaded by the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People (NAACP)—banks continued to frame minority neighborhoods as a 
risky investment, even though the wealth of black homeowners and the value of their 
homes increased during this period (Hyman 2012).  
In the community-banking era, local bankers extended access to credit in the form 
of auto, home, and small business loans to meet the needs of the community; however, 
access to credit was organized to uphold a class, gender, and racial order. Members of the 
upper class controlled who was deemed creditworthy—white male heads of 
households—and who was not: women and minority men. Thus, the distribution of credit 
maintained the social organization of the local community. The era’s configuration of 
hegemonic masculinity naturalized the financial steward’s elevated status and monopoly 
over lending. While the financial steward model of masculinity reflected a value in the 
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local community’s interests, the investment bankers of the 1980s and 1990s understood 
themselves as acting on behalf of the stock market itself. 
 
INVESTMENT BANKING: 1980-1999  
In the late 1970s and 1980s, a series of policy reforms deregulated the financial sector 
and opened up global capital markets. This gave way to the rise of investment banking. 
After restrictions on interstate branch banking were removed, community banks dwindled 
and were replaced by national retail and commercial banks (Amel and Jacowski 1989). 
Investment banking surged with a new ideology of “shareholder value” (Ho 2009), a 
model of corporate governance that prioritized maximizing shareholder dividends rather 
than product development (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000). Aggressive investment 
practices like junk-bond sales, leveraged buyouts, and hostile takeovers became 
emblematic of the ethically dubious, emerging frontiers of finance. Meanwhile, becoming 
rich by making scrappy transactions on the crowded floors of the stock market turned 
traders into legends (Zaloom 2006). As the stock market grew during the “bull markets” 
of the 1980s and 90s, investment bankers and traders alike interpreted this growth as 
proof that their efforts to correct market inefficiencies worked (Ho 2009).  
During this era, new reigning ideals for masculinity appeared in the media icons 
of the macho trader and the savvy investment banker (McDowell 1997). Investment 
bankers became the “Masters of the Universe,” a term coined by Tom Wolfe in his 1987 
satiric novel, Bonfire of the Vanities. Wolfe used the title to describe young men driven 
by greed to make millions by investing in junk bonds and leveraged buyouts. Investment 
bankers of the era mastered the stock market by being bold and aggressive. The “Masters 
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of the Universe” archetype reinforces masculine cultural ideals that value greed, 
ambition, and risk-taking.  
The limitations of greed and ambition are explored in the 1987 Hollywood hit 
Wall Street, which follows the opportunistic young stockbroker Bud Fox. Fox is hired 
and mentored by his hero, the wealthy Gordon Gekko who is a “corporate raider” 
performing hostile takeovers of companies. He buys a majority of stock in a company to 
gain voting rights and then puts pressure on executives to sell business units and lay off 
employees to increase the share price. Gekko trains the impressionable Fox to engage in 
illegal insider trading and run companies into the ground. Gekko famously says, “Greed 
is good,” which justifies any measure necessary to make money. But when Gekko targets 
the company where Fox’s own father works as an aircraft mechanic and heads the labor 
union, Fox realizes that Gekko’s behavior is unethical. But it is too late: Fox is arrested 
for insider trading and helps the authorities collect evidence to convict Gekko. Fox and 
Gekko represent the downfall of Wall Street’s “Masters of the Universe,” a consequence 
of greedy and risky behavior.  
The “Masters of the Universe” archetype for masculinity captures the prevailing 
gender and racial order in financial services of the 1990s and early 2000s (Bielby 2012; 
Madden 2012; Turco 2010). Aggressive workplaces like the trading floor and the 
investment bank privilege men and penalize women who struggle to uphold norms for 
masculinity and are held to different standards when they do (Levin 2001; Roth 2006b; 
Zaloom 2006). Louise Roth (2006) identifies how women in finance are expected to both 
conform to norms for masculinity and follow cultural ideals for femininity. Racial/ethnic 
minority men who comply with industry norms for masculinity risk being perceived as 
too aggressive, threatening, or unethical (Jett and Chartrand 1999; Wingfield 2010). 
Meanwhile, networks dominated by white men tend to exclude women and minority men 
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(McGuire 2000, 2002). The “Master of the Universe” icon of masculinity naturalizes the 
white-male domination of this industry, as men are cast as better suited to make cutthroat 
deals.  
The investment-banking era’s implications for social inequality extend beyond the 
financial sector. The shift in corporate governance from retaining and reinvesting 
earnings to downsizing labor, flattening organizations, and redistributing corporate 
profits to shareholders had grave implications for stability for workers throughout the 
economy (Fligstein and Shin 2007; Kalleberg 2011; Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000). To 
increase profits, financial investors have pressured firms to downsize, de-unionize, and 
outsource and computerize jobs (Jung 2015). These measures subsequently increased 
managerial positions and earnings (Goldstein 2012). Rather than cutting costs (Fligstein 
and Shin 2007), maximizing shareholder value redistributed earnings from workers to 
executives (Boyer 2005; Shin 2014). The rise of the investment-banking model of finance 
restructured firms and resulted in less negotiating power, fewer protections, and more 
instability for workers.  
In sum, in the investment-banking era, investment bankers acquired the status of 
“Masters of the Universe” who conquer the stock market by being ambitious, aggressive, 
and bold. This era of masculinity featured distinct obstacles for women and minority men 
in the financial services industry. The implications of this era of masculinity extend 
beyond workplaces in finance: The rise of a shareholder value ideology has degraded the 
conditions of American workers throughout the labor market. While this ideology 
continues to reign on Wall Street, the archetype for masculinity has changed over the past 
20 years, as a result of growth in the hedge fund industry.  
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SHADOW BANKING: 2000-PRESENT  
At the turn of the 21st century, the culminating effects of deregulation, globalization, and 
financial innovation led to the rise of the shadow-banking industry, and with it a new icon 
of masculinity. Shadow banks refer to credit intermediaries that feature less regulation 
relative to traditional banks.5 Hedge fund, venture capital, and private equity firms are all 
examples of shadow banks. Shadow banks are the regulatory “black box” of finance. 
Although regulation of their activities increased with the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010, they still receive less oversight than 
their counterparts at the “too big to fail” investment banks.  
Shadow banks have proliferated over the past 30 years at the expense of the 
traditional banking sector. Shadow banking grew from less than 4 percent of the total 
U.S. business sector in 1974 to as much as 37 percent in 2013 (Antill et al. 2014). 
Shadow banks increased their assets under management worldwide from $26 trillion in 
the early 2000s to $80 trillion in 2014 (A.A.K. 2016). In the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis, government regulations and interventions in the failing investment banks 
led investors to transfer funds to this less-regulated sector of the financial services 
industry (IMF 2014). While shadow banking remains small relative to traditional 
banking, it captures the fastest growing parts of finance. It also presents potentially 
significant risks to the economy’s wellbeing, because of the opacity of shadow banks’ 
activities (International Monetary Fund 2014).   
Growth in shadow banking is perhaps a sign of a retreat from bureaucratic 
institutions and a shift towards smaller firms funded through trust-based networks. 
                                                
5 Investment manager Paul McCulley first introduced the term “shadow bank” in 2007 to describe 
investment vehicles that allowed banks to engage in risky activities that do not appear on their balance 
sheets (A.A.K. 2016). Today, regulators require investment banks to include these vehicles on their balance 
sheets; yet, the term shadow bank still refers to less-regulated affiliates of investment banks. It also refers to 
other firms that provide lending services yet receive less regulation. 
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Charles Tilly (2001) predicted the return of networks of trust as the fabric of enterprise in 
late-stage financial capitalism. To guard against risk and uncertainty, people place trust in 
strong forms of social organization, such as familial, religious, and ethnic communities. 
Highly uncertain environments, like financial crashes and crises, lead trust networks to 
close off and restrict social exchange (Cook 2005). In an era of repeated financial crises 
(Harvey 2011), investors may lose trust in large financial institutions and instead build 
local networks that provide a sense of stability. Thus, recent growth in the shadow-
banking industry suggests a retreat from bureaucratic institutions as investors lost 
confidence in the “too big to fail” financial institutions. Shadow banks capture a 
movement towards less formal firms driven by networks of trust.  
A hedgemonic masculinity has emerged in the shadow-banking era. Hedgemonic 
masculinity is my term that refers to the dominant ideology, discourses, and practices that 
justify men’s power in the hedge fund industry. This ideology reflects a set of ideals for 
men to uphold anti-bureaucratic ideology, entrepreneurship, and risky investments in a 
turbulent market. This configuration of masculinity captures how the founders of hedge 
funds, private equity, and venture capital firms establish organizations that are stripped of 
layers of bureaucracy and management to protect the executive’s autonomy and 
privileges. With less regulation, transparency, and bureaucracy than their counterparts at 
investment banks, the founders of these firms wall themselves off—like garden hedges—
from institutional oversight and shield themselves from the risks of a turbulent market. 
Hedging investment strategies are designed to minimize risk and increase profit from the 
stock market even during market downturns. Thus, hedgemonic masculinity reflects a 
logic of social, professional, and economic risk management. 
Hedgemonic masculinity privileges networks of trust and loyalty, as these social 
ties provide certainty in an uncertain world. The leading ideals captured by hedgemonic 
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masculinity reflect the importance of networks of trust in an environment of heightened 
risk. Considerable research documents how trust is a crucial component of relationships 
within financial services, particularly between lenders and creditors, because of the 
uncertainty and risks involved in investing (Lapavitsas 2006). The concept of 
hedgemonic masculinity provides the link between a modern financial sector emblematic 
of an advanced industrial economy and the existence of a system of patronage 
reminiscent of a by-gone era.  
The 2015 blockbuster hit and Oscar best-picture nominated The Big Short 
captures the dominant ideology driving hedgemonic masculinity. The movie—based on 
Michael Lewis’ (2011) bestselling book—portrays three hedge fund managers who 
predicted the bubble in the home-mortgage industry and made billions short-selling the 
investment banks who invested in collateralized debt obligations (securities of pooled and 
repackaged assets like home loans). The heroes of this story are not the suave, attractive 
bankers of previous eras; instead, the protagonists are socially awkward, eccentric 
nonconformists who fight a rigged system. The movie reflects an anti-bureaucratic 
ideology pervasive in the industry. This ideology casts the big banks and the government 
as warranting suspicion and distrust. Investments, rather than regulatory and legal 
interventions, are understood as the tools for correcting wrongdoing in the system.   
The shadow-banking era features the end of Tom Wolfe’s “Masters of the 
Universe” and the rise of the “Flash Boys,” a term coined by Michael Lewis (2014) in his 
recent book on high frequency trading, a type of high-speed algorithmic trading. 
Electronic trading has exponentially increased the speed of trade execution and has 
outpaced the trading floor of the 1980s and 1990s in terms of size and number of trades 
(Zaloom 2006). Whereas before traders had to execute trades verbally in person or on the 
phone; today, computer trading programs run electronic trades in a fraction of a second.  
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The Flash Boys is a reference to the “Flash Crash” of 2010 when a single trader, 
operating out of his parents’ home in London, drove a 1,000-point stock market crash in 
36 minutes (Bowley 2010). Technical factors overwhelmed the circuit breakers designed 
to halt rapid price drops in the stock market and, instead, exacerbated the plunge, which 
resulted in $1 trillion in losses, the steepest one-day fall on record (Rooney 2010). Thus, 
Flash Boys are lone, tech-savvy operators who can move the market in a matter of 
seconds.6 
This new era of hedgemonic masculinity reflected in the archetype of the Flash 
Boys is the topic of this dissertation. It is no longer the investment banks, but rather 
actors in the alternative, shadow-banking sector that provide a key to understanding why 
white men dominate the “winners” of widening income and wealth inequality. The value 
placed on independent thinking and trust-based networks rationalizes the increasingly 
high incomes.  
 
CONCLUSION  
Alongside transformations in the U.S. financial sector, a shift in the meaning of 
masculinity has occurred. The new masculinity is a response to the increasing 
complexity, uncertainty, and risk posed by modern financial markets. Hedgemonic 
masculinity reflects an ideal for independent thinking that enables someone to outsmart a 
turbulent market. Meanwhile, this ideology also values networks of trust and loyalty, as 
these stronger forms of social capital provide a sense of certainty. While the ideals for 
independent thinking and trust-based networks seem contradictory, these are both 
responses to an environment of elevated risk and uncertainty.  
                                                
6 The trader responsible for the crash was later convicted of financial fraud and market manipulation 
(Anderson 2015). 
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The next four chapters follow the path of a career in the hedge fund industry: 
getting in, moving up, reaching the top, and the aftermath. I investigate how the social 
organization that creates hedgemonic masculinity places value in trust and loyalty, which 
helps to explain why people gain access to this highly lucrative part of finance. I 
demonstrate how hedgemonic masculinity naturalizes the desired characteristics 
associated with masculinity and the relationships that form among elite men, which 
legitimizes their domination of the industry. This creates an environment that allows elite 
men to demand high incomes. 
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Chapter 3: The Voucher for Hedgemonic Masculinity  
Despite a widespread belief in meritocracy, hiring practices at elite investment firms 
discriminate on the basis of gender, race, and class (Gorman 2005; Rivera 2015b). Lauren 
Rivera (Rivera 2015b) finds that top-tier investment banks, consulting agencies, and law 
firms predominantly base hiring decisions for entry-level positions on perceptions of 
cultural fit, which is a euphemism for social class. Rivera concludes that gender and race 
are secondary, largely tied to social class status. Yet a substantial body of experimental 
research documents how gender and racial stereotypes penalize women, especially 
mothers, and minority men in the hiring process (Benard and Correll 2010; Correll, 
Benard, and Paik 2007; Gorman 2005; Pager, Bonikowski, and Western 2009).  
While this research has significant findings about discrimination in the candidate 
selection and interview processes, it largely focuses on bias at the firm level, which limits 
our understanding of how hiring takes place within the context of a specific industry’s 
labor market. In this chapter, I examine how and why people gain access to a job in a 
particular labor market: the hedge fund industry. The dominant discourse in the industry 
is a rags-to-riches story of upward class mobility; however, behind this tale are accounts 
of the importance of elite networks, prestigious credentials, and family ties.  
I find that social and cultural capital more easily secure access for white men 
while hindering the advancement of women and minority men. I call this dynamic a 
voucher for hedgemonic masculinity, because gatekeepers at firms vouch for new hires 
based on shared social networks and cultural capital. This hedges the risks involved in 
hiring someone perceived as an “unknown,” i.e., without personal connections. 
Hedgemonic masculinity is upheld through hiring practices, which construct social 
boundaries around who does and does not gain access to the industry. Access is granted 
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to women who comply with the norms of hedgemonic masculinity without compromising 
normative femininity.  
In this chapter, I start by exploring the motivations people have for entering the 
hedge fund industry, which captures both common discourses and beliefs about 
masculinity held by people who work in the industry. Next, I document how people are 
hired at a hedge fund, focusing on the processes that simultaneously include and exclude 
people on the basis of gender, race, and class. Then I examine the leading “founding 
myth” discourse in the industry about upward mobility and then compare it with the paths 
people recount taking to the industry. Specifically, I detail four common paths taken to 
hedge funds: the social circle track, the finance track, the academic track, and the trading 
track. 
 
MOTIVATIONS: AN ABILITY TO MOVE MARKETS 
The motivations that led people to join the hedge fund industry reflect ideals for 
hedgemonic masculinity in the financialized new economy. The people I interviewed 
described hedge fund managers as mavericks with a passion for innovative investing and 
a talent for influencing the direction of world markets. The meaning of masculinity in 
finance is no longer about the icons of the wise financier or the scrappy trader 
(McDowell 1997). Instead, the icon of hedgemonic masculinity is the intellectual who 
has eschewed the rules of the establishment and operates on his own terms. Men and 
women alike reproduce discourses about autonomy, intelligence, and innovation that 
uphold an ideology of hedgemonic masculinity. This archetype legitimizes and valorizes 
the practice of starting a hedge fund, which grants less oversight and accountability than 
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in other firms. It also allows hedge fund managers to construct boundaries around who 
gains access to the immense wealth accumulated in this industry.  
  “I knew they were the cowboys, I knew they were the smart ones,” Cynthia7 
recalled, explaining what cultivated her interest in working at a hedge fund. Cynthia is a 
white woman who entered the financial services industry in the 1970s. During her 
experience, first in investment banking and then later in public relations, Cynthia had 
hedge fund clients and “knew how they operated.” Hedge fund managers had developed a 
reputation for being independent, daring, and perhaps even reckless, which appealed to 
Cynthia. Her account captures how the industry has become known as the anti-
establishment segment of finance, where people go to flee bureaucratic banks, corporate 
politics, and overbearing managers. While Cynthia called hedge fund managers cowboys, 
others referred to them as mavericks, nonconformists, or flash boys. These terms reflect 
the leading discourse about hedge fund managers being independent, anti-establishment, 
and even contrarian, which upholds an ideology of hedgemonic masculinity. 
When Cynthia’s friend Bert, who was launching a hedge fund, asked her to join 
his team, she had a positive image of the inner workings and high-status reputation of the 
industry. She recalled how Bert said to her, “It’s just crazy how much money you are 
going to be making. Come and be with me.” Cynthia acknowledged how the money 
added to the allure and prestige of the industry. She explained, “I knew he was at a hedge 
fund that was making all this money. It was an industry that I knew about, and I looked at 
them as the best: really smart, making a lot of money, really wired, and very polite . . . 
The hedge fund industry, that’s what so great about it.” The descriptors Cynthia used to 
describe hedge fund managers—smart, wealthy, wired, and polite—reflect the ideals for 
                                                
7 All first names are pseudonyms and school and firm names are changed or anonymized to ensure privacy.  
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hedgemonic masculinity and suggest an association of class respectability, which is 
fitting for an industry that began by managing the money of wealthy individuals and 
families. For workers in the industry, the prospects for upward mobility and elite status 
are part of the appeal. 
 Others told me that they were motivated by the opportunity to outperform the 
wealthy elite. For example, Vincent, who is a white man in his late 40s, explained how he 
stood out at his first job out of law school: 
Everybody went to Harvard. I went locally to Rutgers. It’s a good school, but I 
certainly stood out. And I just didn’t think it was the path for me. That wasn’t 
anybody else’s doing. It was just me being a savvy street kid from New York 
saying, “If you can’t beat ‘em, you join ‘em, when they won’t let you join ‘em, 
you beat ‘em.” And so I made the switch from law to trading at an investment 
bank, and just rose. 
Vincent felt excluded from the elite networks of his colleagues in law, which motivated 
him to outperform them in a more lucrative career path. Vincent believed that he could 
not achieve the ideals for elite masculinity in law so he changed career paths to reclaim it.  
Margaret, a 30 year-old Asian American investment analyst, described her 
decision to move over to the hedge fund industry from investment banking as a rational 
choice for advancing in her career, the product of weighing her likes and dislikes. 
However, latent in her account is a story about the prestige and reputation of the industry. 
This became clearer when I asked her to describe how working at an investment bank 
differs from working at a hedge fund. She responded, “The caliber of people that are 
hired, and it is very correlated to compensation, hired by a hedge fund.” Margaret then 
paused and said, “They look for something different. It’s a combination of both very raw 
ambition but also a certain amount of creativity that comes from specifically loving 
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public markets.” Margaret described the people who work in hedge funds as being more 
highly motivated, more creative, and more passionate about investing than in investment 
banking.  
Margaret later recalled how a sense of influence and immediacy of world 
financial markets appealed to her:  
The beautiful thing about being able to invest in the public markets is that 
everything that happens in the world impacts what you do, and you get to invest 
in everything that happens in the world . . . those things require you to really be 
on at all times, and the only way you can do that successfully is if you actually 
really like it, or else it would be horrible. And so that’s the type of person [hedge 
funds] look for. I think that’s what really defines a hedge fund and why it is that it 
can do so well, because you do have a tremendous amount of very intelligent 
people who are looking to grow that number [the bottom line]. 
Activity in world financial markets never ends. This made Margaret feel engaged with 
world events. It also gave her a sense of significance, purpose, and progress in a way that 
is identifiable and measurable in the fund’s rate of return.  
In her ethnography of investment banking, Karen Ho (2009) identifies how a 
culture of smartness and self-importance permeates investment banking and draws 
graduates of elite universities to the industry. Margaret echoes this culture in her account, 
but also demonstrates how the culture of alternative financial services like hedge funds 
differs: For her, drive, creativity, and passion sets them apart. According to Margaret, 
intelligence is not enough, because Wall Street is brimming with highly-educated elites. 
From her point of reference as an Ivy League graduate, being smart and having a 
prestigious degree does not differentiate her from her peers. What sets apart people in 
hedge funds, according to this mindset, is their ability to innovate and invest with a 
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macro perspective of world markets. The hedge fund is understood as the ivory tower of 
finance, because it has enough money to “move markets”—change the price of stocks, 
bonds, and currencies in stock markets around the world. While Ho’s investment bankers 
understood themselves as making firms and therefore markets more efficient, hedge fund 
workers view themselves as influencing major current events and economic progress 
worldwide.  
 
THE HIRING PROCESS 
The people I interviewed recounted lengthy job search and application processes. For 
example, June, an Asian American woman with 10 years of experience with investment 
analysis, recounted how she submitted over 200 applications to find her last job. Others 
confirmed that her experience is the norm in this industry. Several stressed how it was 
always better to apply for a job when you already had one. Those who had been laid off 
or quit generally described longer job searches and less appealing prospects.  
Once a person’s resume rises to the top of the large stack of applications, he or 
she may be invited for a series of interviews. The people I interviewed recounted 
participating in processes of inclusion and exclusion that were framed as a simple 
designation of “fit.” While other research identifies how this discourse of fit is a 
euphemism for social class (Rivera 2015b), I find that it also contains implicit meanings 
about gender and race. First I examine how this discourse of fit reinforces inclusion based 
on homophily: the tendency for similar people to associate (Smith, McPherson, and 
Smith-Lovin 2014). Then I investigate how “fit” becomes a cover for more overt forms 
of discrimination at work.  
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Inclusion: The Chemistry Aspect  
The people I interviewed described the interview process as primarily concerned with 
whether or not the person is a “good fit.” In general, people recounted the interview 
process in gender, class and race neutral terms: Interviews are a time for both the 
employer and prospective employee to determine if the position is a good fit. Several 
defined this as whether or not someone “clicked,” while another explained it as 
“chemistry.”  
Former hedge fund manager, Vincent now advises hedge fund clients at a large 
investment bank. He assumed an advisory role after selling his firm that he successfully 
ran for over a decade. Vincent recounted his advice to clients about hiring:  
In smaller firms, I always tell my clients when they’re hiring, and people who are 
looking to get a job with one of my clients, the hiring decision at a hedge fund is 
very much a people decision, like there’s a chemistry aspect to it. There’s a 
connection between the interviewer and the interviewee, which goes something 
like, “I could work with that person everyday. I’m going to spend a lot of time—
probably more time than I spend with my wife—so I need to be able to get along 
with that person.” 
Vincent stressed the importance of chemistry in hiring because of the long hours at hedge 
funds and close working environment at small firms. Vincent’s account supports the 
previous research on hiring at elite firms that identifies how cultural homophily guides 
hiring decisions (Rivera 2015b). Homophily preferences enable workers to get in the 
door at a firm and are key to understanding how future colleagues build trust. While 
homophily provides the basis to bind relationships in contexts of uncertainty, like hiring, 
it also forecloses opportunities to people who are perceived as being different. 
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In probing the idea of “good fit,” interviewees provided insight into how hiring is 
gendered and racialized. For example, Nicole, a white investment analyst in her mid-20s, 
was hired as the only woman on an 80-person investment team. Nicole described a time 
when she had to strongly advocate for a woman candidate: “I knew that she would be 
pretty heavily penalized in fit for, you know, being different.” Being a woman counters 
the norm for hiring men at Nicole’s firm, which makes women stand out and appear not 
to “fit.”  
In contrast, Nicole recounted how men routinely endorse other men but it is 
naturalized and framed in terms of fit. She explained: 
In recruiting, I have to push so hard to get a woman ranked in the top five, 
because what happens is they ask around the room, “Does anyone know these 
guys?” [my emphasis] We’ll rank them 1-10 and one of the big factors is if 
anyone knows about these guys from college, because it’s all on-campus 
recruiting. And the guys are like, “Yeah, he was on the same sports team I was on. 
I’m sure he’s a good guy.” It’s like even if they don’t know them personally, 
they’ll still vouch for them as part of their extended social network. But if the 
girls are on different sports teams or don’t have as much friend overlap, nobody 
will vouch for them. I used an incredible amount of political capital to get the one 
intern in.  
Nicole noted how college social networks and extracurricular activities like sports teams 
are gender specific, and racially and class coded, as the target colleges are predominantly 
white and higher income (Hayes 2014; Karabel 2006). Even if the hiring committee 
members have no formal experience with the candidate, men vouch for other men in 
alumni, fraternity, and sports networks, which are used as a proxy for merit. This voucher 
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for hedgemonic masculinity reveals how evaluations of merit in hiring processes are 
gendered, racialized, and classed.  
 At Nicole’s firm, this voucher is then confirmed through an interactional process, 
in which the interviewer and interviewee talk informally about their interests and leisure 
activities. Nicole described how this 30-minute interview penalizes applicants who had 
less common ground with the interviewer:  
It’s just about what do you do on the weekends? What sports do you play? Who 
are your friends? What do they like to do? Things like that. And the problem is, 
I’ve actually been on the phone for a lot of these, and the ones that work the best 
are the guys that come in and say, “I played football or lacrosse or soccer,” and 
someone else in the office will be like, “Me too! Do you know so and so?” And 
they’ll just talk about their mutual friends from college for a half an hour. The 
people who don’t have that point of reference flounder, because it’s really hard to 
build a conversation that’s built around the interviewer where it’s like, “What do 
you like to do on the weekends?” “Oh, I like to run.” And the interviewer’s 
response is, “Oh, I don’t think we have any other runners here.”  
Nicole explained how a “good fit” is evaluated based on shared social and cultural 
experiences. These shared experiences may be based on gender-typed sports, racially-
segregated activities, and class-structured access to elite universities or prep schools.  
Nicole continued to describe the importance of background: “the other thing is 
where people are from and where they went to high school, specifically.” Nicole’s firm is 
dominated by people who grew up in upper middle class communities in the northeast, 
attended elite high schools, and graduated from prestigious universities. Having grown up 
in a middle-class family in the rural Midwest, Nicole believed that her employment was 
contingent on her degree from an elite university.  
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In addition to her pedigree, Nicole recalled how she was hired as part of an effort 
to increase diversity:  
[The only] other female analyst was transitioning out of the group to a marketing 
position, so the managing director of the group at the time went to her and said, 
“Take over recruiting. We need to hire women.” The group was 60 or 70 guys at 
the time, so I was hired to be the first women and to start this push into hiring a 
more diverse class. 
The other woman moved from the investment team to the marketing team when she got 
married. According to Nicole, it was assumed that she would start having children and 
needed a job that would allow her to fulfill her responsibilities as a mother.  
Hiring and recruiting processes open or preclude access to job opportunities, 
rewards, and resources based on who is determined to be a “good fit,” which was also 
referred to as chemistry. A voucher for hedgemonic masculinity reflects a sense of trust 
that confers additional capital to white men with elite credentials, and gives them priority 
in hiring decisions. After someone has established membership in the industry, they no 
longer need this voucher. Instead, membership enables them to dictate the terms of their 
employment, as described to me by one hedge fund manager who sold his firm, retired, 
and then returned on his own terms. Tenured workers then extend a voucher for new 
hires, which obscures the preference for hiring white men and renders it as the result of 
networks, credentials, and cultural fit. 
 
Exclusion: Not A “Good Mix” 
Cultural, gender, and racial homophily does not fully account for who gains access to 
elite firms like those in the hedge fund industry. Although few people were willing to 
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give specific details out of concern for damaging their reputation in the industry, several 
examples of hiring processes featuring outright discrimination and exclusion on the basis 
of gender did emerge. When I began fieldwork, Paul Tudor Jones, the billionaire founder 
of longstanding Tudor Investment Corporation, incited controversy when he spoke on a 
panel of top hedge fund managers. He expressed his reservations about a woman’s 
prospect as a trader, because he perceived women to be distracted by having a family:  
Every single investment idea . . . every desire to understand what is going to make 
this go up or go down is going to be overwhelmed by the most beautiful 
experience . . . which a man will never share, about a mode of connection 
between that mother and that baby. And I’ve just seen it happen over and over 
(Johnson 2013). 
According to Jones, motherhood prevents a woman from being a successful employee. 
For this reason, he argued, “You will never see as many great women investors or traders 
as men—period, end of story. And the reason why is not because they are not capable. 
They are very capable” (Johnson 2013). 
In several interviews following the event, people referenced Paul Tudor Jones’ 
comments as evidence of persistent biases against women. During my interview with 
Karen, a white investment professional with over 20 years of industry experience, she 
exclaimed in frustration that Jones’ sexist comments validated discriminatory practices in 
other firms. Karen, like other people I spoke with, cited hedge fund managers they knew 
who never hire women on principle. She said, “If you’re a hedge fund, and it’s your 
company, you can do whatever you please.” Because the industry is small and reputation-
based, women have few options to pursue recourse for discrimination. Several women 
mentioned how filing discrimination charges against a prospective, current, or previous 
employer would be a career-ending move, as it would ruin their reputation. According to 
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Karen, hedge fund managers have considerable discretion over whom they hire, fire, and 
mentor, which allows women few opportunities as traders or fund managers.  
When I probed Karen to elaborate on how this mentality influenced her own 
career, she recounted one time when this impacted her directly:  
I was running a book, and one of the big clients was up for grabs, somebody had 
left to go to [firm name deleted]. And I was next in line to really get this client. 
And one of the guys who also covered the client went to my boss and said, “They 
don’t like women. And they don’t particularly like Jews, so I don’t think you 
should give them blah blah blah.” And so my boss comes up to me and says I 
don’t think you should cover them. I don’t think it’s a good mix. 
Karen’s account demonstrates how homophily is directly tied to discrimination. When 
people are matched on the basis of gender, race/ethnicity, or class, discriminatory views 
and stereotyping are at work. Although she does not describe the hiring process, Karen’s 
account of client assignments clearly depicts how what might be framed as more overtly 
sexist and racist becomes translated into fit: “I don’t think it’s a good mix.” In other 
instances in my interviews, these same practices arise yet are framed in neutral terms, like 
a “good fit.” 
Women and minority men recount blocked opportunities when firm leadership 
gave preference to a familial or other personal connection when hiring or promoting. 
Fund managers may justify excluding women from employment with the belief that 
motherhood prevents women from fulfilling responsibilities in a demanding job as a 
trader or fund manager. Managers face few pressures to change their discriminatory ways 
in firms too small to have human resources or diversity personnel. By exercising 
unbridled discretion over personnel decisions, especially hiring and mentoring, managers 
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reinforce an ideology of hedgemonic masculinity that legitimizes an environment lacking 
scrutiny or repercussions for unethical treatment of personnel.  
 
PATHS TO A HEDGE FUND 
Vincent switched from his professional accent to one straight off the streets of Long 
Island, “So I’m a poor kid from a tough neighborhood in New York, and I put myself 
through college and law school working full time jobs, packing trucks for UPS.” At some 
point during law school, he “got broke.” Vincent recalled, “I had no money left and I 
couldn’t handle any more loans. And I landed a job with a firm that paid for school, so I 
completed my law school at night and graduated while trading bonds here in New York.” 
Vincent’s account reflects a common narrative in the hedge fund world: Raised in a poor 
or middle class background in New York or the Midwest, he described how hard work, 
perseverance, and a little luck led him to riches at a hedge fund.  
Joseph, a well-known personality in the industry, echoed this narrative when he 
was asked at a conference about how he deals with failure. When I observed him during a 
“Fireside Chat”—an interview on sofa chairs in front of an audience at a professional 
conference—Joseph recounted how he grew up in a middle class neighborhood in an 
outer borough of New York City. His father, a construction worker, funded his 
undergraduate education at New York University. After completing a degree from Yale 
Law School, Joseph landed an interview for a job in the investment banking division at 
an elite financial firm. He recalled how he “wore a 100 percent polyester suit and shirt, 
black narrow tie—all polyester to the point of flammability.” The audience at the 
conference laughed loudly.  
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Later, he explained, the job interviewer pulled him aside and told him to buy a 
nice suit and tie, a marker of a “good fit.” Joseph recalled, “I was completely mortified, 
because I thought I looked fantastic.” He still got the job, but was fired 18 months later. 
“At the time, I was like a walking junk bond,” Joseph quipped to more laughter from the 
audience.   
Then Joseph spent the $11,000 he received in severance to buy a designer suit. He 
applied for a sales position at the same elite firm that had just fired him. He was hired 
again, earmarked as an internal transfer, and worked there until he had raised enough 
money to launch his own hedge fund, only seven years later. Dressing for the part, Joseph 
explained, helped him to embody the person he wanted to become. He concluded the 
story by saying, “There will be moments of great despair, but it will work out if you are 
on a path with a purpose.”  
Joseph and Vincent described the hedge fund industry as a meritocracy. Hedge 
funds tend to be small and highly competitive: My interviewees tended to work at firms 
with 5 to 25 workers.8 These firms feature fewer protections for workers than their 
counterparts at large banks. According to the people who work in the industry, this 
environment levels the playing field, promotes meritocracy, and allows for a free market 
approach to employment. They also described how without networking, finding a new 
job takes months and hundreds of applications.   
However, people rarely get in to this industry on merit alone. While Joseph and 
Vincent echo a common industry discourse, in practice, few people I interviewed follow 
                                                
8 When I asked hedge fund workers about the size of their firms, they nearly always responded by citing 
the assets under management rather than the number of employees. When I refer to small, midsize, and 
large hedge funds, I refer to the following designations of size: a small hedge fund has less than $100 
million in assets under management (AUM), a midsize hedge fund has anywhere from $100 to less than 
$1.5 billion in AUM, and a large hedge fund has an AUM of over $1.5 billion. These definitions are based 
on the industry consensus in publications from Grant Thornton, Preqin, and Citigroup. 
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the path of a self-starter. With only two exceptions, my interviewees had prestigious 
undergraduate degrees and half had completed postgraduate education. In addition to 
these credentials, people relied on financial support from family or a firm to get started in 
this business. For example, Vincent’s graduate degree was partially funded by an 
investment bank and Joseph’s father, a blue-collar worker, put him through school. While 
the people I interviewed spoke of their dedication and hard work to account for how they 
got into hedge funds, their accounts often included a time when friends, family, or 
previous colleagues open the door at a firm. In a context where elite pedigrees outnumber 
elite jobs, preference in hiring is often given to someone with a direct social or familial 
tie to the firm, which is understood as a strong indicator that someone will be a “good 
fit.” 
A key to the social organization of this industry lies in the four major paths people 
follow to the hedge fund industry. All four tracks appear to be meritocratic, yet it requires 
considerable social and cultural capital to take advantage of these tracks. This capital is 
needed to pass the test of whether the candidate is a “good fit.” To get on these tracks, a 
person needs social capital in the form of elite social networks and cultural capital in the 
form of an elite or graduate degree. Initially, these requirements appear most directly 
associated with social class; however, a closer examination demonstrates how complying 
with hedgemonic masculinity is a third criteria that legitimizes and naturalizes access to 
this high-paying industry.  
The four tracks are not mutually exclusive. In the first track, the social circle 
track, a person finds an opportunity to work at a hedge fund through a personal or 
professional connection. In the next track, a person enters financial services through an 
internship and then training program at a major investment bank. People who start out as 
a trader on the stock market floor and then develop the expertise and record necessary to 
 
 
 
 
 
 58 
locate a job at a hedge fund enter through the third track, which I call the trading track. 
Finally, in the academic track, the fourth track, the person starts off in other fields like 
academia or law, often with degrees from elite universities.  
 
The Social Circle Track  
The most reliable route to secure a job is through gatekeepers located in one’s personal 
networks. Gatekeepers arise from affiliations with prestigious schools, wealthy families, 
and elite firms. After working at large investment firms for 20 years, Cynthia transitioned 
to the hedge fund industry in the 1990s. The opportunity arose at a dinner party when a 
friend recruited her to work at his fund. Cynthia emphasized how her entrance into the 
industry was also facilitated by her knowledge of it through both professional and 
personal affiliations: “on a personal level, I knew a lot of hedge fund managers. So Bert 
who is [hedge fund name deleted], one of my best friends was his first wife’s sister.” 
Cynthia’s personal and professional circles overlapped with the industry, which 
familiarized her with hedge fund culture and provided her with social connections to the 
industry. This social and cultural capital made her a “good fit.” In her account, Cynthia 
demonstrates how a hedge fund is associated primarily with the founder who manages the 
investment portfolio: “Bert who is [hedge fund name].” A hedge fund manager’s identity 
is also tied to his or her firm. 
Stressing how hard it was to get into the industry, Cynthia recounted the 
importance of having personal connections and an established reputation to get a job:  
Everything was based on your reputation. And everybody else [was] trying to get 
in. You really had to know somebody . . . And you really had to know the people. 
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It was the old fashioned way of doing business, where your word is your bond. 
And to me, that is just so important. It is the basis of any relationship.  
According to Cynthia, having a strong reputation and sense of integrity is the foundation 
of business relationships and access to social capital in the industry, a feature reminiscent 
of an unspecified nostalgic time in the past. Social connections, reputations, and integrity 
are all markers of trustworthiness, an integral part of doing business in an industry with 
high risks and high rewards. Cynthia’s case is not an exception: Most interviewees 
located hiring opportunities through alumni networks, college friends, familial 
connections, or previous colleagues. 
Another interviewee, Jeffrey who is a white man in his 50s, described trust and 
integrity as central to doing business with wealthy elites. Reflecting on building 
relationships in the industry, he said:  
In the end, people are looking for someone they can trust . . . You don’t need to 
get into the minutiae [of the investment strategy] . . . Over time I started to 
understand the validity to that, especially when you are dealing with wealthy 
families. A person who I can trust is actually going to look out for my best 
interest, and I think that’s where a lot of the money management business falls 
short and may be pronounced in the hedge fund industry because the stakes are so 
high. 
Jeffrey’s account demonstrates how a “good fit” is determined on a sense of trust. 
Trustworthiness is often based on shared a social positions, like gender and race 
(Gambetta and Hamill 2005; S. S. Smith 2010). 
Jeffrey then listed four characteristics that he looks for in people: Integrity, 
strategy, skill, and focus. He struggled to define integrity and said, “I know integrity is a 
pretty liberally used term. People say they have integrity but they don’t have integrity.” 
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Next, he reflected on how his lengthy experience allowed him to differentiate between 
“those people who are actually looking out for the client’s best interest most of the time” 
versus those who prioritize their own interests first. Jeffrey’s account demonstrates how 
perceptions of trust and integrity stem from a sense that both parties’ interests align. 
Identifying with one another—which is based on shared social categories—facilitates this 
recognition of aligned interests.  
Jennifer further illuminates how social ties facilitate this sense of trust. Jennifer is 
a white woman who located her first job at a hedge fund in the late 1990s through a good 
friend who was married to a hedge fund manager. Jennifer recounted the reasons why her 
friend’s husband hired her:  
He really liked me. We were personal friends. He had seen things that I had 
written and we were buddies and so he felt that I had the right mix of financial 
industry experience as well as the personality and skills to be a hedge fund 
marketing person . . . my communication, relationship-building skills, which is 
really what I am strongest at. 
Jennifer identified how interpersonal, communication, and relationship-building skills are 
desirable attributes for marketing personnel. A marketing job at a hedge fund primarily 
involves investor relations. The skills valued for these client-facing positions are not only 
gender coded—likeable personality, communication, and relationships—they are also 
markers of social class status, which is why a hedge fund manager might search for 
someone within his or her social circle. Jennifer’s account demonstrates how perceptions 
of fit are dependent on social class and gender status.  
For workers who entered the industry through their broader social circle, as 
opposed to former colleagues, I observed a gendered pattern: Women were often 
recruited to investor relations positions, while men tended to enter jobs on the investment 
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side. For example, Cynthia entered finance in the early 1980s as a stockbroker. She was 
the first woman to become a Vice President at a top-tier investment bank. Cynthia had 
extensive experience in financial analysis, yet her friend recruited her to work in client 
services, a position more commonly held by women. Jennifer’s account provides insight 
into why this happens. In social settings, people may be more prone to recognize a 
woman for her relationship skills rather than her technical expertise.  
In contrast, Andrew, a white man in his late 30s who is a lawyer by training, was 
recruited to the investment side of the business. “I lucked into the industry,” explained 
Andrew. After finishing law school, he came across this opportunity, “I was at a 
wedding, and a woman that I know, her husband was a headhunter who was looking for 
people at a distressed prop [proprietary trading] desk at [top-tier investment bank name 
deleted].” Within four years, Andrew transitioned to a job at a hedge fund. Andrew was 
lucky: He was at the right place at the right time. However, his “lucky” opportunity is 
only available to people who have access to elite networks. Unlike Cynthia and Jennifer 
who had experience in finance, Andrew was recruited to work in distressed trading, 
position more often associated with technical expertise in the industry.  
Matthew, a black man with nearly 20 years of trading experience, is from a 
wealthy background with elite credentials: He attended an exclusive boarding school and 
graduated from Cornell University. After a college internship at a top investment bank, 
he was hired to participate in a two-year training program. Matthew followed a common 
pathway to a career in asset management; however, a personal connection expedited his 
entrance into the hedge fund side of financial services.  
Matthew became frustrated with racism at the investment bank, after a white 
colleague accused him of being arrogant and aggressive, which he attributed to the 
perceived incongruity of being a black man from an elite background. Then one day he 
 
 
 
 
 
 62 
ran into the student president of his boarding school and his father, a wealthy man in the 
process of launching a hedge fund to invest his own money. Matthew explained how this 
provided an opportunity that he described as a combination of chance and his elite 
privilege: 
At 24, I was miserable working for [firm name deleted] on the muni-bond desk. I 
was walking on the street and I bumped into the guy who had been the president 
of my high school. He was with his dad, and he said, “Hey, what are you doing?” 
“Ah, well, I work here and I don’t really like it.” And by chance, and this was 
totally by chance, the dad was like, “I’d like to interview you. We’re starting a 
hedge fund.” . . . “Why don’t you come in and talk to me?” So I come in and I 
talk to him and he offers me a job that day trading convertible arbitrage. So 
there’s an example [of privilege]. I didn’t get that for anything except that I went 
to a high school with that guy. For me to deny that is ridiculous. But I think that a 
lot of people who sit in some of these seats, they don’t even think about that 
because it’s just a total function of how the world works for them. 
Matthew described how this elite social connection opened up an opportunity for him to 
move from investment banking to the hedge fund industry, a more lucrative area of 
financial services. He stressed how his experience was not unique, but rather an example 
of a common path to advancement in this industry. Matthew identified how most people 
within these elite circles do not recognize how opportunities are a product of their 
backgrounds, as these forms of privilege become normalized. Throughout our interview, 
he frequently acknowledged how class privilege operates in this industry. This is perhaps 
a product of his cognizance of how race and ethnicity also shapes his own experiences 
(examined further in Chapter 6).  
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As the examples of Cynthia, Jennifer, and Matthew demonstrate, social networks 
influence who gains access to potentially lucrative and powerful positions in the industry. 
The networks are dominated by white men, which may make it difficult for minority men 
and women to find job opportunities and mentorship. Cynthia, Jennifer, and Matthew 
gained access because they complied with and upheld other norms for hedgemonic 
masculinity, like an elite and well-networked social position. 
In contrast, Sasha, a black woman and first generation immigrant raised in a 
working class family, recounted struggling to build networks in this industry. She said, “I 
didn’t get here because of my networks. I’m from Jamaica. My parents’ networks aren’t 
going to help me here.” Instead, she entered the industry as an accountant in the back 
office, a less prestigious and lower paying department.  
Generally, I found Sasha’s experience to be the exception to the rule:  
Employment at hedge funds often requires workers to locate jobs through social 
connections. Family networks, college friends, and religious communities open, or 
preclude, access to hedge fund employment. For those with high-class privilege—from 
their families, elites pedigrees, or professional circles—these opportunities are perceived 
as natural or normal. However, personal connections appear to sort men and women into 
different roles in the industry based on perceived “fit:” financial analysis and investor 
relations, respectively. Meanwhile, workers lacking these connections perceived them as 
a primary barrier to their advancement. The next section follows the investment-banking 
track, in which the job facilitates access to high-status networks. 
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The Investment Banking Track 
Margaret sat across from me in the conference room of her firm’s office on the Upper 
East Side of Manhattan. She graduated with a degree from Yale University in 2008 at the 
height of the financial crisis. When I asked about her training for the industry, she 
replied: 
My educational background had nothing to do with what I am doing now. I 
studied linguistics and cognitive neuroscience. So absolutely nothing related. The 
natural tracks for those are either academia, which didn’t appeal to me, and 
working for the CIA, which also didn’t appeal to me, and so I tried to sort of do a 
little bit of career exploration and a little bit of soul searching and ended up 
finding a very good number of very smart people that I respected that were going 
into this industry. 
Margaret found the leading career paths for her degrees unappealing. Her smart peers 
were pursuing investment banking, so she decided to test out the industry by applying to 
a summer internship at an investment bank. She was accepted and followed a common 
pathway to the financial services industry for elite graduates (Ho 2009). She excelled and 
the firm hired her after graduation to conduct research on mergers and acquisitions.  
Like others on the investment-banking track, Margaret’s pedigree is more highly 
valued to firms than the training she received in college. Because she graduated with a 
degree from a highly regarded university, Margaret was presumed to possess the 
intelligence and analytical skills to learn on the job, which makes her a “good fit.” Others 
who have degrees in finance frequently returned to school to get an MBA. But highly 
specialized training in finance is not an explicit requirement, at least not for those with an 
elite degree. People emphasized that firms prefer employees whose credentials appeal to 
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prospective investors in promotional materials, implying that a degree from an Ivy 
League school is more valuable in terms of fit than formal training in financial modeling.  
During her year as an analyst in investment banking, Margaret worked 
exceedingly long hours. At times, she slept on a sofa in the lobby, a typical rite of 
passage for entry-level analysts. Since she majored in an unrelated discipline, Margaret 
learned everything on the job. She recalled, “It’s not rocket science, but it is challenging.” 
She described investment banking as the training program for Wall Street. 
Margaret also noticed more women working in entry-level positions, which she 
attributed to recent diversity initiatives. She emphasized, however, that the numbers were 
still male-dominated in her unit and were noticeably more so in higher-level positions. 
Margaret recalled how the dynamic among younger workers differed from those who 
were more senior: 
My immediate boss was six years older than me, and when you are dealing with 
that demographic, it is a lot more familiar and a lot more open to having an equal 
mix of men and women. It’s not until you start talking to very senior people that 
there became an odd dynamic, a tangible difference in being a woman versus 
being not. 
Margaret explained how during college and this first job, she was “very much somebody 
who was not aware of the gender dynamic.” She noticed few women among senior 
professionals at the investment bank; however, she said that she did not recognize how 
gender shaped her own experience until she moved to the hedge fund industry, a marker 
of advancing in her career. Margaret identified a phenomenon well-established by gender 
scholars where women in finance and related field are sorted out, or “opt out,” as they 
move along in their careers (Blair-Loy 1999; Roth 2006b; Stone 2008).  
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 Three months into her job in investment banking, Margaret started receiving calls 
from “every headhunter in all of New York City,” competing with one another to hire 
analysts for other sectors of financial services. Headhunters are a common gateway to the 
hedge fund industry for people who start in investment banking. Investment banks have a 
steep, pyramid structure, so there are limited opportunities for upward mobility (Ho 
2009). Margaret explained how “the most obvious options are private equity and hedge 
funds, in terms of where to funnel your skill-set to post-investment banking.” Margaret 
found hedge funds most appealing: 
For me it was a fairly easy choice. I mean there were certain things about 
investment banking that I know I didn’t like, which was like process, 
presentations, etc. But I did like the analysis. I did like the due diligence. And so 
for me that stratification is the very clear difference between P.E. (private equity) 
and hedge funds, and so it was a very natural choice. 
Margaret described the process as obvious and natural, referring to how the skillsets 
matched and how she liked the work.  
 After a year, Margaret responded to the headhunters’ calls and took a job at a 
hedge fund startup. Reflecting back on the hiring process, Margaret emphasized again the 
importance of liking what she identified as detail-oriented and all-consuming work:   
Whenever you walk into a hedge fund interview for a job, the most important 
thing that you can demonstrate is that you genuinely like looking at securities, and 
that is absolutely critical, because this is not a job where you can get up and walk 
away and call it a day. It is always, always happening. 
In this instance, Margaret used the word “like” to describe financial analysis. At other 
times during our interview, she used the word “love.” This was consistent with my other 
interviewees in similar job functions.  
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Margaret, and other women, embraced this industry discourse of liking, even 
loving, financial analysis. Yet, some people attributed the low numbers of women in the 
industry to a lack of interest in finance shared by women. It was assumed that women 
were less likely to feel passionate about financial analysis. Although the discourse of 
liking or loving finance appears gender neutral, I learned that it reflects a gendered 
discourse about professional interests. Despite these assumptions, men and women alike 
on the investment side of the business upheld this discourse and expressed a sense of 
excitement for investing.  
Overall, the diversity initiatives at investment banks made this a more appealing 
track for women to enter the hedge fund industry. Margaret, however, believed that the 
recruiting process creates unique obstacles for women. She stressed how younger women 
are often disadvantaged due to their interactions with headhunters, whose job is to 
evaluate the candidate for fit:  
Recruiters are not your friends—not a friend of the candidate, anyway. Recruiters 
are interesting creatures because they always appear in the form of young, 20-
something year-old girls who look just like you across the table and who are fun 
and they sit there and they interview you and you think that they are your friend, 
so you tell them everything. You’re like, “Oh, I don’t like this part of my job. I 
hate this part of my job.” And then, they write that all down, and you realize at 
some point that their interests are not aligned with yours. Their goal is to filter out 
as many candidates as possible and pick out the best batch for the people who do 
pay them, which is the firms. I think a lot of young people fall into the trap of 
seeing somebody who looks like them across the table, spilling their guts, and 
then getting dinged for the fact that they just told them a bunch of things that are 
negatives. They get filtered out.  
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Margaret thought that trusting the recruiter could penalize women applicants, especially 
younger women. As Margaret warned, openness with a recruiter does not benefit the 
candidate but can instead expose negatives that may lower her chances of getting the job.  
Margaret’s account is important for two reasons. First, she shared what she 
believed to be important advice to prospective women candidates, exposing how women 
must comply with hedgemonic masculinity. She distanced herself from normative 
femininity in this context, which is associated with “spilling their guts” and gossiping. 
Regardless of whether women actually engage in these behaviors, her account reveals 
common assumptions about femininity, which is defined in opposition to the hedgemonic 
ideals for masculinity. Margaret stressed how it is important to instead express a sense of 
excitement for the work itself. The underlying message is to develop a savvy approach to 
the hiring process, which involves reinforcing hedgemonic masculinity by rejecting 
normative femininity.  
Second, Margaret’s account provides insight into how hiring processes may 
disadvantage women. Other women also expressed skepticism about joining a firm that 
used recruiters. For example, Melissa, a white woman in her late 20s, works in a sales 
position in the hedge fund unit at an investment bank. She is actively searching for a job 
at a small hedge fund. A recruiter contacted her about several positions that match her 
interests, but the manager at one hedge fund had a reputation for being difficult and 
aggressive. Because of this, Melissa grew to distrust hedge fund managers who use 
recruiters and interpreted it as a sign of underlying problems, like a negative culture or 
bad management. She preferred to find a job through a social connection, because she 
could gain a better sense of the firm’s prospects and culture, i.e., whether it is a “good 
fit.” Other people mentioned how locating opportunities through these avenues might 
 
 
 
 
 
 69 
make the applicant appear needy and less trustworthy, because it implies the person is 
ineffective at building social networks.  
Other people I interviewed described how the close networks people form as they 
undergo training at prestigious universities and highly regarded investment banks can 
build social ties that provide access to more reliable jobs than those provided by 
headhunters. While prospective investment analysts pursue technical training in financial 
research, modeling, and sales first at an elite university and then at introductory training 
programs at the leading investment banks, they form networks through group social 
bonding rituals and long working hours. Several people I spoke with described how the 
networks were like tribes or fraternities, a clue to how gender and race shape who is 
included or excluded. Once a person has access to the social group, it provides 
connections through mutual colleagues and friends to people who have advanced from 
investment banking to hedge funds.  
Since entry-level investment banking programs have a higher proportion of 
women relative to hedge funds, the investment-banking track appears to be a more 
common starting point for women to enter the hedge fund industry. Yet, the women I 
interviewed did not recount locating opportunities at hedge funds through the networks 
they built in investment banking. For those lacking access to these networks or to 
personal connections to the industry, independent headhunters provide an alternative 
entry point for accessing jobs at hedge funds. However, these gatekeepers may place 
women at a disadvantage as they begin their careers in the hedge fund industry. Margaret 
believed that since recruiters at headhunting firms were disproportionately young women, 
women candidates were placed at a disadvantage because they are more likely to 
approach one another as peers. Similarly, Melissa assumed that headhunters signal a 
poorly functioning firm. While investment banking may in theory open up more doors for 
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women, it may start them off on an unequal footing, especially relative to candidates who 
have personal connections to the industry.  
 
The Trading Track 
Manny is a second generation Dominican American who grew up on Long Island. After 
graduating from a small liberal arts school in the Northeast, he was working for his 
parents when he ran into a family friend. In reference to his job, she asked him, 
“Wouldn’t you rather be on Wall Street?” He responded, “Yeah, of course I’d rather be 
on Wall Street, but I don’t know anybody there. I didn’t go to Stanford. I have a lot of 
minuses, so I figured I could work my way up.” She promised to get him onto Wall Street 
the next day.  
 The woman’s daughter worked in a training program at what was then called the 
American Stock Exchange (now called the New York Stock Exchange). The following 
day, Manny met with the head of the firm, who took his resume, barely looked at it, and 
then quickly scanned to the bottom. He noticed that Manny played rugby in college. 
“Really? You played rugby for four years and didn’t kill yourself?” he said, gesturing to 
Manny’s small stature. After talking about rugby for 30 minutes, the boss invited him to 
start work two hours later. Manny recalled, “The next day I was a clerk on the American 
Stock Exchange floor.” Rugby served as a signal to the head of the firm that Manny was 
a “good fit.” He could hold his own on the trading floor, which requires someone who is 
strong, agile, and daring. The interaction between the interviewer and Manny reinforces 
the norms for masculinity on the trading floor, which features repertoires for handling 
pressure, getting physical, and being aggressive (Levin 2001). 
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Manny’s starting salary in the early 1990s was $19,000 a year, which was half 
that of a competing offer that he received for a job at an insurance company. Despite the 
low pay and long commute, and to the dismay of his parents, Manny took the job with the 
short-term goal of becoming a trader in two years and the long-term plan of starting his 
own trading firm. Within six months, his gamble paid off: He was hired into a training 
program for traders. Before he completed that program, he took a job as a trader at a 
midsize firm. Like Vincent and Joseph, the opportunity to climb to the top of the class 
ladder motivated Manny.  
In 2010, after working a turbulent 15 years as a trader, Manny was recruited by a 
billion dollar hedge fund to work on a new portfolio in his area of expertise. At the time, 
Manny recalled, “I went to that firm feeling like I had made it to the mountain top.” He 
recounted how he settled into an office on the highest floor of a skyscraper in lower 
Manhattan. As he looked out at the Statue of Liberty, he thought, “I’m finally here.” He 
had a full salary and benefits for the first time in his career. As the son of middle-class 
immigrants, Manny reflects the rags-to-riches narrative of the trading floor as a 
meritocracy where anyone could succeed on Wall Street. 
Six months later, however, Manny was laid off. He explained how he was hired 
“to teach them how to play the game.” According to Manny, once he had taught them his 
specialized knowledge from nearly two decades of experience trading in that area, the 
firm replaced him with two junior men that were paid at a lower rate. Even though 
Manny reached the “mountain top,” he found that his expertise was easily replaceable. 
“Game over,” Manny said.  
Instead of continuing a risky career in trading, Manny accepted an offer from a 
friend for a job at a trading software company that provided the stability he felt he needed 
as a husband and father. While this career move represented a step backward in his 
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career, and a failure to comply with hedgemonic masculinity, it preserved his masculine 
status within his family as the breadwinner.  
Manny’s experience demonstrates the precarious nature of skill and expertise on 
Wall Street. It also captures the fragility of the status conferred by upholding the ideals 
for hedgemonic masculinity. Manny’s mastery and lengthy experience as a trader gained 
him access to an upper-level job at a top-tier hedge fund. Yet this knowledge was 
transferable. Without the cultural capital of a prestigious degree or the social capital of 
elite networks, Manny was easily replaced by less experienced traders. This reflects how 
an ideology of hedgemonic masculinity justifies the maintenance of boundaries around 
the upper echelons of finance. Manny’s career path also required that he take on 
considerable professional risk and financial instability. In his career as a trader, he 
worked at several unstable firms, including one that collapsed after the manager was 
charged with insider trading. This placed pressure on his family, which conflicted with 
his ability to provide as a breadwinner for his wife and children.  
Manny’s account reveals the demands of competing masculinities, especially for 
men who are not white or from an elite background. Without these additional status 
markers, Manny struggled to uphold the normative masculinity of the trading floor, the 
hedgemonic masculinity of the hedge fund world, and the breadwinner masculinity 
expected of him as a father: The masculinities reinforced in the financial sector require a 
high level of comfort with career turbulence and financial risk-taking, yet the normative 
masculinity associated with fatherhood required professional and financial stability.  
The trading track to the industry captures the masculine icon of the scrappy trader 
who earns riches through speed, dexterity, and aggression on the trading floor. This track 
is one of the few avenues through which working and middle class traders can enter the 
inner workings of Wall Street, albeit a fragile and tenuous entrance. Today, however, few 
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traders work on the stock exchange floor. When I toured the New York Mercantile 
Exchange, a commodities futures exchange, each pit had only a dozen traders at most. 
Twenty years ago the pits would have been packed with at least one hundred traders each. 
For the most part, industry insiders—including Manny—considered this path 
unachievable in the age of electronic markets when most traders are employed at 
investment banks. The paths of Manny and others reflect an ideal for masculinity of a 
bygone era.  
Yet, many insisted that the self-starter path was true in the early days of the 
industry, when “two guys and a Bloomberg”—the leading stock market analysis and 
electronic trading platform—could launch a hedge fund out of their garage. This story 
reflects a common origin myth. For example, Craig, who is a white man with over 15 
years of experience as a trader, explained how the industry used to be one where a “guy” 
who graduated from a state school could get a start on the floor of the New York Stock 
Exchange and make enough money to launch his own hedge fund. To Craig, this was 
what made the industry remarkable: “For every hotshot that gets written up in Trader 
Magazine, there are 10 guys who are walking in the street right now wearing khakis and 
street jeans, or at [hedge fund name deleted] t-shirts and shorts, who have 10 times as 
much money.” In the past, an average guy could make it rich on Wall Street, according to 
Craig. Today, he explained, it has become institutionalized and dominated by the 
graduates of elite universities. Craig, for one, has a Ph.D. in Molecular Biology from 
Stanford University. 
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The Academic Track 
While working as a post-doctoral fellow at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, a 
friend from high school recruited Craig for a job as a trader on Wall Street that paid six 
figures. At first, he declined the offer: “I said, ‘Thanks for thinking of me,’ but I had just 
gotten my doctorate and was making big money, you know $20,000 a year [he laughs].” 
When the friend explained how much money Craig would make, Craig reconsidered and 
moved to New York to become a trader on the New York Stock Exchange. He recalled: 
“I was a floor trader standing around in crowds waving my arms up and down yelling for 
contracts.” After five years, Craig transitioned to proprietary trading—when a firm 
manages its own money—and then to hedge funds. While Craig followed the same path 
as Manny, his degree from Stanford provided him with social and cultural capital, which 
may help to account for why he advanced in the industry while Manny’s career petered 
out.   
Craig and others with graduate degrees in non-finance fields emphasized that it 
was a shame that their skillsets would not be put to the betterment of society. For 
example, Anselm, a white Austrian with a doctorate in Physical Chemistry, lost his job at 
NASA when his department underwent funding cuts. Unsure of how his skills applied in 
industry, he sought advice from a friend in finance who convinced him that the 
mathematical tools he learned in graduate school would lend to a successful career in 
finance. When I met Anselm at a conference, he was raising money to launch his own 
hedge fund.  
“It’s a complete waste!” Arjun exclaimed with a smile as he described the value 
of having so many people with doctorates working in finance. Born in India, Arjun 
moved to the U.S. for college and earned a doctorate in Applied Math. He completed his 
dissertation on artificial intelligence in the early 1990s when “there was nothing to do 
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with it.” Arjun laughed as he said this, gesturing to how valuable it would be to society 
today.   
When I asked Albert how he became a hedge fund manager, he looked me 
straight in the eyes, smiled, and said, “failed academic.” Albert, a white British man with 
over 20 years of experience working in financial services, has a doctorate in Polymer 
Chemistry from Cambridge University. Like Craig above, Albert became “a little 
disillusioned about academia” while in a low-paying postdoctoral research position. He 
stressed how the departmental politics, career risk, and solitary work made it an 
unappealing path.  
A previous colleague who had pursued a career in finance advised Albert to 
consider changing career paths. As Albert recalled, “he said finance is every bit as 
analytically challenging as what you’re currently doing, which was eye-opening to me.” 
This led Albert to read up on the industry and learn about work as a trader:   
I started to read some books on finance, derivatives, and the like. A lot of the stuff 
in derivatives, Black Scholes,9 and option pricing, is frankly a heat diffusion 
equation except that they call the variables by different terms, and so I thought, 
well, finance is just undergrad physics. I can do this. And so with that very 
ignorant approach—not knowing anything more—I set up some interviews and 
the rest is history. 
Albert applied to nine jobs at investment banks. He interviewed for eight jobs and 
received all eight offers. Two were in different units of the most prestigious firm at the 
time. He selected one because of the opportunity for strong mentorship, which he again 
attributed to his ignorance at the time. The other offer was in a unit that would later break 
                                                
9 Black Scholes refers to a mathematical model of price variation over time. 
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off to be one of the most successful hedge funds of all time. In retrospect, Albert 
remarked, “I really, in reality, I chose the wrong job. If I had chosen the other career 
track, I would potentially have been far more successful financially.”  
 Yet, after more than 15 years at three different investment firms and locations 
across three continents, the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis afforded Albert the 
opportunity to spin off his current unit and start his own hedge fund. The difficulty of 
starting a firm in this environment was still creating challenges at the time of our 
interview seven years later. However, Albert’s staying power was perhaps indicative of 
the attractiveness of his pedigree—filled with elite universities and high-status 
investment banks—to potential investors, even 20 years out of school.  
 Like other people on the academic track, and Margaret on the investment-banking 
track, Albert’s elite credentials reinforced the norms for hedgemonic masculinity, served 
as evidence of fit, and gained him entrance into financial services. A doctorate, or for 
others a law degree, signifies the ability to acquire expertise and confers status more 
valuable than technical training. At hedge funds, the particularities of each fund’s 
strategy require that most training be done on the job. In fact, business schools rarely 
provide courses on hedge fund management, although more are becoming available as 
the industry’s reputation for high-incomes grows. This is indicative of how 
patrimonialism operates in this industry. People explained how firms favor workers who 
are perceived as highly intelligent and critical thinkers, because they will be more easily 
molded into the firm’s investment tradition. A high-status degree signals the desired 
characteristics of a “good fit:” The ability to learn on the job and be groomed into a 
firm’s practice. 
Men and women alike must adhere to the expectations for hedgemonic 
masculinity; however, men may be more convincing when they perform the scripts for 
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critical thinking. Margaret and other women found that when they asserted their ideas in 
investment meetings, it was not uncommon for them to receive less attention, or for a 
man to restate their ideas and gain recognition for them.   
The experiences of Craig, Anselm, Arjun, and Albert were more common among 
the people I interviewed than the bootstrapping narratives of Manny, Joseph, and 
Vincent. Yet, both reflect the prospects and limitations posed by the recent proliferation 
of hedge funds. For workers, the industry represents both the lucrative opportunities of a 
free market and the shortcomings of a society that fails to invest in fields that advance 
medical science, aerospace research, and artificial intelligence.  
These accounts are also revealing of how hedgemonic masculinity operates in this 
industry: The hedge fund manager as a scientific, market theorist is the new archetype of 
masculinity in finance. Previously, aggressive traders and wise financiers were the 
competing icons of finance masculinity (McDowell 1997). Today, mathematical wizards 
and anti-bureaucratic techies have replaced them as the leading icons of the industry, as 
examined in Chapter 2. These shifting icons of masculinity legitimize gender as an 
underlying social structure guiding access to rewards and opportunities. 
 
CONCLUSION 
While the dominant discourse of upward class mobility in the hedge fund industry 
reflects a self-starter ideology, the common tracks people take to enter the industry reveal 
the importance of elite networks and prestigious credentials. People take four common 
paths to working at hedge funds: the social circle track, the investment banking track, the 
trading track, and the academic track. The social circle track appears to be the most 
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common track and yet also the most difficult to access, especially for people without 
wealthy families or prestigious schools. 
The hiring and interview processes lead to the inclusion and exclusion of people 
on the basis of gender, race, and class. In contrast to previous research that foregrounds 
the role of social class status in hiring at elite firms, I find that cultural designations of a 
“good fit” are explicitly gendered and racialized. A voucher for hedgemonic masculinity 
privileges the social and cultural capital of high-status, white men. For women and men 
with less status, access to the industry is granted yet contingent upon them upholding and 
performing hedgemonic masculinity while also complying with competing masculinities 
and normative femininity. This makes employment for women and lower-status men 
more insecure and unpredictable.  
The tracks people take to the hedge fund industry and the hiring practices heavily 
rely on recruiting through social circles built around wealthy families, elite degrees, and 
high-status firms, which are framed in terms of fit. These social circles allow hedge fund 
managers to carefully select employees in ways that reinforce their own power and 
autonomy within their firms. The normative practices and beliefs that reinforce 
hedgemonic masculinity legitimize a social organization that bolsters the authority of the 
hedge fund manager relative to that of their workers, especially those who have lower-
status. In the next chapter, I examine how the norms for hedgemonic masculinity on the 
job encourage risk-taking and networking in ways that further afford status to white, 
upper class men.  
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Chapter 4: The Financialized Ideal Worker 
The masculine cultural ideal for white-collar workers has been well-documented by 
gender scholars (Acker 1990; Blair-Loy 2005; Williams 2001). This ideal evokes a man 
who is fully dedicated to his work and unfettered from responsibilities at home, which are 
presumed to be fulfilled by his wife (Acker 1990; Williams 2001). Joan Acker (1990) 
introduced the concept of the masculine ideal worker to identify how jobs, although 
seemingly gender-neutral, reflect a set of shared assumptions, meanings, and beliefs that 
are implicitly gendered.  
While Acker’s theory remains applicable today, the conditions for workers have 
transformed over the past 30 years. Since the 1970s, the financial sector’s increasing 
dominance in the U.S. economy has weakened job security and heightened inequality 
throughout the labor force (Davis 2009; Kalleberg 2011; Krippner 2005). Unlike the 
steady employment of the post-war era, organizations now feature ongoing restructuring, 
frequent downsizing, flexible scheduling, and flattening (DiMaggio 2001). Risks 
formerly held by employers have been transferred to workers (Hacker 2006), making 
work more precarious. Simultaneously, income inequality has widened as jobs have 
become more polarized (Piketty 2014): Middle class jobs and wages have disappeared, 
while elite workers have grown in numbers and pay (Autor and Dorn 2013).  
This chapter updates the masculine worker ideal to account for work 
transformation in the 21st century. I examine how cultural ideals for elite finance workers 
are gendered and racialized, arguing that the ideal worker in this industry is a 
financialized product that must be cultivated and capitalized. This ideal casts careers as 
assets that require ongoing investments in resources, development, and management. 
These cultural ideals reinforce the dominant ideology of hedgemonic masculinity that 
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legitimizes the position of white men in this industry. Underlying this ideology, 
patrimonialism institutionalizes the privileges enjoyed by white male workers while 
precluding access to others, predominantly women and minority men. In what follows, I 
show how the social organization of hedge funds influences how people advance in the 
industry. I first examine the organizational context by explaining the general social 
organization and working conditions at hedge funds. Then I examine how the cultural 
values, norms, identity, social capital, and compensation influence advancement in the 
industry. 
 
THE FINANCIALIZED IDEAL 
Midsize hedge funds feature a two-tier structure of partners and support staff, which 
provides few opportunities for internal advancement. Firms generally have one lead 
investment manager while the other partners cover non-investment functions, like legal, 
compliance, and client services. While the average number of employees at hedge funds 
has not been systematically studied, the people I interviewed work at firms with 5 to 25 
workers, with a handful of outliers that employed either one or two people—like the “two 
guys and a Bloomberg Terminal” cliché—or up to 300 employees. Although interviewees 
described the social organization of their firm as flat, they outline a two-tier, steep 
hierarchical structure that is bifurcated between partners and their support staff.  
In a context of considerable employee and firm turnover, hedge fund workers 
expressed a need to demonstrate their dedication by working long hours. For example, 
Margaret described how her 80-hour weeks at a hedge fund allowed for more free time 
than her previous job at an investment bank that demanded 120-hour weeks. Meanwhile, 
workers also prepare themselves for the risk that a firm collapses or downsizes. Thus, 
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hedge fund workers are simultaneously independent of the firm and committed to 
keeping it running. When hedge funds survive and this risk pays off, workers can gain 
tremendous benefits: status, autonomy, and wealth. But living with this insecurity also 
comes with expectations for performance, overwork, and risk-taking, all of which are 
exacerbated by advanced technology and global markets.    
Even among the most established firms, hedge funds are unstable since they 
respond to global market swings and are subject to abrupt shifts in investor confidence. 
For example, one woman I interviewed expressed a sense of security working at a large 
hedge fund that consistently posts some of the biggest returns in the industry. When I ran 
into her at an investor conference a year later, however, she had recently taken a new job 
after her previous firm encountered its first losses in 15 years. Her entire office had been 
laid off. Her former firm was one of many large hedge funds to scale back in 2015 due to 
downturns in global markets. And in the first quarter of 2016, investors withdrew nearly 
$15 billion from the hedge fund industry (Martin 2016).  
The instability of this industry fosters a working environment that is best captured 
by Scott, the chief executive officer of a midsize hedge fund with 15 employees. Scott, a 
white man in his 40s, described how global markets never stop. He explained, “We 
always see the sunrise when we start working because our trading day starts three hours 
earlier than New York’s. It actually never really ends anymore because we trade globally 
and there’s always a market on somewhere.” Although his firm had been in business for 
over 30 years, Scott said:  
You need to run your business as if you’re scared of it closing tomorrow, because 
ultimately it could. A market event could happen. Your investors could be 
spooked by another Great Recession and, for all you know, your clients are gone 
in 12 months. So you need to run your business scared a bit . . . It doesn’t matter 
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whether we’re talking about a multi-billion dollar investment bank or a small little 
mom and pop advisory service. As soon as you stop focusing on improving and 
enhancing, you’re done. So, yeah, you need to work hard. It’s too competitive 
otherwise, and markets change too quickly and too dramatically over time . . . It’s 
like a treadmill in a way, because as soon as I retire or I die or whatever happens 
to me, it’s not like markets are going to stop.  
Scott explained how regardless of what is going on his life, the markets continue, which 
requires his vigilant attention to prevent firm failure. A constant concern for potential 
failure allows Scott to keep up with heavy competition, market activity, and investor 
demands.    
Many of the insecure working conditions that hedge fund workers encounter are 
characteristic of white-collar work in the new economy (Kalleberg 2011; Pugh 2015; 
Williams et al. 2012). Hedge funds operate in response to market fluctuations, so workers 
prepare to repeatedly change jobs and firms. Even at more stable firms, the two-tiered 
organizational structure provides limited opportunities for promotion. Workers advance 
through external labor markets, requiring them to locate opportunities at other firms that 
offer higher status and pay. To access these opportunities, workers engage in networking 
and professional development to expand their skillsets and credentials. When firms 
downsize, workers may be hired as contractors, at times for a former employer who 
replaces salaried employees with contingent workers. In these cases, workers are highly 
paid, but also assume additional risks of employment as they operate as in-house 
contractors. 
In this environment, I find that workers apply the strategies they use to hedge risk 
in the market to manage risk in their own careers. Workers manage their careers like a 
financialized product that requires ongoing investment and cultivation, which fosters a 
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financialized cultural ideal for workers. This ideal, however, rests on the belief that both 
stock and labor markets are meritocratic and self-regulating forces. The financialized 
ideal obscures the patrimonial system that organizes the industry. Patrimonialism, rather 
than career management, facilitates access to the opportunities, resources, and rewards. 
As such, the financialized ideal is part of the ideology of hedgemonic masculinity that 
legitimizes the white male domination of this industry.  
Workers anticipate downsizing and firm turnover by building networks both 
inside and outside of the firm that will enable them to locate future job opportunities. In 
the event that a firm restructures or collapses, networks may persist even when 
organizations disappear. This places a high premium on networks and allows for 
patrimonialism to flourish, as networks form through relations of trust and loyalty, a 
practice that tends to favor white men in this industry. In keeping with hedgemonic 
masculinity, the financialized cultural ideals render advancement as a product of 
meritocracy. The underlying patrimonial structure, however, reveals how gender and race 
are a crucial part of the social organization of the industry. 
The five sections that follow outline the employment conditions that distinguish 
the financialized ideal from the previous white-collar ideal worker (refer to Table 1). 
First, I investigate the cultural values that characterize the financialized ideal worker, 
with special emphasis on a passion for work. The second section examines how the 
norms for advancement encourage professional risk-taking, like taking a new job or 
launching a firm, rather than the incremental advancement valued in the white-collar 
ideal in which workers were rewarded for ongoing commitment with stable employment, 
promotions, and incremental raises. In the third section, I explore how workers express a 
sense of identity as a “portfolio worker”—a worker who cultivates a diverse portfolio of 
skills, achievements, and job experiences—rather than identifying with their firm as in 
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previous era. I find that the concept of the “portfolio worker” in the new economy is 
implicitly gendered. The fourth section details how norms for building social capital have 
changed. Loyalty to one’s firm has been replaced with loyalty to one’s networks, which 
provide access to the next job or investment opportunity. In the fifth and final section, I 
explore how the promotion-based wage has been replaced by performance-based 
compensation that I call “the wager,” because it allows firms to hedge employment risk.  
 
Discourse White-Collar Ideal Financialized Ideal 
Cultural Values: 
Norms: 
Identity: 
Social Capital: 
Compensation: 
Devotion to Firm 
Incremental Advancement 
Firm Identification 
Loyalty to Firm 
The Wage  
Passion for Work 
Big Leaps 
Personal Brand  
Loyalty to Networks 
The Wager 
Table 3: The White-Collar Ideal vs. The Financialized Ideal. 
 
Cultural Values: A Passion for Investing 
Hedge fund workers expressed a passion for investing. When I asked what is rewarding 
about their work, some interviewees acknowledged the importance of their high 
compensation. Other interviewees expressed ambivalence about the high incomes. 
Several said the high compensation was a factor that led them to work at hedge funds, yet 
also explained why they find the work fulfilling. Every respondent provided an additional 
explanation for why they felt fulfilled, emphasizing how investing is fast-paced, variable, 
and stimulating, which elicits a passion for the work. As one experienced worker Jay, a 
Hispanic man in his 30s, explained:  
I’m not going to lie to you. Of course, there’s an element of compensation that 
goes into this business. But really, it’s the passion. Don’t get me wrong, we’re all 
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doing it for the money, but there are obviously many times when it’s not all 
glamour like in the movies. There’s a lot of it that’s unglamorous, but you do it 
because of . . . the intellectual aspect of it . . . There’s always new things coming 
up, new ideas and new businesses, and how do we look at this and how do we 
structure that, and it always keeps you stimulated. 
Although compensation was a motivating factor, Jay identified how people develop a 
passion for the work’s intellectual stimulation. Workers justified the long hours and 
insecurity as a necessary tradeoff for engaging work.  
After a conference panel, I approached Diane, a white woman in her early 50s 
who founded a large hedge fund, as she walked briskly towards the elevator. She 
apologized for not having time to talk to me, said she was running to catch a flight, and 
promised to do an interview in the near future. As I sat in her office three months later, I 
asked her how many hours she works in an average week and she replied:  
Oh god! You know it’s interesting, because I sleep more than I used to. This little 
guy [she lifts her blackberry] is with me all the time. So even if I’m not physically 
here [in the office] or traveling, this is always with me, and now with wireless on 
airplanes, I’m still working. I was here on Saturday. A lot [of hours]. I don’t know 
if I want to know what the number is! [Laughs loudly]  
For Diane, her hours improved only to the extent that she had more time to sleep. 
Technology, like her blackberry, allowed her to work at all times. She explained how her 
only downtime was when she had a flight without wireless internet, which she savored.  
Diane described how a passion for investing fueled these long work hours, often 
on nights and weekends:  
Investing for me is not my job, it’s my passion, it’s my extracurricular activities, 
so it’s not even work. I feel sorry for people who don’t love what they do. I can’t 
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imagine going through life not loving my job. And I think that’s the majority of 
people. So I’m so very fortunate that I was able to find something that I love, 
because even through the shittiest of times, it’s better to love what you are doing 
than to hate it . . . I never really turn it off, because I don’t want to, because I love 
it so much. 
Diane’s love for her work justified the stress and long hours. She worked because of the 
passion investing incites in her.  
Hedge fund workers described having a sense of passion for their work, akin to 
romantic relationships (Cherlin 2009; Pugh 2015). Thus, the financialized ideal worker 
must be committed to their work and feel passionate about it. Amid a culture that values 
innovation, calculation, and profits, workers expressed a passion for investing. People in 
the industry justify the high incomes as the result of productivity inspired by this passion. 
Workers described it as something they would do regardless of compensation, suggesting 
a collapsing distinction between work and personal life. Even if capable of retiring, 
workers like Diane would—and do—continue to work. As in the discourse introduced by 
Margaret in Chapter 3 about like or loving one’s work, this discourse of passion reflects 
the norms associated with hedgemonic masculinity, which are upheld by men and women 
alike.  
 
Norms: Taking Big Leaps 
The culture at hedge funds encourages workers to take professional risks that benefit the 
firm. Taking risks is viewed as necessary to boost returns, advance one’s career, and 
distinguish oneself from other investors. However, an invisible line separates what 
constitutes rational, calculative risk-taking in investments management and what ventures 
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into the gray area of too much risk. This distinction reflects how hedgemonic 
masculinity, in keeping with Connell’s hegemonic masculinity, is defined in relation to 
marginalized masculinities and femininities. Thus, someone who is perceived as being 
too cautious risks being associated with femininity. Similarly, someone whose risk-taking 
becomes reckless—e.g. takes on too much leverage or risk in their portfolio—captures an 
marginalized masculinity that serves as a warning for compromising the expectations 
associated with hedgemonic masculinity.  
  “Every trader will always portray themselves as being the one who is looking out 
for risk and they’re not going to just take a shot,” explained Craig, a trader who is a white 
man in his 50s. Craig stressed the tension between taking risk and taking controlled risk 
when he recounted his own approach: “The first rule of risk management isn’t so much 
whether you make or lose money, but when you lose money, do you lose as much money 
as you thought you would lose.” To Craig, risk management is about careful planning and 
control over one’s trades.  
 Craig then recounted how the industry has changed in the aftermath of the 2008 
Financial Crisis. The distinction between his concept of long-term risk management, 
which demonstrates the ideology behind hedgemonic masculinity, and short-term risk-
taking, which captures a marginalized masculinity, becomes clearer:  
I think definitely the days of glorifying big swing trader [a short-term strategy that 
invests in a stock trend over several days] are gone to the extent of oh, that guy 
made a $100 million last year, isn’t he great. There’s a little bit of skepticism. Did 
he just get lucky? What, did he just pile on the firm’s money and make it that 
way? Definitely, people still admire and look up to or want to be the big trader 
who can push the market around, but there is a little more emphasis on 
consistency, [and] stability of results. Did the guy get lucky one year then bleed 
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out in the years after? I think there seems to be a desire from especially these 
people—that the banks are starting to fund—they want to build an institution, not 
just make a quick buck. 
As Craig’s account demonstrates, short-term gains are associated with luck and power 
rather than mastery. The marginalized masculinity captures the “guy” who gets rich quick 
by following short-term trends in the market and flexing his might by buying a mass of 
stocks and forcing the market in the direction that benefits his investments. The ideals for 
hedgemonic masculinity, in contrast, are apparent in Craig’s description of the hedge 
fund manager who strives to establish a legacy and build an institution through 
investments that require long-term planning and a mastery of risk in the market.   
  These norms for risk-taking also carry over to how people plan their careers and 
take professional risks. When I asked about the keys to success in the hedge fund 
industry, hedge fund workers reflected on the long hours, hard work, and—most 
importantly—risk tolerance. Vincent, a white man in his late 40s, recounted what makes 
a worker successful: 
The ones that are most successful tend to be ones that are willing to take a step or 
two out of their comfort zone and learn. Those who do okay, but never 
phenomenally, usually it’s because they get in a comfort zone in the job they are 
in: “It’s a really good job. I’m making a million dollars. I never dreamed I would 
make a million dollars. I’m going to be quiet, and I’m not going to risk a million 
dollars.” . . . The second personality profile is, and maybe it’s just being 
overconfident, is “I can do anything. Failing is not an option. I better push the 
envelope.” Those are the one’s that are most successful.  
According to Vincent, success stems from embracing discomfort and challenging safety. 
Security is inadequate: Success requires the assumption of significant professional risk. 
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Vincent demonstrates how workers rationalize the risks and long hours necessary to 
advance in an unstable industry. He reflects how the dominant ideology of hedgemonic 
masculinity involves an idea about how to manage and negotiate risk-taking.  
  Margaret, an Asian American research analyst in her late 20s, emphasized the 
importance of “putting on risk”—in the form of asserting herself in investment 
decisions—to gain recognition at her firm. For Margaret, investment and professional 
risks are connected: Both are essential for making money and advancing your career. She 
explained how if one does not take risks, “You lose, and it’s actually that final, because 
you don’t get to make money unless you put on risk and if you never put on risk, you 
don’t get to make money, in which case you don’t get to go any further.” Making big 
professional risks, by changing firms, making bold investments, or launching a new firm, 
can incur the greatest rewards—or great losses.  
  What Margaret said next demonstrates how ideas about normative femininity, like 
marginalized masculinities, are often posed in opposition to the ideals for hedgemonic 
masculinity. These alternatives reinforce and define what constitutes hedgemonic 
masculinity. Margaret suspected that taking career risks was something that held women 
back: “It’s very non-intuitive to women to make leaps, but leaps are what this business is 
about.” The notion that risk-taking is not intuitive to women reflects a common gendered 
discourse about risk in this industry (Fisher 2012).  
  Similarly, Deborah, a white woman in her 50s who founded her own firm, 
employed a gendered discourse about risk that cast men as more daring and women as 
more prudent: “It takes a certain kind of leap of faith that I can figure this out . . . And 
maybe that’s a little bit more of a male trait of you know, you throw your hat in the ring   
. . . I think women like to stick in safer waters.” Deborah’s account reflects a discourse of 
gender essentialism, depicting men as more professionally daring and women as more 
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professionally risk-averse. Yet Deborah herself took the risk of launching her own firm, 
which she attributed to determination.  
  Diane explained how she developed her risk outlook through experiencing failure 
during downturns in the market and learning that it is cyclical. She became comfortable 
taking on risk because she learned that losses generated opportunities for buying stocks at 
low prices that would result in huge pay-offs over time. She recounted, “That’s part of it, 
you get used to the turbulence, it doesn’t crash the airplane, it’s just annoying sometimes. 
And that takes time. I wish I could flip the switch and all of the woman in finance could 
become incredibly aggressive, but that takes time.” Diane echoes the dominant discourse 
that women tend to be more risk-averse, like in the accounts of Margaret and Deborah. 
This discourse is a central piece of the dominant gender ideology in finance that 
naturalizes assumptions about gender difference and inequality. This discourse not only 
serves to stereotype women, it also reinforces the ideology that upholds hedgemonic 
masculinity, which is defined relationally in opposition to normative femininity and 
marginalized masculinity.  
  Diane then recounted her ideas about portfolio risk management, which 
demonstrate how both men and women alike reinforce the ideals for hedgemonic 
masculinity. In contrast to a tendency towards aversion to risk that Diane identifies in 
other woman, Diane herself has a long-term approach to managing risk. She said: 
Over time, I was refining what risk meant to me, and I think that’s what 
differentiates me from other people. It’s really how do you define risk? What is 
risk? Because there are times when I want to take it, and I want to take a lot of it. 
And there are times when I want to back off and take it down a notch. Being able 
to identify that when you are in those environments, or being ahead of what you 
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think is going to happen is probably the better way to say it, is what makes me the 
best investor that I think I can be. 
For Diane, risk management is about acquiring a long-term perspective, which puts 
failure in perspective and highlights how success happens through insights gained over 
time. Next, Diane directly connected her outlook on risk to her career and personal life 
demonstrating how hedge fund workers apply the ideals for risk management to taking 
professional risks as well: “And it carries over to other aspects of your life. Like I said, 
everything is cyclical, and I can see it with people. I can see it with virtually everything.” 
    
Identity: Personal Brand 
The white-collar ideal worker developed a sense of identity through their firm, which 
served as the central organizing factor in the worker’s career (Mills and Jacoby 2002). In 
the new economy, elite finance workers understand themselves as portfolio workers and 
develop an identity by constructing a personal brand, a cultivated professional reputation.  
For hedge fund workers, a personal brand reflects an approach to one’s career as an asset 
or product that requires cultivation. Workers promote their brands by building a presence 
on social media, writing a blog or e-newsletter, or presenting at conferences. The goal is 
to gain industry recognition as an expert. This builds trust with future colleagues, 
employers, and clients.  
Hedge fund workers stressed the importance of building a reputation, both 
internally within their firms and externally in the industry. For example, a manager told 
Gita, an Asian American woman who is a portfolio manager at a mid-sized firm, that she 
needed to build an external reputation to become partner at her firm. Gita described how 
her career involved two jobs: “The job of making the cookie and the job of selling the 
 
 
 
 
 
 92 
cookie are two hugely different jobs. The job of actually doing your job and the job of 
selling yourself, telling people, ‘this is what I’ve done’ and building that credibility.” Gita 
felt pressure not only to fulfill her responsibilities at work; she also had to ensure that she 
gained recognition and established credibility.  
Gita described self-promotion as more crucial to advancement than excelling at 
formal job responsibilities: 
You take two people: One spends 50 percent of their time doing the work and 10 
percent promoting themselves, and another spends just 15 percent of their time 
doing the work and 50 percent promoting themselves. It’s not entirely clear the 
one who does more work will do better and, oftentimes, the one who does more 
time and more effort managing their career does better. 
Self-promotion is understood as more productive than task-oriented work because it 
solicits recognition. Once Gita cultivated her reputation by presenting at conferences and 
publishing a book, she gained recognition as an industry expert and her firm appointed 
her partner.  
A personal brand also helped Jennifer to rebound after the networks she built over 
20 years in the industry dissipated in the 2008 crisis. This prompted her to find new 
clients as she launches her own consulting firm. Jennifer approaches networking as 
promoting a brand: “By speaking at conferences and being out there and promoting, it 
reflects on the brand. That was a lot of how I was meeting people. And having my own 
company, I had to go back to that, putting myself out there and following through.” 
Workers like Jennifer identify how establishing a personal brand advances their careers 
by gaining them recognition in the industry and access to clients.  
Central to building one’s brand is developing a personalized “investment thesis:” 
a theory of how to interpret the market. Hedge funds market themselves as providing 
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“absolute” returns, i.e., performance is guaranteed regardless of market trends. Individual 
managers take pride in thinking independently and avoiding herd behavior, which refers 
to following trends established by other people’s investment ideas. Top hedge fund 
managers have renowned investment philosophies. For example, George Soros published 
several books on his theory of reflexivity, which anticipates trading cycles driven by 
market participants who follow trends and hastily speculate, as in the recent U.S. housing 
bubble. Another leading manager, Ray Dalio, published YouTube videos and newsletters 
that explain his “All Weather” strategy, which evaluates how relationships between parts 
of economies develop over time. These practices reflect a belief that an identifiable 
personal brand with an innovative investment thesis is required to attract investors in a 
highly competitive industry as well as to uphold a hedgemonic masculinity that demands 
proof of mastery and independent thinking. 
As Jeffrey, a white man and portfolio manager with over 25 years of experience, 
explained, a manager must have an original idea to start a firm: “I want to carve out my 
niche and I have the confidence with which to do what I’m gonna do.” Identifying a 
niche, and having self-confidence, is the investor’s warrant to launch a fund. Several 
people called this “variant perception”—industry jargon for a unique stance that differs 
from the standard market viewpoint. It reflects the hedgemonic ideal for originality and 
nonconformity. At times, it also deters collaboration among colleagues.  
One portfolio manager described how this culture fosters an independent 
environment. Lisa is an Asian American woman in her late 30s who manages one 
portfolio at a mid-sized firm. She explained how only one person could be the lead for 
each investment portfolio:  
It’s very independent. The industry in general encourages independent thinking. 
There is very limited collaboration among people. For instance, every portfolio 
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has to have a sole portfolio manager [PM] structure. There can only be one trigger 
puller for every portfolio. You can’t have a co-PM model. It rarely works out. 
Each investment portfolio is driven by the portfolio manager’s vision of the markets, 
which made it difficult to collaborate between two or more portfolio managers. Lisa’s use 
of the term “trigger puller” reflects as association with a cowboy or military masculinity. 
It was common in my research for people to refer to hedge fund managers as cowboys, 
chiefs, generals, or kings, reflecting a distinctly masculine concept of leadership. While a 
personal brand appears gender neutral, a personal brand reflects an independent operator 
and has an underlying connotation inextricably tied to hedgemonic masculinity.  
Independent leaders are preferred because they are believed to foster “variant 
perception.” As Lisa said, “In order to make money, you have to have independent 
thinking, you have to have a variant perception of a strategy, a single name, or a stock 
idea.” Variant perception is desirable because it demonstrates innovation and an 
identifiable investment brand.  
Reflecting a commonly held value for independent thinking in the industry, 
variant perception is a discourse that reinforces hedgemonic masculinity. In practice, 
however, most investments are a collaborative process. Lisa pointed out this 
contradiction between the value for independent thinking and the role of social networks 
in influencing investment decisions. Rather than working independently, she explained, 
“In reality, people talk to other people who are also in the same industry who also cover 
the same kind of investment universe. And therefore, you see some overlap between 
portfolios.” Lisa cited the “Tiger Cubs” as an example. The term Tiger Cub refers to 
firms that were founded by former employees of Tiger Management, one of the largest 
and oldest hedge funds in the industry. Julian Robertson, the founder of Tiger 
Management, provided the initial investment money for many of these Tiger Cubs, which 
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use the same strategies and feature comparable returns. Lisa emphasized how this 
example demonstrated how “even though people encourage independent thinking, 
sometimes they will talk to their friends to verify the idea. For instance, if I like Apple for 
a stock and I talk to my friends, ‘Do you also like Apple?’ That sort of contagion exists in 
the industry.”  
Contagion, also called herd behavior, refers to how investment ideas spread 
through the industry. Investments that follow this contagion or herd behavior are 
generally frowned upon, because it contradicts a hedgemonic value for independent 
thinking. It also narrows profit margins and inhibits investment returns. In some cases, 
herd behavior may be associated with insider trading. Yet despite these detractors, rapid 
price movements in the stock market—as a stock quickly gains upward or downward 
momentum—indicate that investors do share ideas about stocks and strategies.  
Thus, contagion is indicative of the underlying social practices in the industry. 
While people described building an industry reputation through a personal brand and 
investment thesis, their accounts also suggest that reputation is largely based in trust-
based networks that confer credibility. The personal brand rhetoric depicts workers as 
independent agents. It gives the impression that anyone can establish him or herself in the 
industry through reputation management using online platforms and professional 
associations. The personal brand rhetoric is a discourse that upholds hedgemonic 
masculinity. In practice, a favorable reputation largely arises from interpersonal 
relationships and word of mouth built through social networking.  
Embracing the portfolio worker mentality, hedge fund workers stressed the 
importance of building a reputation, which they call a personal brand. In contrast to the 
white-collar ideal worker who articulated a sense of identity through one’s firm, a 
personal brand reflects an approach to one’s career as an asset or product that requires 
 
 
 
 
 
 96 
cultivation. Similarly, an “investment thesis”—a personalized theory of markets—allows 
a manager to establish an identifiable brand distinct from other managers. Elite workers 
in finance brand themselves as independent, portfolio workers by establishing a 
professional reputation that allows them to build trust with their colleagues and clients. A 
portfolio worker cultivates an independent personal brand, which reinforces the norms 
associated with hedgemonic masculinity.  
 
Social Capital: Loyalty to Networks 
In the past, the white-collar ideal worker demonstrated loyalty to the firm by developing 
close ties with coworkers and managers (Kanter 1977). Although workers in the new 
economy are expected to socialize with their co-workers, they are no longer the 
“company men” of the post-war era. Rather than focusing within a company, the most 
important networks are those that extend beyond the organization. In anticipation of firm 
turnover and downsizing, workers build networks both inside and outside of the firm to 
locate future job opportunities. In the financial services industry, social capital—the 
resources and benefits provided by one’s location in a social network (Burt 2004)—
provides access to promotions, job opportunities, investor bases, and other sources of 
institutional support. Social capital exposes a paradox in a context of insecurity: although 
workers are expected to operate as independent, autonomous agents, they also rely on a 
varied and wide social network in order to advance through external labor markets.  
People “grow their networks” outside their firm by attending conferences and 
social hours. During fieldwork at industry conferences and events, people usually 
exchanged cards and followed-up promptly by email to establish a channel of 
communication and demonstrate professionalism, which helps to build trust. During first 
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introductions, people often asked one another, “What can I help you with?” or more 
directly, “What do you need?” Exchanging favors like personal introductions or 
investment advice is normative behavior. As one person described, there is a “pay-it-
forward mentality” in the industry: People are eager to extend a hand in anticipation that 
it will be reciprocated. Several people stressed how this helped to establish the trust and 
credibility that builds professional relationships. One man strategically emails his 
contacts periodically to avoid only contacting people for instrumental purposes. 
For hedge fund workers, investing in social capital is an integral part of one’s 
career. According to this mindset, you do not build, but invest in a network. People 
stressed the need to “leverage”—i.e., maximize—their networks, reflecting a distinctly 
financial view of social capital. Jennifer recounted how she “had been pretty successful at 
leveraging speaking at conferences” to find clients. Leverage also refers to an investment 
strategy where an asset manager borrows money to generate higher returns. Leveraging 
can be very profitable but involves higher levels of risk than traditional investment 
strategies. Using the term leveraging instead of networking reflects the discourse of risk 
management undergirding an ideology of hedgemonic masculinity, in which one must 
take social risks and capitalize networks to advance professionally. 
Gita emphasized the importance of building a network for her to advance in her 
career. Rather than informal social activities, she prioritizes formal networking like 
conferences as a more effective way to get face time with people in the industry:  
 I have to be creative in terms of thinking about other ways to basically get in 
front of people. Because in terms of building your credibility, part of it is just 
being in front of people. Because they see you, they know who you are. You use 
things like conferences or industry events where you kind of be there and be 
present. And you have to carry yourself well and professionally. And a 
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combination of being charming and pleasant and at the same time, knowing your 
stuff and being aware of the market and understanding the dynamics of whatever 
it is, the area you cover. And those are all the things I am trying to leverage, that I 
can pull, in terms of building my network. 
Gita explained how being “in front of people” allows her to establish rapport and build 
trust. Exposure is key to building a professional reputation. For Gita, developing her 
professional reputation involved cultivating her personality and expertise as a way to 
invest in her social capital.  
Gita’s use of the words “charming” and “pleasant” reflects the gendered 
expectations in this industry for women, who are expected to have soft skills associated 
with normative femininity. These expectations are compounded by the fact that women 
tend to be concentrated in client-facing positions that involve managing relationships 
with high-net-worth investors and investment allocators from large institutions like 
university endowments, pension funds, and investment banks. 
Gender dynamics also arise in how firms encourage people to form close social 
bonds by sponsoring social activities like dinners, fantasy football leagues, and physical 
sports teams. Some firms even host off-site retreats where employees travel to scenic 
locations to go white-water rafting, alpine skiing, or charity gambling. One larger firm 
initiates new employees into the firm culture at a karaoke bar and hosts annual relay races 
on the firm’s remote campus. These kinds of activities facilitate group trust, promote 
bonding, and establish normative behavior.  
In many cases, hedge funds even socialize colleagues to feel “like a family,” as 
one man phrased it. Relations become “like a family” through social bonding and dating 
practices in the industry. Several people reported that it was common for colleagues to 
date, especially due to the tendency to overwork. The long working hours provided little 
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opportunity to meet a romantic partner outside the office. One man I met at a conference 
recounted how at a friend’s firm “they are encouraged to sleep together.” He added that 
hiring materials feature married couples that met at the firm. At every co-ed event I 
attended, men commented on my appearance and asked me out explicitly on dates: One 
older man even suggested I meet his son and introduced me to his “handsome young 
business partner.” Thus, boundaries between kin-like and kin-based relationships become 
blurry as people and firms actively encourage social bonding. 
Yet not everyone could forge constructive bonds in these work settings. Women 
described how these social gatherings tended to center around “old boys’ club” activities 
like drinking games. In some cases, sexual harassment prevented women from building 
trust with their colleagues. One Asian American woman lamented how men make 
racialized and sexualized comments about her appearance. She described how a male 
colleague made advances by saying, “How to you keep so thin? Do you eat egg rolls?” 
She looked at me, raised her eyes, and opened her mouth in astonishment: “You wouldn’t 
believe the things people say to me.” I often got the sense that women withheld the most 
egregious examples. 
During interviews, however, people described how proto-familial networks and 
master/apprentice relationships mold select workers into future hedge fund managers. 
The latter involves building a close relationship with a hedge fund manager who serves as 
a mentor. A hedge fund manager generally refers to the primary investment decision-
maker—the formal title is usually chief executive officer, chief investment officer, or 
lead portfolio manager (PM)—who founded the firm around his or her investment 
philosophy. Throughout my fieldwork and interviews, people referred to hedge fund 
managers as “chiefs” or “kings.” One man called them kings and then caught himself 
(since he knew I was interested in gender), clarifying, “I intentionally said king because 
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it’s always a man.” While this is not true in practice—several of my interviewees are 
women who run hedge funds—it captures the prevailing industry norms and beliefs that 
associate leadership with masculinity. 
The industry’s low numbers of women and minority men, combined with 
accounts of race-based networks, indicates the role of these chiefs and kings is not only 
gendered but also specific to race, ethnicity, and nationality (see Robertson 2014). 
Workers described the culture at hedge funds as like fraternities, which suggests racial 
homogeneity. The racial and ethnic connotation becomes even more apparent in 
references to firms spun off from larger institutions like investment banks and mutual 
funds. People sometimes referred to these firms, often predominantly white, as “tribes” to 
describe the practice of a successful investment manager who would leave to start a 
separate firm—often funded by money raised from the previous firm and investors—and 
brings along his or her entire team. The terms king, chief, and tribe reflect the way social 
ties are racialized in this industry.  
To groom select workers into an investment tradition, a hedge fund manager hires 
people in whom he or she sees potential and then trains them in his or her personalized 
approach to investment management. When I asked Jay, a Latino man with a decade of 
industry experience, how he trained to work at a hedge fund, he responded: 
The business is very collegial. It feels like a family almost. One thing I learned 
immediately is there is a very strong mentorship environment. It’s very 
patrilineal. What I noticed is, for example, my boss came from this place and he 
had been taught by this guy and then he had come from some other place. There 
was a very strong sense of that mentorship and master/apprentice type of 
relationship . . . One generation teaches the next generation who teaches the next 
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generation. There’s a strong sense of loyalty, there’s a strong sense of kinship and 
family. It really does feel like a family.  
Jay expressed pride in the sense of family, loyalty, and tradition in this industry. He 
identified a patrilineal structure where relations with senior professionals provide training 
and mentorship. In fact, his response to my question about training immediately 
identified networks as a key skill and way to gain the know-how of the industry. 
Business schools offer few courses on hedge fund investment strategies, so most 
of the preparation comes from on-the-job experience. Developing technical skills in 
hedge fund investments is primarily learned from a more senior colleague. In this 
exchange, a protégé exchanges loyalty for skills developed under the manager’s tutelage. 
A fund manager grooms an apprentice into his or her investment tradition and, if the 
protégé is successful, the manager may provide the seed funding for the protégé to launch 
a fund. When a manager takes someone on as a protégé, he or she is passing along an 
investment tradition for the protégé to carry on at the firm. This instills a sense of trust, 
loyalty, and even kinship.   
When I met Jay at a networking event, he was surrounded by younger men, a 
group noticeably comprised of racial and ethnic minority men in a room filled with a sea 
of white faces. As we talked, he stopped intermittently to introduce the younger men to 
important contacts. I later realized that they were his protégés. Later, during our 
interview, I asked Jay how he develops these relationships. He responded, “As you get 
older, wiser, more experienced, you seek somebody that reminds you of you, who has 
that same ambition, that same passion, that same drive. And you teach them all that you 
know.” According to Jay, mentoring stems from a sense of familiarity. His quote is also 
revealing of how elite structures are reproduced from one generation to the next. 
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What Jay said next demonstrates the significance of tradition in patrimonial firms. 
According to Weber (2012), tradition becomes recognizable when participants take the 
structure for granted: Patrimonialism feels natural to participants. Jay described how 
building relationships involves “this organic process whereby you see people that have 
the same mentality, the same passion. It’s very tough to explain from a data perspective, 
quantitatively, how do you quantify that? You just see it. You kind of feel it. It’s 
organic.” Jay naturalizes the patrimonial structure by calling it organic, because he has 
been socialized into the tradition.  
It became evident during my fieldwork that networks form along racial, ethnic, 
and national lines, as demonstrated by Jay’s mentees at the networking event. Jay also 
provides insights into how these networks become segregated. He described how “people 
always try to place” him racially, as though he must be categorized. Even though his 
surname easily identifies him as Latino—which he verified by mentioning growing up in 
the southern borderlands and being the first generation born in the U.S.—Jay described 
how this is a focal point of his professional interactions, suggesting that racial/ethnic 
identify is a primary marker through which people build relationships and networks.   
One black man, Matthew, reflected on the industry’s diversity issues: “The 
diversity problem is that you have no black leadership. And when there aren’t people in 
positions of power then the whole relationship game cannot be played.” According to 
Matthew, it is necessary to forge relationships with people in positions of power. Without 
black leadership, it is less likely a manager will identify a black man as having potential 
as a protégé. Becoming a manager’s protégé involves having a manager recognize the 
protégé as someone familiar, which forges a sense of trust and loyalty. In an industry 
dominated by white networks, this prevents racial and ethnic minorities from advancing. 
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Karen also recounted how a sense of loyalty to personal networks can prevent 
people outside of those close networks from accessing opportunities. She recounted how 
she was denied a promotion because the manager hired a familial connection of a 
colleague: 
Even some of my closest male colleagues would still love me, tell me things, and 
then make different decisions because, “Oh wait, I am sorry but so and so’s 
brother needed to get hired. Shit happens.” I don’t think that’s just reflective of 
working on Wall Street or at hedge funds or in venture capital, but when there’s 
big money, greed, power, people protect their own [she slows for emphasis]. And 
sometimes it’s the guy in the parish, the guy in the corner, the guy in the 
whatever. And it’s very frustrating. 
Because of the high monetary stakes in this industry, according to Karen, hedge fund 
managers rely on trust and loyalty-based networks—familial, religious, or local 
communities—when conducting business deals and hiring employees. People restrict 
access to resources for themselves and their personal networks. Karen also stressed the 
potential pitfalls of not gaining access to the dominant networks in finance. As a woman 
in trading, she recalled: “It was very clear that being a woman on the trading floor on 
Wall Street . . . that life is not a meritocracy. I don’t golf. I don’t live in Connecticut. I 
don’t go to all of the same clubs. All those things matter.” 
Relationship-based grooming practices at hedge funds impact who advances in 
this lucrative industry. An apprenticeship style of education builds the loyalty and trust 
underpinning the patrimonial structure. The master/apprentice relationship exchanges 
loyalty for technical skill development. Hedge fund managers select protégés to groom 
and carry out their investment tradition. Unlike mentoring relationships, these practices 
may lead to the transfer of large sums of money. These master/apprentice relationships 
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are predominantly patrilineal and familiarity-based, which places women and minority 
men at a disadvantage. Grooming practices are influenced by gendered and racialized 
networks, which provide a clue to why white men not only dominate in the industry, but 
also hold the higher-level positions. 
While patrimonialism captures the social organization of the industry, 
hedgemonic masculinity is the dominant ideology that justifies patrimonialism, as 
reflected in the financialized ideal for workers. In contrast to the white-collar ideal 
worker who demonstrated loyalty to the firm, the financialized ideal is to maintain 
diverse, external social ties to locate lucrative job prospects, business deals, and potential 
investors. In an industry with frequent firm turnover and collapse, networks persist when 
organizations disappear. As such, social capital becomes more literal as people capitalize 
on their social networks. Workers describe how they “leverage” rather than build 
networks, reflecting investments in social capital and a discourse of risk management.  
At hedge funds, the ideal worker is a risk-taking enterpriser, yet not everyone is 
able to take the same risks, because valuable social and economic capital is often denied 
to women and minority men. In the following section, I demonstrate how perceptions of 
risk influence the wage-setting processes in this industry, which are distinct from 
previous understandings of the ideal white-collar worker.  
 
Compensation: The Wage vs. The Wager  
Under the standard employment contract, employers compensated white-collar workers 
for fulltime labor with a base family wage sufficient to support a family (Vosko 2009). 
Whereas the white-collar worker of the post-war era enjoyed a modest premium over his 
working class counterparts, the new economy features polarized wages (Piketty and Saez 
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2006). Wages have stagnated for working and middle class workers, as dual-earner 
households became the cultural norm and employers move away from the family wage. 
High-earners, however, have witnessed dramatic increases in earnings. The earnings 
among elite finance workers are decoupled from a household’s needs; instead, high 
compensation allows these workers to become investment managers.  
This expectation is apparent in the cultural logics hedge fund workers use when 
discussing compensation. At hedge funds, earnings reflect a wager between an employer 
and employee. Each actor risks money, time, and security for potential earnings, 
commensurate with the amount of risk involved. While workers wager on the firm’s 
ability to generate revenue, the firm, according to people who ran hedge funds, wagers on 
a worker’s potential to raise funds from investors or earn returns in the market. Workers 
describe performance-based wages that consist of a base salary and a bonus structure 
dependent on the firm and employee’s performance. Thus, employment relations are akin 
to a partnership position: In exchange for assuming the risk of working for a small firm, 
workers incur a stake in its performance. 
Hiring is a bet on the employee’s future potential to generate revenue. Salary 
negotiations operate like a futures exchange: Each party agrees on a contract to secure a 
price and hedge against future risk. The starting salary can be understood as a stake: 
Money designated at the onset of the bet to represent the employer’s investment in an 
employee’s potential. If the bet pays off—i.e., the employee raises the firm’s bottom 
line—the payout comes as a bonus. Thus, the firm appears to hedge against the risk of 
employees underperforming or departing by paying a base salary and reserves full 
compensation for after performance expectations are met. Employees wager that the 
employment will lead to professional advancement.  
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While negotiating a base salary, workers wager on anticipated gains and potential 
losses. The people I interviewed described how the prospective employer bases their 
offer on the possible revenue that an employee can bring in or the money saved by their 
labor. Fernando, a Latino man in his 30s, explained this negotiation process: 
When it comes to hiring an employee, [hedge funds] all look at it the same way. 
How much do they pay the employee versus how much benefit the employee 
brings? Either in terms of profit generation, if it’s an employee that’s in charge of 
bringing in profits with good investment decisions, or if it’s an employee that is in 
more of the administrative side, how they are going to help the firm manage the 
operations more efficiently. They’ll look at how much money can this employee 
save us by hiring him, and they’ll make the decision based on that. 
According to Fernando, employers evaluate a prospective employee’s value based on the 
anticipated contribution to the bottom line. Whereas white-collar employees’ salaries are 
at least in theory based on expected outcome of labor, hedge funds workers expect their 
earnings to reflect their perceived potential to generate profits and improve cost-
efficiency.  
 A worker’s potential is determined by past performance, tenure, social 
connections, and credentials. According to my interviewees, inexperienced workers are a 
riskier wager, so access to elite networks and credentials, like an Ivy League education, 
signal this potential. Tenured workers with a strong reputation can demand higher wages 
and better terms. One described how after selling his firm and briefly retiring, he pitched 
a job to top firms by convincing each firm that he would improve their business model 
and bottom line. This gave him more control over the employment terms, as the firm 
perceived him as a less risky hire.  
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After the hiring process, the wager continues to determine compensation. Hedge 
funds are evaluated by financial statements, and so are hedge fund workers. Workers are 
socialized into a culture of calculation and investment risk-taking in which employee and 
firm progress are evaluated in accordance with the fund’s financial statements. As 
Margaret, said, “One of the beautiful things about hedge funds is that because they are 
small and they are flat, the metric of success is so objective: It’s did you make money 
today? Is it green or is it red?” When profitable, firms distribute bonuses according to 
each individual’s perceived contributions.  
However, support functions, like accounting, are compensated less than 
investment and sales positions, which are perceived to more directly impact the firm’s 
bottom line. The support jobs—called the back office—appear to be avenues through 
which women and/or minority men enter the industry, which contributes to the gender 
segregation and wage inequality in the industry. The lower earnings are justified with the 
assumption that support roles neither bring in money like sales positions nor directly 
generate money like investment positions.  
In response to these perceptions of value, workers manage their careers like an 
asset, believing that contributions to the bottom line—through investment returns or 
funds raised from investors—will advance them professionally. According to Gita: “If 
you want to make it to the top, you have to focus on the bottom line, and that’s gotta be 
either bringing in assets or bringing in performance . . . If you do this awesome job, but it 
doesn’t contribute to the bottom line, does it really matter?” Success stems from raising 
money from investors and generating investment returns: All other contributions do not 
matter. As Diane warned, “At the end of the day, it’s your rate of return, because if you 
don’t have one, you probably won’t be in the industry.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 108 
Workers described how their own contributions to the firm’s profits fosters a 
sense of shared ownership. This differs from the standard employment contract in that 
commitment to the firm does not stem from the firm’s ability to retain and support them 
over time. Workers felt that they had a stake, or an investment, in the firm that inspired 
dedication. When I asked about his firm’s culture, Scott recounted how the compensation 
system cultivates a sense of shared ownership in the firm. Scott explained:  
There’s an ownership culture here. Everyone here will share the profits of this 
firm when it’s profitable and everyone will not be compensated as well when the 
firm is not profitable so we’re all pulling for the same thing which is a profitable 
business.  
Thus, the workers incur the risks because if the firm performs, they benefit financially; 
however, if the firm flounders, the workers’ earnings suffers. In this sense, they share 
ownership of the firm. However, they do not have equal say in the firm’s management.   
This shared ownership culture stems from a sense of individual risk. This is 
evident in the account of Craig, who recounted how his firm restructured the incentive 
system for traders. Previously, the compensation system rewarded individual 
performance. Now bonuses are based on team performance, which impacted how he 
approached the risk-level of his trades. In the previous system, Craig evaluated risk based 
on what he personally could afford to lose:  
You’re not seeing the whole picture anymore. You’re worried about your 
individual drawdown [investment decline], but you are no longer worried about 
the firm’s risk. It becomes the risk manager’s job to manage that. You worry 
about your own individual PnL [profits and losses] risk, about what you’re willing 
to lose in order for it to be profitable to keep trading, but you don’t worry about 
the firm’s overall risk. 
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This compensation system—a common model in the industry—transfers risk to workers 
and encourages individual risk-taking, which helps to explain the high incomes in this 
industry.  
  After Craig’s firm implemented team-based pay, the performance of the dominant 
trader, who traded 75 percent of the team’s total allocation, determined the compensation. 
If this trader performed, the whole team profited. If his performance faltered, everyone 
lost. Craig could take on more risk without being penalized, yet he had no incentive to 
excel, because he would not be rewarded in pay or recognition. Craig lacked a sense of 
control or stake in the firm’s performance, which prompted Craig to return to the job 
market for the fourth time in less than ten years. He left to regain a sense of autonomy 
and recognition emblematic of hedgemonic masculinity.  
Hedge funds socialize workers into a culture of calculation and investment risk-
taking. Employee and firm progress are evaluated in accordance with the fund’s financial 
statements, yet this leaves support functions with fewer earnings than investment and 
sales positions, whose contributions are more easily calculable. In this environment, 
workers manage their careers like an asset to increase their contribution to the bottom 
line, either through increasing investment returns or investor capital. Contributing to the 
firm’s profits fosters a sense of shared ownership among workers, especially those who 
most directly benefitted from the bonus structure (e.g., investor relations and investment 
personnel). These workers felt that they had a stake in the firm. This stake, however, 
largely stems from their own measurable contributions—in sales numbers or investment 
returns—rather than a sense of collective dedication to the firm.  
For elite finance workers, the family wage has been replaced with the wager: a bet 
between a prospective employer and employee that designates shared ownership in the 
operating risks of the firm. From these workers’ perspective, each actor incurs risk in the 
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pursuit of shared profit. While a worker wagers on a firm’s prospects for generating 
revenue, firms wager on whether prospective employees will contribute to the bottom 
line. Base salaries reflect a stake in the wager, and bonuses are payouts if the wager pays 
off. Thus, compensation structures operate akin to taking a risky wager that involves 
assuming ownership in the firm. The financialized ideal worker is one who embraces 
risks to get ahead, since “leaps are what this business is about.” The financialized ideal is 
a risk-taking entrepreneur who invests to move and accumulate money. Workers then 
suffer the consequences when risk-taking fails; as such, they serve as independent 
partners who share a sense of ownership in the firm.  
This wager appears gender neutral, but reflects gendered assumptions about 
taking risks described above. The wager reflects a cultural value in risk-taking that blurs 
personal, professional, and investment risks, which may be greater for women or 
minority men who do not have the benefits of whiteness and masculinity to fall back on. 
Furthermore, the gendered discourses about risk-taking used by Margaret, Deborah, and 
Diane in the section on industry norms provide a clue to how gender, specifically notions 
about masculinity and femininity, shape perceptions of value in this industry. In a context 
where measured risk-taking is valued, beliefs that woman are more risk-averse may 
penalize them and prevent them from embodying the financialized ideal worker.   
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter explored how elite workers make sense of employment conditions and 
expectations for workers in the new economy. The financialized ideal worker is a 
professional risk-taker who repeatedly changes positions, organizations, and even careers. 
An innovative, passionate self-starter and an active contributor to the firm’s bottom line, 
the financialized ideal worker reflects a belief that workers should approach their careers 
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like assets, requiring ongoing investments in the form of resources, development, and 
management. Embedded in this ideal are neoliberal ideas about profits and efficiency that 
foreground the worker as an independent actor. This ideal assigns risks and 
responsibilities to elite workers, who describe employment-hedging strategies that turn 
workers and their careers into financial products—a coping strategy for dealing with 
unstable and unpredictable careers.  
The financialized ideal for workers differs from the traditional white-collar ideals 
in five important ways. First, a passion for investing in financial markets is the primary 
cultural value that motivates their devotion to work. Second, workers describe being 
socialized into a professional culture that sets norms for risk-taking. Third, rather than 
identifying with their firm, workers express a sense of identity in their personal brand, an 
asset or product that requires cultivation. Fourth, a sense of loyalty to one’s networks has 
replaced loyalty to one’s firm. This is characteristic of a patrimonial system in which 
relationships among workers form the foundation for the firm structures. Finally, the 
family wage has been replaced with the financialized wager: a bet between a prospective 
employer and employee in which each actor incurs risk in the pursuit of profit. The wager 
rewards risk-taking and blurs the distinction between personal, professional, and 
investment risks. 
In this chapter, I find that the financialized ideal worker appears gender neutral 
yet reflects underlying expectations for masculinity that work to legitimize men’s 
domination in finance. Elite financial workers establish a personal brand as a portfolio 
worker that reflects a new configuration of hedgemonic masculinity that values 
independent behavior in the stock market. In a patrimonial system, masculinity facilitates 
valuable social capital for men, especially those who are white. The wager that sets 
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compensation appears gender neutral, but reflects essentializing stereotypes about gender 
and risk-taking that often penalize women. 
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Chapter 5: Reaching the Top 
What allows people to launch their own hedge funds? In this chapter, I focus on the 
findings from 14 people in my sample who had founded a hedge fund. I refer to these 
people as hedge fund managers because they are in a leadership role at their firms. Of the 
14, 10 people served as the primary investment decision-maker at the hedge fund. The 
remaining four—Scott, Farrah, Karen, and Margaret—served as head of research, 
operations, or compliance.  
I find that starting a hedge fund requires social and institutional forms of support, 
which is largely consistent with the literature on small business owners, entrepreneurs, 
and family enterprisers (Bessière 2014; Lane 2011; Viscelli 2016). Yet, in this context, 
the risks that people take to become hedge fund entrepreneurs provides them with access 
to large sums of money. This amplifies the level of rewards and the person’s ability to 
pass along wealth. This helps to explain the reproduction of the patrimonial organization 
of the industry and how it structures access to the high incomes. 
In the following sections, I first examine the leading discourse that rationalizes 
wanting to become hedge fund managers: financial security. I examine how this 
discourse reflects expectations tied to hedgemonic masculinity, specifically for autonomy 
from bureaucratic institutions. Next, I discuss the necessary preconditions for 
entrepreneurship in the hedge fund industry. Each hedge fund manager I interviewed 
benefitted from at least one of these conditions. The first condition requires personal ties 
to wealthy investors who provide the initial funding. The second features a manager at a 
previous employer who provides both training and funding. The third precondition is a 
precipitating crisis, such a poor performance or a stock market crash, which provides an 
opportunity to spin off a business unit into an independent hedge fund. I argue that 
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patrimonialism and hedgemonic masculinity naturalize these conditions, especially the 
trust-based relationships that favor white men.  
 
FINANCIAL SECURITY  
Hedge fund managers described their ultimate goal as achieving financial security, which 
several people defined as complete financial independence. Financial security is a 
common discourse among hedge fund managers that reinforces hedgemonic masculinity 
and legitimizes the high incomes in this industry. Unlike the financial security sought 
after during the period of shared prosperity—lifetime employment, a living wage, and 
incremental advancement—these elite workers imagine financial security as the ability to 
retire. Rather than achieving security in the sense of a nest egg or safety net, financial 
security refers to liberation from all financial constraints for life. The discourse of 
financial security reinforces an ideology of hedgemonic masculinity, by casting the 
accumulation of wealth as a masculine ideal.  
Jeffrey, a white man who has been managing hedge funds since the 1990s, 
explained how money represented independence to him. When I asked him to elaborate 
on what he means by that, he responded: 
To me, money is independence in that I’m not a spender, I’m not a consumer, and 
I, believe me I quit [top-tier firm name deleted] and took four years off to travel, 
so I have my own view on—I’m not going to get into the philosophical thing, but 
to me money is independence. It’s not, “Hey, I can buy a fancy car or I can get 
my wife bigger earrings.” That just doesn’t interest me.  
Jeffrey reiterated that he did not value money for the material goods it brought, but for 
how it gave him a sense of independence, which reinforces the status associated with 
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hedgemonic masculinity. Traveling symbolizes that freedom: The ability to drop 
everything and disconnect without feeling the pressure to pay the bills. To Jeffrey, money 
is a means to live a particular lifestyle. However, the lifestyle he values is not one of 
consumer capitalism and designer goods, but one of leisure and mobility. 
Several recent startup founders described similar motivations. Jerry, a Latino man 
in his 20s, described being motivated by a love of investing and a goal of “complete 
financial security.” When I asked him to define this catchphrase, Jerry responded: “total 
financial independence.” He explained how he saved up money to start his fund. His 
received an inheritance after his father died, which he invested while employed at an 
investment bank. Jerry said the time was right because he was young, unmarried, and 
childless, so he thought that he could take the risk without jeopardizing a family. He 
echoes a common discourse in the industry that entrepreneurial risk-taking is 
incompatible with a masculine status in the family.  
Similarly, Jamie, a mixed-race man in his 30s, was in the process of launching a 
hedge fund. He also expressed a goal of financial security. Jamie recounted how moving 
up the corporate ladder left him unsatisfied. Jamie had it all: a professional job, a 
promotion in sight, a family, and a house in the suburbs. He described his previous 
lifestyle as “The American Dream,” yet he found it unfulfilling and felt dispassionate 
about his work. Jamie’s mentor was a law school professor who started investing on the 
side and made enough money to retire at age 42, yet continued to work because he loved 
his job.  
Jamie said that his dream of financial security stemmed from being raised in a 
lower-middle-class household in the South where money was a constant source of 
tension. While he identified having everything he needed, any extracurricular activity, 
even going to college required a sacrifice from his parents. He did not want money to 
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limit the opportunities available to his own daughters. Jamie emphasized that this was not 
only his dream: He and his wife shared this dream for their family. Jamie detailed his 
long-term goals and what it would look like when he reaches the top his of career. Jamie 
said, “So I want, we want [emphasis mine], for top of the career, for our daughters to 
have these great opportunities that we didn’t have when we grew up, so that means a lot.”  
My interview with Jamie demonstrates how financial security involves an ideal 
for being able to work out of passion, rather than necessity. He explained, “Going back to 
financial security, financial independence, top of career is I’m doing what I’m doing 
because I just want to, not because I have to get paid. So to me that’s top of career.” 
Financial security previously implied a steady monthly paycheck, incremental wage 
increases, and lifetime employment security; now it means having enough money that 
one could, in theory, retire but continue to work out of a passion for investing. Jamie 
upholds the discourses of passion for investing and of financial security, which reinforce 
an ideology of hedgemonic masculinity. Within this system of beliefs, passion, 
autonomy, and security are associated with the status conferred to masculinity. 
An unspecified amount of money defines financial security: It captures an abstract 
idea of wealth, like winning the lottery. Jamie said, “I’ve had these dreams and then my 
wife and I talk about these things and it used to be conversations about what would we do 
if we won the lottery? And in a way, this is kind of our lottery ticket, but our lottery ticket 
that we might have more chance at winning.” For Jamie’s family, his business represents 
a somewhat more likely chance to win the lottery.  
When I asked Jamie what that position of security looks like to him, Jamie 
reflected on reaching “the number” that represents financial security:  
I don’t know what number that is because living standards change and inevitably 
when you have more, you kind of want more, but there’s going to be a point 
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where we’ve got everything we need. I guess you could say that we had 
everything we needed when we were in our suburban lifestyle but it wasn’t what 
we wanted. We felt like we wanted more. 
At some distant point, Jamie anticipated that his family would have everything they need. 
Yet, he also acknowledged that all of his needs were met in his previous suburban 
lifestyle as a corporate attorney. What Jamie said about the specific number that captures 
the amount of his “lottery ticket” provides a clue to why incomes keep increasing in this 
industry: The number keeps moving upward as the person adjusts their standard of living 
relative to their new wealthy peers. This provides insight into how the status conferred by 
hedgemonic masculinity is always relative, based on the proximate marginalized 
masculinity. Jamie captures how the benchmark for what constitutes the ideal lifestyle 
changes as one climbs the hierarchy of masculinity and social class.   
 When I asked people what will it look like when they reach the top of their career, 
a common response was to make enough money to be able to pursue their retirement 
goal, which usually represents an intrinsic social good to them. For example, one wanted 
to pursue a doctorate in economics and work for the World Bank to promote sustainable 
development. Another wanted to turn her philanthropic involvement with a children’s 
cancer initiative into a fulltime pursuit. Yet, the number that represents financial security 
varied. One thought that $50 million would be a modest amount to found a trust for his 
family and support philanthropic causes. The “number” snowballs as people advance in 
their careers. For the most part, it is always out of reach because there is continually 
another threshold to pass: another raise, a bigger bonus, a wider profit margin, or more 
assets under management. This is perhaps indicative of the relative ideals for hedgemonic 
masculinity, which are always defined in relation to one’s peers. The further one 
advances in their career, the standard is set higher and higher.  
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 Hedge fund managers described being motivated by a goal for financial security. 
Financial security is a discourse that upholds hedgemonic masculinity. Within this 
discourse, financial security represents a state of individual autonomy and freedom from 
financial constraints (Fridman 2016). Becoming independently wealthy presents a way to 
eschew the constraints of bureaucracy—symbolized by the corporate job—and live 
according to one’s own terms. However, achieving this hedgemonic ideal requires one of 
several preconditions that provide access to wealthy networks.  
 
NECESSARY CONDITIONS 
While hedge fund managers recounted a dream of financial independence as the primary 
motivator inspiring them to launch their own hedge fund, one of three preconditions were 
needed to facilitate the pursuit of this dream. In the sections that follow, I examine three 
possible conditions that allow someone to start a hedge fund. These include having 
personal ties to wealthy investors, having a manager at a previous employer who provides 
training and funding, and/or having an opportunity arise from financial distress at one’s 
employer. 
  
1. Personal Ties 
Made possible by financial sector deregulation, the hedge fund industry grew as a less 
regulated and more lucrative alternative to investment banking. Hedge fund managers 
have launched firms by procuring seed money from wealthy investors, elite networks, 
and professional mentors. Traditionally, high net worth individuals and families were the 
primary investor base. Today wealthy families constitute eight percent of investors 
(Preqin 2015). Most operate through “family offices,” capital pools of family estates and 
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trusts managed under a fund structure to fund philanthropic endeavors or establish wealth 
for subsequent generations. In some cases, a family member manages the fund, while 
others hire investment professionals (the Rockefellers are an example). Over the past 20 
years, family offices have transferred their money from traditional investment vehicles to 
hedge funds to increase returns.  
For the wealthy, investing in a hedge fund signifies class distinction. Cynthia, 
who entered the industry in the mid-1990s, recounted the status of a hedge fund investor, 
“By the time 2002-2003 came around, the biggest thing you could do when you went to a 
cocktail party is say, ‘I’m a hedge fund investor,’ because that meant you were accredited 
and had a lot of money.” Since the S.E.C. requires that hedge fund investors have a 
minimum net worth of $1 million and an annual income of at least $200,000, calling 
oneself a hedge fund investor allows people to signal their wealth without disclosing the 
exact size of their fortunes.  
Karen got her first opportunity to start a hedge fund in the 1990s as the result of 
funding from a wealthy family. Initially, she and two colleagues—“one was a significant 
portfolio manager in the business”—invested money for a large family office. Then she 
and her partners used that foundation to manage a portfolio for a broader group of 
investors who they recruited through a number of channels. Karen recalled:  
We then used the track record and went back to our roots. We went to large 
institutions, we went to consultants, went to other families and foundations. 
There’s pretty much x amount of buyers in the world and x amount of sellers, so 
if you come out of the institutional business, you understand the process of who 
are the gatekeepers and who are the direct buyers, so we just used our Rolodexes 
and started calling. And the consultants, you have to get in their process so we 
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would present to them. And then the foundations, we would get on panels. That’s 
how you build your business. 
Once Karen and her colleagues had received the initial funding from a family office, they 
were able to build a track record and used their professional networks to recruit other 
institutional investors.  
Other people recounted how they located initial investors through familial, racial, 
ethnic, and religious networks. One hedge fund manager, Jeffrey, a white man in his 40s, 
explained how he found investors when he launched a hedge fund in the 1990s: 
The client base was primarily some very large European families . . . My partners 
were very, very wealthy European families that were plugged into that world. 
There was no way you or I or anybody was going to pick up the phone and call 
these families . . . Wealthy French people don’t take incoming calls. [Pauses to 
think] It was very much a network effect. 
Jeffrey accessed wealthy networks only by having a business partner from a rich 
European family. People without ties to family wealth could never access these investors.  
At age 18, Ken, a white man in his late 40s, started his own hedge fund with 
investment funds provided by his family and friends. Several friends of Ken’s father, who 
was the dean of a business school and ran a hedge fund on the side, each invested 
$25,000. In addition, Ken raised $10,000 from his grandparents, $10,000 from his 
mother, and the remainder of his $200,000 in seed funding came from his father. He 
explained how this amount of money fell under that which would have required him to be 
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Later, he raised additional 
investment funds after establishing a track record. By age 21, he was featured in the Wall 
Street Journal as the leading fund in his strategy. The newspaper posted his phone 
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number, which then started “ringing off the hook.” In a matter of months, his hedge fund 
went from $200,000 to tens of millions in assets under management.  
Other people also mobilized investments from their own familial networks. For 
example, Brian, a white man who single-handedly ran his own hedge fund with $200 
million under management for 20 years, raised capital from his former manager at the 
investment bank, the synagogue in his hometown in the South, and the parents of several 
ex-girlfriends. Meanwhile, Jerry’s early success at an investment bank allowed him to 
grow capital from his father’s inheritance. Jerry also stressed the importance of his 
personal access to Mexican assets: He was able to “mobilize money from Mexican assets 
transferred across the border because of the conflict in northern Mexico, in places like 
Juarez.” Jerry described his approach to money management and market analysis as 
cautious, because his “partners”—i.e., his investors—are from his family’s social 
networks. He felt both a personal and professional responsibility to succeed.  
While in some cases, members of racial and ethnic minority groups like Jerry are 
able to profit from non-white networks of wealth from places like Mexico, India, and 
China, it is far more common for people to describe white-dominated networks of 
investors. My sample has a lower proportion of white people—33 out of 45 people—than 
among hedge fund managers in the industry as a whole, which is overwhelming led by 
white men (Barclays Global 2011). 
Wealthy networks facilitate the success of some, while precluding others. Several 
people who are racial/ethnic minority group members stressed how their personal 
networks did not endow them with the same capital as their white colleagues, preventing 
them from launching a firm. As Matthew, a black man in his early 40s, explained:  
 [The diversity problem] starts from one thing and one thing only. Two separate 
people want to start a hedge fund using the exact same concept in terms of the 
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fund. One will have access to people with capital. The other will not. That’s the 
difference between who can start a hedge fund and who can’t. 
Matthew’s account supports previous research that documents how black financial 
professionals struggle to access white wealth (Bielby 2012). While several people, like 
Jerry, located funding through transnational racial and ethnic minority networks, the 
amount of wealth available from networks of white investors surpasses that of racial and 
ethnic minorities. 
Due to the large sums of money involved, highly successful hedge fund managers 
nearing retirement transition their firms into family wealth offices to manage their 
personal fortunes. Examples include top earners like George Soros, Carl Icahn, and 
Steven Cohen (Goldstein 2014; Prince 2013). In 2002, Soros appointed his sons, Robert 
and Jonathan, to oversee investments at the Soros family wealth office. However, in 
2011, the elder Soros replaced his sons with another protégé, employee Scott Bessent 
(Ablan and Goldstein 2012). Soros later provided $2 billion in seed funding for Bessent 
to launch his own hedge fund (Burton 2015). Meanwhile, Soros’ son, Jonathan Soros, 
plans to establish a family office with his own wealth. Soros is not the only hedge fund 
manager to pass leadership along to a son (Copeland 2014). Upon his retirement, Warren 
Buffett plans to transfer leadership of Berkshire Hathaway to his son. Other billionaire 
hedge funders provide the funding for their sons to launch their own firms. For example, 
Andrew Marks, the 28-year old son of billionaire Howard Marks of Oaktree Capital 
Management, is launching a firm with a $200 million seed investment from his father.  
I found no record of this being done for daughters, which is consistent with 
research on other family businesses (Bessière 2010). My interview with Justin, a white 
man in his 50s who has run his own hedge fund—with no employees—with $50 million 
in assets under management for the past 20 years, provides insight into why. He had adult 
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daughters, one worked in finance, whom he expressed reservation about directing into 
hedge funds. He said, “Do I want to steer my daughters into this industry? I would help 
them out but I don’t know [if I want them to], because it’s very much an old boys 
industry.” Justin expressed concern about his daughters’ wellbeing entering into an 
industry dominated by men, which may help to account for why sons rather than 
daughters appear to follow their father’s careers.   
Meanwhile, Justin described how having the financial support of his wife’s 
corporate job enabled him to take the risk of starting a firm 20 years ago. Justin went to 
business school at an Ivy League university in the 1990s where he met his wife. She 
worked at a large private equity firm to support their growing family while he launched 
the hedge fund from their home. He mentioned twice how he still works from home 
where he enjoys getting to play a more central role in raising his daughters. He said, “It’s 
a great industry if you care about your family, because you can do your work from home. 
It’s actually one that lends itself to having a family.”  
Jamie also explained how the financial support of his wife enabled him to start a 
hedge fund. Jamie explained how his middle class background did not provide many 
opportunities to find investors. Unlike many managers who rely on family and friend 
networks from wealthy childhoods, Jamie “didn’t go to private school.” Instead, he relied 
on financial support from his wife as he builds professional networks to find high-net-
worth investors. He recounted how she was returning to work, after spending three years 
at home with the children, to provide for the family. Jamie said, “I couldn’t do this 
without her,” referring to her emotional, intellectual, and, soon, financial support. For 
hedge fund founders like Jamie, entrepreneurship required support from a spouse, which 
is consistent with research on men in technology whose wives financially support them 
during periods of unemployment and entrepreneurship (Lane 2011). 
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The accounts of hedge fund managers demonstrate how access to wealthy social 
networks is a necessity for launching a fund. Hedge fund managers launch firms by 
procuring seed money from access to wealthy investors, elite networks, and professional 
mentors. Initial investors were often located through familial, racial, ethnic, and religious 
networks. All reflect patrimonial structures enabled by trust networks based on a shared 
sense of loyalty among families, friends, and colleagues. These patrimonial structures are 
predominantly based on relationships among men and are often organized according to 
race and ethnicity. In the absence of wealth networks, some hedge fund managers relied 
on the support of a spouse, as they built social networks in the industry.  
 
2. Patrimonial Firms 
The second precondition is training and seed funding from a hedge fund manager. As 
detailed in Chapter 4, hedge fund managers groom protégés to carry out their investment 
tradition. An apprentice style of training build the loyalty and trust underpinning 
patrimonialism in the hedge fund industry. This tradition may lead to the transfer of large 
sums of money to seed a protégé’s firm. Investment networks formed from 
master/apprentice relationships reveal a patrimonial firm structure where a manager 
begins a lineage of affiliated firms guided by shared investment principles and whose 
funds bolster the manager’s overall asset base. Along with seed money, protégés gain 
access to guidance, especially when seeded by a professional mentor who has groomed 
the protégé to carry out his or her investment tradition. These master/apprentice 
relationships are predominantly patrilineal and familiarity-based, which often prevents 
women and minority men from accessing them.  
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Some investment strategies are sustained with a small asset base, so for larger 
hedge funds, seeding other small firms allows for more opportunities to generate returns. 
As the most successful hedge fund manager in the 1980s and 1990s, Julian Robertson 
earned the nickname the “Wizard of Wall Street” (O’Keefe 2008). He launched his firm, 
Tiger Management, in 1980. Over the course of 20 years, the firm averaged net returns of 
25 percent a year and peaked at $22 billion in assets. Today, Robertson actively manages 
his own money from his family office atop a Park Avenue skyscraper called the “height 
of perfection” (Abelson 2015). 
Robertson’s protégés founded successful firms commonly referred to as the 
“Tiger Cubs.” For some, Robertson provided the seed funding, which reflects a practice 
of reciprocity for a protégé’s loyalty and commitment. The number of affiliated firms—
the Tiger Cubs and Grand Cubs—is estimated to be 120, and the total assets under 
management of the 62 firms registered with the S.E.C. is over $250 billion (Altshuller, et 
al. 2014).10 Tiger Cubs include top firms like Stephen Mandel’s Lone Pine Capital, 
Andreas Halvorsen’s Viking Global Investors, Chase Coleman’s Tiger Global 
Management, and Lee Ainslie’s Maverick Capital. Since 2006, Robertson’s protégés 
outperformed the Standard & Poor’s 1500 Index by 53.9 percent (Altshuller, et al. 2014). 
These firms feature similar investment philosophies, strategies, and performance 
outcomes, suggesting Robertson groomed them to perform according to his model. In 
other words, they feature a shared investment tradition. 
Investment networks like the Tiger Cubs are indicative of patrimonialism: One 
fund manager starts a lineage of affiliated firms guided by the same investment principles 
and whose funds bolster the manager’s overall asset base. Robertson’s wealth was 
                                                
10 The Securities and Exchange Commission requires firms to register and file reports quarterly if they 
have over $100 million assets under management. The 58 firms omitted from Novus’ estimate are either 
too small, inactive, or fund of funds (firms that invest in other hedge funds). 
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generated not only by his own investment fund: He trained a series of protégés and 
funded them to start their own firms. Thus, he benefitted from hiring, grooming, and 
seeding protégés. The Tiger Cubs demonstrate how seeding practices do not only stem 
from familial ties, but also from proto-familial ties within a patrimonial firm. 
While none of the people I interviewed were founders of the “Tiger Cub” firms, I 
spoke with several hedge fund founders who received partial or full seed funding from a 
previous manager or colleague. For example, Brian, introduced above, described having 
the support of the manager who trained him at an investment bank. Like with Julian 
Robertson’s Tiger Cubs, Brian’s former mentor trusted Brian to invest his money because 
he had trained Brian into a particular tradition of investing that he endorsed.  
Two hedge fund founders, Farrah and Margaret, reflect another type of 
patrimonial firm in which colleagues at a previous hedge fund who are trained in a shared 
tradition leave to start their own firm. Neither Farrah nor Margaret joined in a portfolio 
manager role. Farrah raised funds from investors by marketing the firm to the client base 
she had built at previous firms. She explained how one partner, the portfolio manager, 
had a strong reputation and track record that investors trusted, so she was able to 
convince them to provide seed funding. The dynamic between Farrah and her partner 
reflects a common gendered division of labor at hedge funds, where women work in 
client facing positions and men work as investment decision-makers.  
The hedge fund industry relies on an apprenticeship style of education, which 
allows for employees to build strong bonds with one another and their manager. This 
system of education presents opportunities to venture out and start once one’s own firm, 
especially when a former manager provides the seed funding. When hedge fund 
employees are groomed into an investment tradition, over time they receive access to 
training and investor funds that enable them to start their own hedge funds. 
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3. Financial Distress 
The third major condition that enabled hedge fund founders to launch their firms was 
financial distress at their previous firm, usually prompted by a financial crisis. For 
example, when I asked Vincent what led him to start his own firm, he responded, “It was 
very opportunistic.” He explained how he had been working at a large investment bank, 
and he created a new business space at the firm: “I started in this firm and within 18 
months, I was running a desk [a business unit]. So it was a rapid ascent. I started 
something they didn’t have. I used my legal skills to expand on a concept. That’s kind of 
how it rolled out.” After taking a job at an investment bank, Vincent identified a new 
investment area and then ran his own business unit. He was able to develop his business 
while housed within a larger investment bank. 
In 1998, the Russian Debt Crisis caused the firm to have financial distress, which 
provided an opportunity to break off from the larger institution. When management asked 
for volunteers to quit the firm, and Vincent turned this into an opportunity. He recalled: 
The firm that I was working for after they had asked me to build, or help build, 
this institutional asset management business, got into trouble in the Russian Debt 
Crisis of ’98 and they were looking for volunteers [to leave]. And so I took a long 
shot and said, “Would you be upset if I took this team out and created my own 
thing? I’ll take care of all the clients. You’ll never have a client issue. Clients love 
me. They’ll travel.” And they said, “Well, we can’t say yes.” But they winked or 
blinked or whatever and I did it.  
Although the firm did not formally endorse him leaving with an entire business unit, they 
looked the other way because it freed them from a source of financial distress. Vincent 
moved the business unit “out of the investment bank, joined with a competitor, made a 
twice as large size firm.” He and the competitor each had about $15 or 20 billion in assets 
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under management, and they quickly increased the number of assets to $50 billion. Over 
an 8-year period, the firm grew to over $200 billion in assets under management so they 
sold it and retired.  
The financial crisis of 2008 provided two other hedge fund founders with the 
opportunity they needed to leave investment banking. Like Vincent, both of them had 
developed a business platform at an investment bank and then turned it into an 
independent hedge fund. For example, Deborah is a white woman who runs her own 
hedge fund and has over 30 years of experience in finance. She grew up on a farm in the 
Rocky Mountain West and completed a doctorate in Statistics from the University of 
Chicago. Although she planned to become a professor, she became interested in 
alternative paths towards the end of her program. She asked her professors what to do 
with a math degree outside of academia. One statistics professor advised her to go to New 
York and work at an investment bank. She recalled the professor saying, “There are these 
investment banks that hire mathematicians. They’re not rocket scientists, but it’s pretty 
interesting work.”  
So Deborah packed her bags and moved to New York to take a job at an 
investment bank. She recounted, “At that point in the mid-80s there were a lot of jobs 
available. Everyone was looking for people with my skillset as well as many other 
skillsets. It was just a boom time in the business.” She started in research and modeling, 
which diverted her from the more popular trading path and prepared her for portfolio 
management. After a decade, she moved into and eventually ran the proprietary trading 
unit, which trades the firm’s own money rather than investors’ money. This appointment, 
she recalled, was “meant to be an honor [firm name deleted] gave people to prepare them 
to go to hedge funds.”  
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During 2008, Deborah’s employer underwent substantial hardships. A headhunter 
who needed someone to manage a new hedge fund platform called the firm and 
Deborah’s boss recommended her. She had been planning to start her own hedge fund, so 
she took the opportunity. Deborah explained how she felt prepared to do so because of 
the culture at her previous firm:  
Luckily at [firm name deleted], it was a very entrepreneurial, aggressive place, so 
I had been basically running my own business for a long time. Not just trading, 
but actually managing the expense side of the equation as well and hiring so it 
wasn’t that huge of a step to go to a hedge fund but it’s all incremental. It’s kind 
of all an evolution of one’s career. So it never seemed like the right decision next, 
it just happened.  
Deborah recounted how the process of working her way up in investment banking 
provided her with the skillset that allowed her to launch her own firm. The 
entrepreneurial culture of the firm where she worked taught her how to run her own 
business.  
Despite feeling frustrated with the political dynamics of investment banking, 
Albert, a white man in his 40s, also recounted how he acquired the skillset for becoming 
a hedge fund manager by leading business units—that employed hedge fund investment 
strategies—at investment banks. To Albert, the regulatory changes in response to the 
crisis provided an opportunity because of the “permanent reduction in risk capital on the 
part of the banks.” He said, “In my mind, if there was ever a time to really to take the 
gamble and see if you could build something by yourself, then it was then.” Whereas 
financial crisis provided an opportunity for Vincent and Deborah to leave firms in 
distress, Albert identified it as a moment in which he could capitalize from opportunities 
brought about by foreseeable changes at investment banks. 
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CONCLUSION 
Overall, the people who started a hedge fund described themselves as primarily driven by 
a goal of achieving financial security. This goal is largely unattainable for most people in 
the U.S., even for those who work at hedge fund. This dream of financial security is a 
discourse, rather than a common realty, that reflects an expectation for a type of 
autonomy defined by vast amounts of wealth. The expectations captured by the discourse 
of financial security reinforce the norms for hedgemonic masculinity, specifically a desire 
to increase one’s income and wealth. The financial security discourse rationalizes the 
pursuit of amassing a large fortune, which depicts the high incomes in this industry as 
warranted and justifiable.    
Achieving this particular type of financial security not only requires risk tolerance 
but also access to resources in a patrimonial system, which is organized according to 
trust-based networks that are shaped by gender and race. The hedge fund managers I 
interviewed experienced at least one of three conditions necessary for launching their 
own funds: having personal ties to wealthy investors, having a manager at a previous 
employer who provides the training and funding, and having an opportunity arise from 
financial distress at one’s employer. These preconditions reveal an underlying system of 
patrimonialism that organizes the transfer of wealth in this industry. 
During my interviews with recent startup founders like Jamie, I had contradictory 
responses to their motivations. On the one hand, listening to Jamie speak, I felt his 
excitement. His eyes widened as he spoke about the possibility of having no financial 
concerns. Rather than a source of tension, money symbolizes a sense of opportunity and 
possibility. He spoke earnestly of the risks involved—selling his house, investing his 
savings, and quitting his job—as a necessary means of creating a better future for his 
family. He made me consider the risks I took by quitting my own secure job in finance to 
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get a doctorate in Sociology and spoke to my concerns about what the future may hold 
for me and my family. His optimism, a self-described “glass-half-full” kind of guy, was 
contagious because it taps into an American myth of meritocracy that working hard, 
dreaming big, and taking risks will be rewarded.  
On the other hand, the dreams of hedge fund managers like Jamie brought to mind 
the workers who are left behind. In an era when the top one percent drives income 
inequality, it is perhaps no surprise that an extreme and inaccessible goal motivates those 
striving to enter this elite circle. This dream of financial security dream appears more 
difficult to attain than that of the corporate job and house in the suburbs: It is unattainable 
even for most elites.  
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Chapter 6: The Ideology of the Flat Organization 
Over the past 40 years, the fate of the American firm has been the topic of debate. With 
the goal of aligning the firm to meet the demands of a global capitalist economy, 
investors, directors, and executives have largely embraced a shareholder value ideology 
that defines the firm’s primary purpose as increasing share prices, rather than selling a 
product (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000). Subsequent changes to corporate governance as 
a result of this ideology have removed layers of management and bureaucracy to promote 
a bare bones corporate structure (Davis 2009). In the late 20th century, the corporation 
changed from a social institution to a nexus-of-contracts (Davis 2016); today, workers 
encounter the aftermath of this transformation. 
Scholarship on workplace inequality has documented how firm structures create 
social hierarchies at work (Acker 1990, 2006). Joan Acker (1990:147) identified how 
gender is embedded within the firm’s organizational logic, which is defined as “the 
underlying assumptions and practices put into policy through contracts, rules, manuals, 
and evaluations.” Organizational logic explicitly refers to the central governing practices 
of bureaucratic organizations (Britton 1997). Recent research finds that the defining 
characteristics of organizational logic in bureaucratic firms in the new economy—
employment insecurity, external career development, teamwork, and networking—have 
unique consequences for gender inequality (Williams et al. 2012). However, scholars 
have yet to determine the full impacts of the shareholder value ideology on workplace 
inequality at firms that have been stripped of layers of bureaucracy. 
 This chapter explores the implications of transformations in corporate 
governance for gender inequality. According to the shareholder value ideology, the ideal 
is a “flat organization” with layers of management and bureaucracy removed to make the 
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firm more decentralized, horizontal, and flexible (Borgatti and Foster 2003). Using hedge 
funds as an extreme case, I examine the implications of a so-called “flat” organization for 
gender and other forms of social inequality. I seek to understand how social inequality is 
impacted when layers of bureaucracy and management are stripped away: How are 
gender hierarchies constructed and legitimized in a “flat” organization?  
In the sections that follow, I show how a “flat” organization is a discourse rather 
than a practice in the hedge fund industry. I outline how the organizational logic of so-
called “flat” firms contributes to the construction and legitimization of gender hierarchies 
in five ways. First, gender is embedded in the streamlined “nexus of contracts” that make 
up the formal structures of the organization. Second, an examination of the standard 
division of labor demonstrates that gender is a central organizing factor. Third, gender is 
present in the dominant ideologies governing the expectations for hedge fund managers. 
Fourth, the norms for evaluating performance foreground the role of markets and profits 
as a meritocratic force; however, a closer investigation identifies how an environment 
with few protections for workers allows discrimination to go unchecked. Finally, since 
“flat” organizations establish an environment where social networks take precedence over 
the firm, networks of trust and loyalty facilitate professional risk-taking. In this 
environment, hedgemonic masculinity provides a safety net by faciltating access to job 
opportunities and investor capital. 
 
1. GENDER AND THE NEXUS OF CONTRACTS 
The shareholder value movement promoted the restructuring and delayering of firms in 
the name of maximizing stock dividends. This transformed the firm from a social 
institution designed to meet the needs of its constituents into a nexus of contracts (Davis 
 
 
 
 
 
 134 
2009). The goal driving this movement was to strip firms down to their most basic 
elements necessary to perform. By “trimming the fat,” firms could in theory eliminate 
operating costs and become less bogged down by bureaucracy.  
Hedge fund managers adhere to the ideology of the “flat organization.” Among 
the people I interviewed, hedge fund managers and employees alike described the 
organizational culture at their firms as “lean” and “flat,” which they defined in contrast to 
the “pyramid” structures of investment banks. For example, Vincent believed that 
flattening firms—removing layers of bureaucracy and management—makes them more 
collaborative and less competitive. Vincent described the culture at the firm he founded 
as “very flat” and “quick to decisions.” As the manager, Vincent recalled how he strived 
to cultivate an environment where he was accessible to his employees: “You would just 
walk in the room and ask a question. On very rare occasions, if it was for odd specific 
reasons, I would overrule it, but that was very rare.” Removing mid-level management 
characterizes a flat organization, which is designed to promote contact between 
executives and staff. This is consistent with changes in organizations in related fields like 
technology, where executives strive to foster an environment of open communication 
(Turco 2016).  
The physical organization of hedge funds reflects the goal of eliminating barriers 
between executives and employees. In small and midsize hedge funds, employees 
typically work in an open room with executives and support staff sitting alongside one 
another on trading desks, which refers to a set of desks lined up side-by-side and 
organized in two rows facing one another. Even when executives have their own offices, 
they usually reserve the office for small meetings and conference calls, opting instead to 
sit on the trading desks for the remainder of their work. For this reason, when I conducted 
interviews in offices, it was usually in conference rooms rather than private offices. 
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Like Vincent, the other hedge fund managers I spoke with expressed pride in 
establishing a collaborative workplace and what they called a “hands-off” approach that 
allows their employees to self manage. This also enables them to avoid hiring personnel 
who they perceive as extraneous, like midlevel managers and human resources. At the 
smaller firms, job functions like legal counsel, information technology, and payroll 
services are outsourced. Refer to Figure 1 for a sample organization chart for a mid-size 
hedge fund.  
 
 
Figure 1: Midsize Hedge Fund “Flat” Organizational Chart. 
The formalized policies and contracts at hedge funds are designed to establish a 
“flat” organization structure. For example, when a hedge fund manager launches a firm, 
the first step is to hire outside legal counsel to draft agreements for prospective investors. 
Depending on the type of firm, these include a private placement memorandum, a limited 
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partnership agreement, or operating agreement. These documents establish the legal 
terms of any investments including the potential benefits and risks for investors. If the 
hedge fund has more than one executive, an additional agreement will designate the 
various rights and responsibilities of the partners. At small firms, these contracts may 
serve as the primary guidelines for all other policies and procedures.   
While these streamlined operating guidelines may suggest a flattened 
organization, the specific policies indicate a clear hierarchy that places the chief 
executive(s) on top. The legal agreements explicitly state the central role of the chief 
executive by summarizing the qualifications of high level personnel and providing some 
transparency into their investment strategy. These people are written into the document 
by name and referred to as “key personnel,” reflecting how their continued employment 
is central to the firm’s stability. The key personnel are largely what the firm promotes in 
the legal agreements, which is in part why personnel with elite credentials are highly 
valued, which I examined in Chapter 3. These credentials demonstrate the firm’s 
legitimacy and elicit trust among prospective investors. In effect, the key personnel are 
the face of the firm and often the deciding factor as to whether an investor will entrust his 
or her money to the firm. 
Specific clauses indicate the importance of key personnel and the firm’s ability to 
retain them, which signal the firm’s stability and trustworthiness to prospective investors. 
For example, a “key man” clause is sometimes included to allow investors to redeem 
their funds if specific key personnel leave the firm or become incapacitated. The 
agreements disclose any potential conflicts of interest or other investment activities that 
may pose concerns to investments. Finally, investors may request information about how 
much money chief executives have personally invested in the fund to gauge how much of 
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a stake they have in the fund’s performance. These provisions reflect a firm structure that 
is contingent upon one or two top personnel, without whom the firm may fail to operate.  
Finally, the legal documents also specify the fee structure that investors can 
expect to pay. These are composed of two primary fees: the management fee and the 
performance fee. The management fee is often 1-2 percent of the fund’s net assets, which 
covers basic operating costs like office space, salaries, and equipment. The performance 
fee, also called the performance allocation, distinguishes hedge funds from other 
investment firms. The idea behind this fee is that the firm should receive a certain 
percentage of the investment returns to motivate it to perform well. In a sense, the 
performance allocation is akin to a bonus for the firm: The industry standard is 20 percent 
of the fund’s performance. Since the fee is charged based on the fund’s performance, 
hedge fund managers pay capital gains taxes, rather than the higher-rate income taxes, 
which helps to produce the high incomes in this industry.  
While interviewees understand these practices as promoting a “flat” 
organizational structure, in practice, these firms do not have a horizontal structure; 
instead, the structure concentrates authority among top executives. The formalized 
policies and procedures of hedge funds demonstrate how a “flat” organization transfers 
more power and importance to chief executives. This suggests that these organizations 
are not so much “flat,” as the top executives have considerable influence over the firm’s 
day-to-day operations and long-term sustainability. Furthermore, the legal terminology 
used in these contracts, like the “key man” clause, implies that these organizing 
agreements are explicitly gendered with the underlying assumption that top executives 
are men.   
The importance of the top executive is evident in my interview with Diane, a 
white woman in her 50s. When I asked her what characterizes the organizational culture 
 
 
 
 
 
 138 
of her firm, she introduced the term “organized chaos” to describe how her team 
brainstorms and executes investment ideas. Diane said:  
What would be a good phrase to describe it? It’s entrepreneurial chaos. And it’s 
encouraged. It’s encouraged because it’s not cookie cutter. I think one of the 
reasons why we’ve been successful for so long is that we think outside the box. 
No idea will be knocked down because it doesn’t fit into our box. Our box is 
thinking about where the opportunities are at and how we monetize them. So I 
would say “organized chaos.” . . . At a lot of places they meet every week and 
they get together and they talk about ideas and blah, blah, blah. The velocity of 
ideas that we’re seeing is so huge that I would be spending four out of five 
business days going through every single idea, so we have to be able to go 
through stuff really, really fast. 
Diane preferred an environment of “organized chaos,” because she understood it as 
allowing for more room for creativity. She avoided a formulaic, standardized process, 
which she views as both time consuming and constrictive.  
 What Diane said next, however, demonstrates the central role of the hedge fund 
manager as the key decision-maker amid the chaos. Diane described herself as “hands 
off,” caught herself, and then qualified:  
I’m hands off but I’m not hands off. So the research process, I’m very hands off. 
I’m the one who comes up with the big picture, sometimes crazy idea, and then I 
want the team to go out and create the models that either support or refute my 
idea. But when it comes to the actual direction I want the portfolio to go, I’ve 
already decided how that is going to occur, but I want them to do the analysis to 
support my thesis on something. I’m very hands off in terms of here’s the 
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research project, do it. Or, here’s the research project, they come back to me and 
say, “No, this is a bad idea, we should do it this way.” Have at it. Run with it.  
Diane was the final authority on the firm’s investments. Although she wanted thorough 
and critical research to challenge or confirm her ideas, Diane knew a priori the direction 
she wants to take the investments, and she suggests that the research is primarily used to 
support her investment thesis. As Diane said, “I never make an investment, an allocation 
decision, without having them [the team] involved in the process, but I know where I 
want to go in the allocation process.” 
 Diane’s culture of “organized chaos” captures the dynamics of a firm with few 
formalized policies and procedures. The operating agreement establishes an environment 
that allows for this “organized chaos” and reinforces the authority of key personnel. 
While hedge fund managers like Vincent and Diane perceived their approaches as 
conducive to establishing a flat organizational structure that encourages creativity and 
innovation, which it may in fact do, it was clear that in practice the organizational 
structure is not flat. Instead, it appears to reinforce the concentration of decision-making 
power and authority into the hands of chief executives.  
Figure 2 demonstrates the difference between a flat organization and a traditional 
organization. Although smaller hedge funds resemble the flat organization with one layer 
of executives and one layer of staff, the typical mid-size hedge fund organization chart 
shown in Figure 1 more closely resembles a traditional organization. The hedge funds I 
studied featured varying layers of hierarchy, yet managers defined their firms as flat 
relative to large investment firms with layers of management and bureaucracy.  
Constructing organization charts for these hedge funds demonstrates how “flat” is 
a discourse rather than a practice. This discourse features two different concepts of what 
constitute a “flat” firm. In the first, the “flat” discourse refers to an organizational 
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structure that is horizontal and free of hierarchy. In the second, it captures a collectivist or 
egalitarian ideology that promotes participation, open communication, and questioning 
authority. 
For comparison, Figure 3 shows an ideal type for a horizontal organization, a 
collectivist organization, in which workers collectivity make decisions and share 
authority in a general assembly (Rothschild-Whitt 1979). This model aims to eliminate 
social hierarchies within a work organization. By giving each worker a vote in decisions 
made at the organization, like hiring and firing, collectivist organization strive to remove 
certain forms of gender and racial discrimination at work (Sobering 2016; Sobering, 
Thomas, and Williams 2014). 
  
 
Figure 2: Traditional and Flat Organizations. 
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Figure 3: Collectivist Organization. 
Hedge fund managers separate themselves from the constraints and control of 
institutions, whether it is the regulators or the investment banks. The institutional context 
in which they do this is gendered in that it reaffirms the authority of the hedge fund 
manager, who is identified as the “key man.” Within this context, hedgemonic 
masculinity justifies the creation of these boundaries—akin to hedges—to assert the “key 
man’s” autonomy, authority, and value as the top executive(s) at their firm. Within these 
boundaries, hedge funds establish their own norms for managing money, employees, and 
firms, which is reflected in the gendered division of labor.  
 
2. GENDER AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR 
The global stock exchange organizes the division of labor at hedge funds. Although each 
team member has discrete job responsibilities and tasks, the workplace as a whole is 
organized according to activity in the market. For example, Scott, a white man in his 40s 
and the chief executive officer at a hedge fund, described the all-encompassing force that 
global markets played in his life: 
You really never have control when you are dealing with markets. Markets are 
going to do what they are going to do. If there’s a market crisis, and suddenly we 
have to go into a mode where we are reaching out to every investor to talk to them 
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about how we are handling it or something, that’s going to happen at a moment’s 
notice, so in the bigger sense you’re not going to have control . . . We’re out of 
the West Coast. We always see the sunrise when we start working because our 
trading day starts three hours earlier than New York’s. It actually never really 
ends anymore because we trade globally and there’s always a market on 
somewhere other than a slim slice of time on Saturdays. 
Scott described his life as bound to the market. At a moment’s notice, his firm may shift 
investment strategy or investors may bombard him with calls requesting an update on 
how a market downturn or upturn will impact their investments.  
Hedge fund managers clearly identify how the demands of the market delineate 
responsibilities in the workplace. Scott described the organization of work among his 
partners, outlining how his role as chief executive officer11 differs from this other 
partners:  
I keep my finger on the pulse of the business, more importantly than anything. 
I’m checking the vital signs of the business. I oversee all aspects of what we do 
that don’t involve investment decisions. So I have two partners: One’s the Chief 
Research Officer who’s in charge of designing and enhancing our investment 
programs and then I have another partner who is our Chief Investment Officer. He 
implements our investment programs. I oversee everything else.  
According to Scott, his role as CEO allows him a certain degree of control over his 
schedule and responsibilities: “On a day-to-day basis, yeah, ultimately I’m the boss, so if 
people need to meet with me, I can just tell them when they’re going to meet with me and 
if there’s some trip on the horizon, I can schedule it.”  
                                                
11 In Scott’s case, the role of chief executive officer refers to the head of business development and 
operations. However, this terminology is not consistent across firms in the industry. In other firms, the 
CEO may also serve as the chief investment officer, who oversees all investment decisions. 
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However, Scott qualified this degree of autonomy as contingent on the demands 
of the market. He said, “But the joke about entrepreneurs is the great thing about 
entrepreneurship is that you get to pick those 120 hours a week that you work. And that’s 
pretty much my life. I work very hard. We’re always going, but I do have some say in 
when I do what I do.” As a hedge fund entrepreneur, Scott had to be prepared to work 
whenever global markets trade, because a sudden shift in the market may lead to 
questions from his investors. 
The hedge fund managers described their firms as partnerships in which the 
founding partners have equal standing at the onset of the firm and then later hire on 
support staff as needed. For example, when I asked Farrah, a white woman in her 40s, 
about the division of labor at her former firm, she responded, “We were equal partners,” 
referring to the founding legal arrangement of the firm. Farrah explained how there was a 
clear separation of responsibilities:  
We got along really well and everybody knew what they liked to do. So there 
wasn’t really, you know [a hierarchy]. We kind of leaned on one partner who sort 
of took on a lot of the running of the business. I did everything that was client 
related and he did everything that was more related to the business and the other 
two guys were happy to let him do that. It was really, really nice. 
While each person held the legal title of partner—implying a horizontal organization 
structure akin to the collectivist workplace model described above—the four partners did 
not have equal standing in terms of earnings or decision-making at the firm. For example, 
one partner led the business operations of the firm and another assumed the position of 
lead portfolio manager, i.e., key investment decision-maker. Although the operating 
agreement specified an equal partnership, the firm was run according to the investment 
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philosophy of this portfolio manager. He had been successful at their previous firm and 
had assembled a loyal following of investors.  
After five years of strong performance, Farrah’s firm had a year of negative 
investment returns, prompting Farrah and her three male partners to shut down the firm 
and return their investors’ money. This led Farrah to embark on a series of short tenures 
at struggling firms, which I discuss in the concluding chapter. Her colleagues on the 
investment management side of the business, however, had earned enough to manage 
their own money, which upholds the ideal for achieving financial security. Farrah 
recounted, “A couple of my partners still basically just work for themselves running their 
own money.” As an investor relations professional, a job function dominated by women, 
Farrah did not think that this option was available to her because she had no investment 
management experience. 
Albert currently manages a startup hedge fund with one other founding partner, 
several other high-level personnel, and a handful of support staff. While the firm is still 
getting off the ground, Albert and his partner pay their employees equally. The two 
partners earn less than their employees since the partners own equity in the hedge fund. 
On that decision, he recounted: 
We basically decided to pay everyone the same. If we then made money, sort of 
real money, then you get to have a high quality [large cash flows] problem. I’ve 
yet to face that high quality problem. In terms of my partner and I getting to be 
paid less, hopefully that’s just a period of transition we’re in. But you know, we 
could give away a lot of the equity and I think that we will give away, our plan is 
to give away some of the equity in this next year, but as long as we’re sitting on 
the equity then the budget gets tighter. If we were right now sitting on most if not 
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all of the upside, we have to be able to support everyone else when times were a 
little bit leaner. But otherwise, we paid everyone the same. 
Since Albert and his partner hold most of the equity in the fund, they pay their employees 
higher incomes; however, he plans to eventually distribute that equity to employees, a 
technique for retaining them and rewarding their commitment to the firm. By “high-
quality” problem, Albert refers to the dilemma of determining how to distribute earnings 
among employees when the firm starts to generate large amounts of profit.  
As Albert explained this to me, he caught himself and acknowledged an exception 
to the practice of equal pay: Two people received higher salaries to help accommodate 
expenses associated with having a family. According to Albert:  
We made some modest changes frankly only for two people and that was because 
they had families and personal situations and came to us and said, “Listen, I’ve 
got, this is going on, these are the realities.” And it was to the tune of a couple of 
tens of thousands of dollars a year rather than anything over and above that . . . 
We’ve only done it twice and both of them were associated with, let’s call it, as 
opposed to an individual, it was associated with raising a family in New York. 
Later, when I ask about the gender composition of the firm, I learn that the firm only 
employs one woman who is not a parent. In this instance, fathers receive additional 
incomes to help them uphold the expectations for supporting a family, which provides a 
clue to why men, particularly fathers, may out-earn women. Other interviewees 
confirmed that this breadwinner advantage happens at their firms as well.  
Although hedge fund managers described the “flat” organizational structure and 
division of labor in gender-neutral terms, Deborah explained how colleagues refer to her 
hedge fund as the “chick fund,” because the proportion of women at her firm is 
uncharacteristic of the industry as a whole. Reports estimate that the industry is only 
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comprised of 5 to 7 percent women, yet Deborah reports that 12 of her 20 employees are 
women. Similarly, Diane described employing a greater proportion of women, including 
her chief financial officer. Deborah and Diane proved to be exceptions to the rule among 
my sample, as most women tend to work in investor relations and interviewees largely 
describe firm compositions as overwhelmingly male-dominated. Since I oversample for 
women hedge fund managers like Deborah and Diane, I understand their firms as extreme 
cases that demonstrate the male domination of the rest of the industry. Having a higher 
proportion of women—even at 60 percent—was such an anomaly that it earned a 
nickname, the “chick fund,” which highlights the gendered division of labor and male 
domination in this industry.  
 
3. GENDER IDEOLOGY 
In stark contrast to the motivations expressed by startup hedge fund managers who want 
to control their schedules, have flexible hours, and achieve financial security, established 
hedge fund managers recounted how their lives have become fully tethered to running 
their businesses. Previous research documents the around-the-clock schedule of 
entrepreneurs and the gender biases of investors (Thébaud 2015), yet it omits how these 
working arrangements are organized by an ideology of masculinity. The ideology of 
hedgemonic masculinity justifies a social organization of the hedge fund industry that 
requires hedge fund managers dedicate their energy and time to their firms. The ideals 
associated with hedgemonic masculinity confer status and respect to managers who 
demonstrate independence, dedication, fortitude, and mastery.   
The meanings that hedge fund managers associate with success and failure in the 
industry reveal how masculinity is enacted and upheld in a “flat” organization. For 
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example, Vincent explained career advancement through an analogy with sports and 
violence. He said, “This is a contact sport. You can’t get through 10 years in this business 
without having someone try to kill you or having to self-defend and kill somebody else 
career-wise. It’s a negative.” Vincent attributed his own success to being smarter than his 
competition, having audacity, being fearless, and taking risks, all expectations for 
hedgemonic masculinity in this context.  
In other interviews, ideas about masculinities and femininities became clear when 
interviewees criticized industry norms or the behavior of their colleagues. For example, 
hedge fund managers often described themselves in contrast to other managers, who they 
perceived as risk-takers, aggressors, bad apples, or egomaniacs. These comparisons 
served to distance themselves from the negative stereotypes and media portrayals of the 
industry. By setting boundaries between themselves and these stereotypes, interviewees 
shed light into how masculinity operates in this context. The comparison separates them 
from a particular kind of demonized masculinity—one that brings financial crises and 
crashes—and serves to redefine what masculinity means to them: independence, hard 
work, strength, and mastery.   
 
  
Hedgemonic 
Masculinity 
Marginalized 
Masculinity 
Marginalized 
Femininity 
Contribution Deep Value Quick Returns Due Diligence 
Approach Mastery Imprudent/Negligent Prudent 
Personality  Individualist Egomaniac/Addictive Exacting 
Value Independence  Notoriety Performance 
Table 4: Discourses of Hedgemonic Masculinity, and Marginalized Masculinity and 
Femininity. 
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For example, Brian, a white hedge fund manager in his 50s, expressed frustration 
with “incompetence and negligence” in the industry. “Why do they still have their jobs?” 
he said in reference to the low returns and poor performance during the crisis. Brian said 
that investors “fund who they like, who treats them well.” Investors tend to overlook poor 
performance, Brian thought, when the hedge fund manager is a friend or family member. 
Brian critiqued the centrality of the “old boy network” in shaping access to funding and 
to getting a job: “If you know someone, you get a job. There’s no more meritocracy.” He 
also claimed that “illegality” is still present. For example, “front running still goes on, 
which is when you tell someone that someone is going to dump a bunch of stocks so they 
can short them.” According to hedge fund managers like Brian, these practices give the 
industry a bad name and lead to negative media portrayals. 
Similarly, Albert described a moment at a group retreat when he realized that he 
needed to re-evaluate his priorities in life. Albert recounted: 
What became very apparent and an eye-opener for me is that nearly every single 
one of the senior managers had a dysfunctional family life, dysfunctional 
marriages, high percentages of divorce, and unfortunately I have to hold my hand 
up high in the air because I went through a divorce earlier in my career. For me, 
going to that, it was too late because in fact when I went to that I was already 
mid-divorce.  
Albert’s description of the dysfunctional personal lives of his colleagues demonstrates 
both the ideal for upholding masculinity as well as the negatives outcomes associated 
with achieving that ideal. According to Albert, the dysfunctional marriages and family 
lives were the product of the expectations for long hours and complete dedication. He 
added, “And I would say that an incredible percentage of people in this industry have 
some sort of let’s call it vice, whether it’s substance abuse, alcoholism, pain-killers, they 
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chase something or need a distraction or a stimulant of some other kind.” The need for 
stimulus—also expressed in addiction or other “vice”—characterizes the archetype of a 
wired hedge fund manager, who is fixated on, perhaps even addicted to, the stock market.  
 Albert differentiated himself from the marginalized masculinity, explaining how 
he learned to demarcate the end of his workday and the transition to his family life with a 
daily martial arts practice. He said: 
In fairness, what I have done, and I’m not sure it’s a good thing—my wife would 
probably say it’s a bad thing—is that I’ve sort of thrown myself at martial arts. 
That’s where I’m leaving at 4:30. I’m now a third degree black belt and I will be 
absolutely gutted, humiliated, and check my ego at the door by my master who I 
have some one-on-one time with, but it’s a good way to cleanse myself mentally 
and emotionally and then keep everything at check, and hopefully have a rich and 
untainted family life as well . . . It’s a good demarcation of end of my professional 
day and then family time. 
To be able to leave his “ego at the door,” Albert attended a daily session with his 
“master,” who dominated him and put him in his place through sport. Albert thought that 
this ritual of masculine domination allowed him to transition from the role of hedge fund 
manager to that of husband and father.  
 The ego was a recurring reference in my interviews. Whereas Albert had his ego 
beaten out of him in sport, Vincent supposedly lost his as he aged, which he described as 
occurring alongside achieving status and money. Over the course of my interviews, it 
became clear that the discourse of the ego referred to something other than an inflated 
self-confidence. The notion of ego captured a negative alternative to hedgemonic 
masculinity: being driven entirely by greed and status.  
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Diane described how “the ego is in the performance, not in the process itself,” 
when referring to how she strives to maintain a flat organizational culture. When I asked 
for clarification on what she meant, she elaborated:  
I see the egos a lot when I interact with the hedge fund guys. Where people want 
to be public. They want to be in the press. They want everybody to know that they 
have bought a really expensive apartment. It’s the need for greed, if you will. 
Whereas our motto—and we’ve made a lot of money, we have billions and 
billions of dollars under management. We probably have one of the best private 
equity track records, and hands down one of the best hedge fund track records as 
well. And, again, the process has just been so flat. When I started managing this 
portfolio 20 years ago it was just me. Over time, I’ve added some people but 
neither my partner nor I have a desire to manage a lot of people. I think we have a 
desire to run a lot of capital, but not build some monstrosity of an organization. 
And I don’t think you have to. So that alone makes us a lot less ego-driven than 
most folks because the reward is in our numbers. And doing a good job, which 
we’ve done but not in building some big organization with hundreds of people. 
The “egos” Diane identified are attention seeking, greedy, and status-oriented.  
Professional status in Diane’s account is synonymous with organization size, 
measured in terms of assets under management. She critiqued the practice of building a 
firm with many employees, which she understood as not necessary for production and 
only desired as a marker of status. Instead, she took pride in managing a sizeable amount 
of money with a small number of personnel relative to other firms. This is a recurring 
point of pride and self-efficacy expressed among the hedge fund managers I spoke with: 
The feat of managing a large amount of assets with the fewest people as possible.  
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In addition to the discourse of the ego-driven men, generalizations about women 
demonstrate beliefs in gender essentialism, as well as serve to designate what “to do” and 
“not to do” to uphold the ideals for masculinity in this context. While interviewees 
acknowledged the barriers woman face in the industry, they tended to cite the low 
numbers of women hedge funds managers as evidence of how women are poorly suited 
for the industry or lack the attributes necessary to comply with industry expectations. 
Their accounts cast femininity—assumptions of what women do—in the workplace as 
examples of how not to succeed. In a sense, interviewees fixated on the dependent 
variable—examples of women who did not advance—and then used it as proof of why 
women fail or opt out. I do not reference their accounts to identify why there are so few 
women managing hedge funds; instead, I analyze them to provide insight into ideals for 
hedgemonic masculinity, since it is defined in opposition to femininity and other forms of 
masculinity.  
For example, several hedge fund managers I interviewed believe that women’s 
aversion to risk hampered their long-term success as investors. For example, Justin, a 
white man in his 40s, emphasized how it was “women who did less poorly” as investment 
managers during the financial crisis of 2008 because “men take more risk.” While this 
may have enabled women to outperform the stock market during the crisis, Justin 
wondered if it led to lower profits during market upturns.  
Similarly, Diane believed that men’s and women’s different approaches to risk 
disadvantages women in their careers in investment management. She provided an 
allegory of a car race: 
This is how I view women versus men in the world of investing, and how good 
women are at risk management. So there’s a man and a woman, they each have a 
Lamborghini, and they get into their car. They both drive off in their car. 
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Suddenly, there’s a sign that says, “Dangerous Turn, Slow Down.” And the 
woman goes, “Oh, dangerous turn, I’m going to slow down.” And she slows 
down. The man keeps going. He drives over a cliff. She never picks up speed. He 
gets a new car. He comes back onto the road. That was the only curve and he 
drives really fast to the finish line and ends up getting there before she does. She 
saw the risk. She made the appropriate changes in her vehicle to not drive off the 
road. He drives one speed, which is fast. The problem is she prevented a car 
crash. That’s the good news. The bad news is that she never got out of second 
gear.  
To Diane, this allegory captures why women lose out in the investment world for not 
taking on more risk, even though they are believed to be better at anticipating and 
preparing for risk. Diane told me that she was unsure whether these “differences” were 
the product of socialization or biology. Her allegory also reveals an underlying 
assumption that if an investment fails, there is always more money to “buy a new car,” a 
symptom of the cultural beliefs about money and risk in the industry. In other words, 
when a professional risk fails, it does not ruin a man’s career. However, if we continue 
with a more literal interpretation of Diane’s analogy, the man would die when he drives 
off a cliff, which corresponds to the negative effects of extreme risk-taking on one’s 
reputation in this industry. 
 I found no evidence to support Diane’s claim that women take fewer risks than 
men. While Diane described herself as “guilty” of being too risk-averse, she and the other 
hedge fund managers I interviewed—men and women alike—explained how they learned 
to evaluate and take calculated risks in similar terms, often citing the first time they 
experienced a major downturn in the market or a bad trade. For example, at one women’s 
networking event I attended, the women swapped stories of the first time they lost over a 
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million dollars on a single trade. One trader recounted how she was certain she would be 
fired after losing five million dollars; however, when she reported the news to her 
manager at the end of the day, he congratulated her on achieving this rite of passage in 
the industry. While the hedge fund managers generally described themselves as cautious 
about risk, the occasional heavy loss was understood as part of learning how to trade and 
manage investments. 
 Diane told the car race allegory immediately after she recounted a time when she 
received pushback from her partners when she wanted to invest in a hedge fund run by a 
woman who is often perceived as too aggressive in terms of taking on risk in the stock 
market. Diane said:  
I wanted to give money to this woman who runs an event portfolio. She’s really 
super aggressive and I think that kind of scared them a little bit. She’s got great 
numbers but she’s aggressive like when you meet her personality-wise and I think 
it freaked them out a little bit. And I had money with her in my previous position, 
so they are like, “But the drawdowns,” and I was like, “Look at her track record. 
Every time she has a drawdown, you want to put money in.” And so 
mathematically the numbers ultimately bear out but it was a little bit scary 
probably for the first investment for me to recommend. Now, we don’t have those 
conversations obviously and I own half the firm.  
Diane described how her male partners perceived this woman as too aggressive both in 
terms of her personality (“it freaked them out”) and her investments. Furthermore, by 
following up this anecdote with the allegory of the car race, Diane contradicted her ideas 
about women being more risk-averse. Instead, Diane’s account of this women’s 
perceived risk provides insight into how women may be read as too aggressive when they 
follow the norms for risk-taking in this industry. This women’s case demonstrates how 
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women comply with the ideals for hedgemonic masculinity but are held to different 
standards than men. 
 In her ethnography of Wall Street, Karen Ho (2009) examines the formation of a 
Wall Street habitus, which refers to a collection of bodily dispositions and practices that 
constructs the worldview of investment bankers in a way that rationalizes restructuring 
and their role in creating it as making markets more efficient. Yet, an analysis of 
masculinity is missing from Ho’s account of the Wall Street habitus. I argue that the Wall 
Street habitus is gendered. It reflects beliefs and practices that reaffirm masculinity, such 
as gendered discourses about risk-taking. In the next section, I examine how the 
dominant gendered ideology of the industry impacts how employers perceive their 
employee’s performance and value to the firm. 
 
4. GENDER AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
Hedge fund managers evaluate their employees based on numeric metrics according to 
the firm’s bottom line (refer to Chapter 4 for further discussion). According to this 
neoliberal logic, quantitative metrics imply that success is purely meritocratic, because 
the market is understood as unbiased.  
This market logic guides management practices of hedge fund managers. For 
example, Diane described the flat structure as allowing for performance to determine 
success, rather than other markers of status. Of her firm, Diane said: 
It’s really flat. It’s really flat. I measure our success by our performance. It’s not 
measured by the size of somebody’s office or where they went to school or 
something like that. It’s very, very flat . . . There’s no big egos. The ego is in the 
performance, not in the process itself. And it’s flat.  
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In a flat organization, according to Diane, individual success is contingent on team 
performance, rather than the individual’s status and authority. Thus, the team is evaluated 
as a whole with the assumption that if one person’s performance falters, the entire team 
will underperform in terms of investment returns. However, evaluating employees based 
on teamwork has been demonstrated to disadvantage women in male-dominated teams 
because women’s contributions tend to receive less recognition (Williams et al. 2012). 
One investor relations professional, Amanda, who is a white woman in her mid-
30s, explained how her firm has a flat organizational structure with no formal 
promotional procedures or titles, because the hedge fund manager believes that 
eliminating standardized processes will promote meritocracy. Amanda explained:  
We don’t have titles, so no promotions. The only way you feel like you are 
getting promoted is through comp [compensation] . . . It’s supposed to promote a 
meritocracy, but I think sometimes people need those milestones to feel like they 
are progressing in their career. 
As Amanda recounted, in the absence of formal policies for promotion, compensation 
becomes the exclusive source through which employees receive feedback about their 
performance. She explained how her managers provide little supervision, so 
compensation is the only way for evaluating her performance and she receives little 
insight into how it is calculated.  
While hedge fund managers discouraged employees from discussing their 
compensation packages, colleagues do share information within and across firms. I came 
across several cases in which an employee discovered that they were underpaid relative 
to their colleagues. At one women’s networking event, the women shared their 
experiences with negotiating raises. One wrote a lengthy report demonstrating her value 
to the firm, while another did so after her manager gave her an unsolicited raise because 
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she felt the need to command descriptive recognition for her achievements rather than 
merely an increase in compensation. A woman trader in her early 20s recounted how the 
first time her supervisor asked her into his office to discuss her annual bonus, she silently 
and abruptly walked out of his office when he showed her the number. She explained 
how she has no benchmark for her earnings because her colleagues—all men—never 
share information about their compensation packages. Even though she did not know 
how much money to expect, she recounted how she anticipated that her supervisor would 
underestimate her value since she is a younger woman. After exiting her supervisor’s 
office, he approached her with a substantially higher number and now broaches 
compensation with her in a much different manner than when she first started. Without 
formal policies for compensation and promotion, advancement is an ad hoc process.  
At times, the lack of formal procedures creates tensions between managers and 
employees. For example, Amanda described a time when she and her supervisor jockeyed 
for an account because their responsibilities were not clearly differentiated. In the end, 
the supervisor deleted her name from the meeting notes and took sole credit for recruiting 
the investor. Amanda thought that as a supervisor, he should not have been in 
competition with his supervisees and should have instead acknowledged her 
accomplishment, because it bolsters his own achievements as a supervisor. In Amanda’s 
case, the emphasis on quantitative metrics for determining compensation results in 
competition between supervisor and supervisee.  
Quantitative metrics—a proxy for merit—inform beliefs about workplace 
diversity: Several interviewees expressed the belief that quantitative metrics for 
advancement eliminate gender and racial discrimination in the workplace. One 
investment professional, Fernando, a Hispanic American man in his 30s, described how 
this metric of success eliminates discrimination on the basis of ethnicity:  
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What I have found is that ethnicity is a non-factor. Ethnicity—people don’t care. 
And it’s because these funds are very PNL [profit and loss] oriented. They are 
there to make money. And they make money not by people’s looks; they don’t 
make money by how people talk, by people’s accents, or where people are from. 
They don’t make money usually by whether a person has a great social network. 
Hedge funds make money when the analysts, the portfolio managers, and the 
traders make good judgments on the investments. I usually see all types of 
ethnicities. I don’t think that they’re trying to abide by the Department of Labor 
laws. I really think it’s a function of meritocracy. If you’re from India, from Asia, 
if you’re black or white, it really doesn’t matter, as long as that person can 
produce. Usually there is a meritocracy to it: It doesn’t matter as long as people 
can produce.  
Fernando stressed how the financial returns make an objective measure of success that 
removes other forms of discrimination from preventing people from exceling in the 
industry. He believed that the balance sheet purely reflects individual achievement and, 
thus, allows for meritocracy.  
Quantification becomes a proxy for meritocracy, which obscures how other social 
factors—like race, gender, and class—influence how performance and value are 
evaluated in this industry. Several people, however, shared insights that depict an uneven 
playing field. For example, I first met Sasha, a foreign-born black woman with over a 
decade of experience in the industry, at a conference and we got together regularly 
throughout my fieldwork. When I met Sasha for lunch at her firm in November, she 
described how much she enjoyed her work and her colleagues. The following Easter, she 
invited me over for dinner with her family and several friends. I learned that she had 
become fed up with her job because of dynamics with two white women on her team. 
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Sasha had recently heard that a colleague earned three times her pay, so she 
requested a raise commensurate with her tenure and credentials. Sasha stressed her value 
in the labor market: “I should get paid market and market is xyz.” Her supervisor refused, 
emphasizing that Sasha should be grateful for the job. Sasha recounted how the 
interaction made her feel, “She might as well called me the N-word. That’s what it felt 
like.” Although always conscious of her minority status, this interaction was the first time 
in her career when Sasha felt “put in her place:” 
That was really hurtful and not so much because you’re not getting what you 
want, but because the things she said to me really showed her true colors, her real 
feelings. I’ve always been the one [black person], but I’ve never been so directly 
spoken to, put into place—like “know your role”—as I was at that moment.  
Sasha’s attempt to advocate for herself as an employee reveals a fault line in the 
supposedly merit-based system. Sasha stressed how her supervisor recognized and 
commended her work until the moment when she demanded equal pay. Although Sasha 
believed that she clearly demonstrated her contribution to the firm, her supervisor 
deemed her of lesser value.  
 After the incident, the “human resources manager” at Sasha’s firm contacted her 
to schedule a meeting to discuss what has transpired between Sasha and her supervisor. 
When she relayed this to me during our interview, it surprised me because no other 
interviewees mentioned human resources personnel, even when I included a question 
about human resources in my preliminary interviews. As far I knew, most small to mid-
sized hedge funds do not hire human resources personnel; instead, I learned from 
interviewees that hedge funds occasionally hire psychologists—the “corporate shrink”—
to mediate interpersonal disputes.  
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I asked Sasha about the human resources manager’s role, and she explained that it 
is actually the top executive at the firm: the chief investment officer also serves as head 
of human resources. This is a common practice described by hedge fund managers who 
“wear multiple hats” to avoid hiring additional personnel. Sasha identified the 
shortcomings of this arrangement and expressed concern about the manager’s 
motivations in approaching her about the incident. Sasha said that she understood their 
meeting as an attempt to protect the firm in the event of a lawsuit. According to Sasha, 
the hedge fund manager explicitly asked her if she intended to press charges. Instead of 
protecting her rights as a worker, he represented the firm’s interests. In a flat 
organization, few protections exist to balance the interests of executives and supervisors 
when employment disputes arise. Executives also provide limited transparency to 
workers into decision-making processes like the distribution of earnings and promotions. 
Over the following months, tensions at the firm escalated until Sasha quit her job.  
In a competitive, reputation-based industry, Sasha identified few options to seek 
recourse for discrimination. Interviewees described reporting discrimination to a human 
resources representative—usually an investment executive—as futile and, at times, even 
made interactions worse. Filing a formal discrimination lawsuit was a “career-ender,” 
according to one woman I talked to. Several people stressed that no firm would hire 
someone with this on his or her reputation or background check. Instead, interviewees 
reported that they resolved the problem amongst themselves or sought employment 
elsewhere, identifying the labor market as the proper mechanism for addressing racial or 
gender discrimination. One time at a networking event, a woman admitted to me in 
secrecy that she pressed charges and settled out of court with a former employer who laid 
off all of the women on the investment team. After the woman was laid off, she pressed 
charges but she could not share any details with me due to the terms of the settlement she 
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reached with her previous employer. Her lawsuit was the only reference to a person 
pressing charges for discrimination that I came across throughout my fieldwork and 
interviews. 
Matthew, a senior trader who is black, identified how racism led to his last 
departure from working at the hedge fund division at a large investment bank. He 
described several instances of racism at work such as times when colleagues perceived 
him as threatening or arrogant. When I asked if he intended to file a complaint with 
human resources, he responded: 
Never on the complaint side, because these HR [Human Resources] departments 
are designed to actually support management full stop, so who am I going to 
complain to? Right? If anything, that gives you a straight ticket to be managed 
out, which is fine. Then give me a package, and at the end of the day, I was able 
to get a [severance] package from them. But no, my mentality, and it’s really, this 
is what I think is very important for this conversation on a broader standpoint. My 
mentality is always that I am responsible for my own career. Now there is 
something very powerful about that if you take that on. If you are responsible for 
your own career, and you are not happy, whose fault is that? [He waits for me to 
answer, “your own.”] If you’re not getting paid what you think you should be 
getting paid, whose fault is that? [Your own] If you’re not being recognized, if 
you’re not getting the leadership opportunity, all those things.  
Matthew deemed it unrealistic to expect others to acknowledge and address their own 
racism. Instead, he preferred to take his talent elsewhere, stressing the “commercial” case 
for diversity: Firms that discriminate lose valuable talent, he reasoned. This reflects a 
neoliberal ideology of individual responsibility that posits the labor market as the 
appropriate recourse for firms with discriminatory practices. However, the low numbers 
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of women and men of color in this industry, especially in leadership positions, suggests 
that the labor market does not effectively deter discrimination. Although research has 
found strong performance among women and minority-led firms, these firms account for 
only 3.3 percent of the industry (Barclays 2011; Rothstein Kass 2013). 
Instead of seeking institutional recourse for discrimination, Matthew assumed 
responsibility for dealing with racism in the workplace. He identified the solution to 
interpersonal and institutional racism in the labor market, giving it neoliberal logics akin 
to beliefs about investing in the stock market: 
If you’re not being recognized. All those things. If you’re not getting the 
leadership opportunity. All those things. Because if you accept that responsibility, 
then you will stop waiting for someone to hand you something, because I think 
that this whole, the improvement on the situation is not going to be somebody 
waking up one day and being like, “Holy shit, I have perception bias.” It’s going 
to be people gravitating to places where they can be seen for who they really are 
and those places would benefit from the type of talent that they attract . . . I’m 
willing to make the commercial argument that if I’m drawing from a broader 
talent pool because I’m able to see people for who they are, I’m going to win. 
There’s no doubt about it. I’m going to win.  
According to this logic, the market will match employers and employees based on fit, and 
discriminatory managers will lose out on talented employees. Matthew’s account 
suggests that neoliberal discourses about the efficiency of stock markets pervade ideas 
about labor markets as well, supported by the fact that references to the government or 
any institutional recourse are notably absent. 
Since hedge funds aim to run lean and have flat organizational structures, 
managers have considerable discretion over the kind of guidance and support provided to 
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their employees. This power imbalance is framed, by interviewees, as an issue of 
workload and time management: Hedge fund managers must “wear multiple hats,” which 
leaves little time to manage and evaluate personnel. However, this is often the product of 
the hedge fund managers’ decision not to hire other higher-level personnel, who could 
devote more time and energy to managing personnel. Thus, employees assume 
responsibility for self-management in the absence of formal oversight, policies, and 
procedures. The “flat” structures and quantitative performance evaluations are believed to 
promote meritocracy, yet interviewees like Amanda, Sasha, and Matthew described 
struggling without constructive feedback for improvement or avenues to seek recourse. 
These supervisory practices often leave those who are discriminated against to perceive 
the labor market as the only viable option for advancement.  
In addition to the detrimental effects of the (lack of) policies on the careers of 
workers like Matthew, Sasha, and Amanda, this also suggests an unchecked and 
hierarchical environment where hedge fund managers are not held accountable for their 
actions. Hedge fund managers wield considerable power relative to their employees, 
which places the burden on employees to cater to the manager’s demands and may 
remove the manager’s sense of accountability to their employees. I argue that these 
practices are part of larger workplace culture that enables hedge fund managers to 
demand high fees from investors. In the following section, I outline how this cultural 
context is tied to ideals for masculinity.  
 
5. GENDER AND NETWORKS 
Brain demonstrates how an “old boy network” can provide a lifeline during 
professional transitions. Brain started his career in finance in the early 1990s at a large 
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investment firm, where he “started with stock picking”—an introductory job where an 
analyst learns how to evaluate stocks. Brian only worked there for a few years before 
launching his own hedge fund in the late 90s. Despite having an MBA from an Ivy 
League university, Brian described himself as landing in the Northeast with no networks. 
Remembering back to when he founded his hedge fund, Brian said, “I didn’t have the 
contacts in finance. I didn’t know anybody.” 
Brain’s perceived lack of contacts did not prevent him from recruiting investors 
for his hedge fund: He raised $2 million in seed investments from his personal and 
professional networks. This included funding from a former girlfriend’s father. He had, 
he said, “actually a lot of connections through my exes,” explicitly referencing finding 
multiple investors through ex-girlfriends. Brian also received seed funding from his 
previous boss at the investment firm, from his family and religious networks in the South, 
from his contacts from the Ivy League business school, and from a colleague’s father and 
his poker friends, who invested in Brian because he was “trustworthy.” Although he did 
not disclose this information in our interview, I later read in a news article about Brian’s 
hedge fund that his father was a former CEO of a public company for 22 years and had 
“plenty of friends in the business community” in Brian’s hometown. Brian clearly had 
vast and wealthy networks, even though he perceived them as less high-status than those 
of his new peers in the northeast. 
Brian’s initial seed funding grew to $200 million over 10 years. Despite this 
growth, he never hired any employees and ran the firm all by himself, with the help of 
outsourcing some of the work. He proudly said, “not one employee.” He did not want to 
achieve the scale and overhead of the large funds and preferred to keep his firm small. 
Even though Brian founded a hedge fund with investments from his own personal 
and professional networks, he distanced himself from the “old boy network” form of 
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masculinity. He defined himself in opposition to it, which is revealing of other forms of 
masculinity that he upholds and enacts in his work. For example, Brian called himself as 
a “deep value guy,” which is a term often used for activist investors who are also called 
“contrarians” (Carlisle 2014). He said, “call me contrarian, but I prefer to be called 
independent minded.” Whereas contrarian refers to someone who goes against current 
practice in picking stocks, independent minded reflects a sense of originality and 
creativity: One who acts entirely apart from the herd. Brian believed that he had a 
“unique investment style” that was “more based in psychology than in finance.” Brain 
explained how as a hedge fund manager, “You find your own style. You make mistakes 
to refine your style. Hedge funds are like snowflakes: No two are alike. It’s just about the 
guy or girl at the top and their brain.” 
Brain explained how “there is a lot of art to stock investment. It’s not a science 
but an art.” He elaborated on this idea in the following excerpt from my field 
observations following our interview:  
When I asked Brian why he ran his hedge fund by himself, he looked around the 
small and mostly empty café. Finally, he turned to the painting next to us and 
pointed to the bottom right corner, which was empty. He turned back to me and 
asked, “What would usually be there?” “The artist’s signature,” I replied not 
knowing where he was going with this. “How do you spell artist?” he asked. I 
looked at him confused, and then spelled artist aloud: “A-R-T-I-S-T.” “You see, 
there’s no ‘s’ following that word,” he said. “I don’t want my ideas to get 
squashed. For some great ideas there is no evidence. Artist not artists.” 
Brian preferred to work alone because he understood investments to be individualistic 
and creative. This provides a clue to how masculinity organizes this industry. Brain 
reaffirms an ideology of hedgemonic masculinity that values individualism and 
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originality, which serves to justify designations of trust and loyalty. Despite Brian’s claim 
that his work is solo and distinct from the “old boy network” that organizes this industry, 
he relied on his social capital to access investors.  
Brian understood his creative, individualistic approach to investing as instilling a 
sense of trust among his investors. When Brian’s hedge fund collapsed amid the 2008 
financial crisis, he expressed gratitude to these early investors with whom he had more 
personal ties. When the crisis hit, Brain recounted, “My early investors stuck with me. I 
am an artist.” Over the years, however, he acquired “more investors who jumped on the 
bandwagon.” According to Brian, it was the more recent investors who “joined the 
bandwagon” during the years of high profits who withdrew their trust and cashed out in 
large numbers when he encountered difficulty during the crisis.  
After closing his hedge fund, Brian spent five years unemployed. He attributed 
this to not having social connections on Wall Street. At the height of his success—single-
handedly managing a fund that peaked at $200 million in assets under management—
Brian felt supported and respected by his peers on Wall Street. However, after closing the 
door on his hedge fund, he searched for jobs only to determine, “the jobs are all about old 
boy’s networks.” Brain felt that he had not sufficiently partaken in the “wining and 
dining” and “favors” side of the industry. Instead, he identified himself as an 
independent-minded “contrarian” and worked from his home office outside of the city.  
Despite this long period of unemployment, I learned in the news that Brian later 
launched another hedge fund, after returning to his original investors and their networks. 
Despite Brian’s claim that he lacked wealthy connections, his dedicated network of 
investors returned to him after the economic recession, demonstrating the contingent 
nature of elite networks. Brian demonstrates how membership in the “old boy network” is 
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tenuous and relative. He had access to wealthy networks, yet he perceived his networks 
as having less status and wealth than his peers in the hedge fund industry.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter detailed how the organizational logic of “flat” firms legitimizes and 
constructs gender hierarchies. First, gender is imbued in the terminology used in the 
foundational “nexus of contracts” that comprise the organization’s formal structures. 
Second, gender emerges as an organizing factor in the division of labor. Third, the 
dominant ideologies governing the expectations for hedge fund managers are explicitly 
gendered. Masculinity justifies and legitimizes specific styles of leadership. Fourth, 
performance evaluations are based on the assumption that the markets are a meritocratic 
force, yet an environment with few protections for workers allows discrimination to go 
unchecked. In this context, recourse for discrimination is understood as best left to 
market forces. In other words, if an employee encounters sexism or racism, it is believed 
that they should pursue employment elsewhere and the discriminatory firm will suffer 
from the loss of their labor. I call this market-mediated recourse for employment 
discrimination.  
Finally, these “flat” firms create a context where social networks supersede the 
firm in terms of providing employment security for workers. Networks of trust and 
loyalty, rather than the organization, allow hedge fund workers to engage in professional 
risk-taking, to the extent that they can access networks with social and cultural capital. In 
particular, hedgemonic masculinity provides a safety net to fall back on by facilitating 
access to future job opportunities and investor capital.  
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Hedge funds provide an extreme case for understanding the consequences of 
“flat” organizations. For example, my findings indicate that the social organization of this 
industry helps to explain the concentration of wealth. First, an environment with 
relatively few consequences for hedge fund managers enables them to demand high fees. 
Second, previous research identifies how a culture of high risk and high rewards on Wall 
Street justifies the high incomes (Ho 2009): I find that networks of trust and loyalty 
contribute to this culture by upholding an ideology of hedgemonic masculinity that 
encourages risk-taking. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Women hold of 57.6 percent of jobs in the U.S. banking industry, yet only account for 
35.4 percent of investment bankers and 9.4 percent of managers at private equity, venture 
capital, and hedge funds (Catalyst 2015). When asked why such low numbers of women 
advance to high-level positions in finance, the most common reply from the people in my 
study was that too few women were in the promotion pipeline or that women simply had 
a lack of interest in careers in finance. Could it be true that women are just not interested 
in joining the “old boys’ club?” My research demonstrates that more than interest or 
numbers prevent women from entering the financial elite. The low numbers of women 
and non-white men are a crucial part of understanding the social fabric of an industry that 
concentrates wealth in the hands of elite white men.  
White men dominate the top “1 percent,” the group largely responsible for 
widening income and wealth inequality in the U.S. (Keister 2014). An “old boys’ club” 
characterizes the upper echelons of business and government (Connell 2005; Enloe 
2013), yet the inner workings of this club are removed from the public view, making it 
difficult to identify how and why it persists. In this dissertation, I set out to understand 
why the “old boys’ club” is so durable and how its persistence enables the high incomes 
and wealth transfer among the “1 percent.”  
My study of the hedge fund industry has three primary findings. First, I find that 
patrimonialism characterizes the social organization of the industry. Patrimonial 
relationships among men, who are predominantly white, facilitate the transfer of training 
and capital within an investment tradition. Trust and loyalty are at the core of these 
exchanges. Networks of trust and loyalty flow along racial, ethnic, and religious lines that 
are predominantly, but not exclusively, white and male. Exceptions include members of 
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racial and ethnicity minority groups who have access to channels of income from abroad. 
In the case of U.S. hedge funds, patrimonialism is gendered and racialized as the leader is 
nearly always white and a man. Hiring, grooming, and seeding practices reproduce 
patrimonialism within the industry. A notable manager may establish a patrimonial 
lineage of firms guided by his or her investment tradition. The manager receives ongoing 
financial benefits from grooming and investing in these protégés.  
Yet, women can and do become hedge fund managers. Sometime they do so 
through the grooming processes that characterize patrimonialism. At other times, they 
find opportunities during crises, such as when firms restructure and during the 2008 
financial crisis. Women who do succeed in becoming hedge fund managers may provide 
insight into how these patrimonial structures may be adapted or upended.  
Second, I find a distinct form of masculinity that rationalizes the patrimonial 
structures and high incomes in this industry. Hedgemonic masculinity refers to the 
dominant ideology, discourses, and practices that justify patrimonialism and the authority 
of the patrimonial leader in this context. Women and men alike uphold the beliefs, norms, 
and practices. The dominant ideology reflects a set of ideals for entrepreneurial risk-
taking, independent thinking, and amassing wealth. The leading discourses in this 
industry—about cultural fit, personal brands, financial security, and flat organizations—
reinforce the ideology of hedgemonic masculinity.  
Hedgemonic masculinity legitimizes the practice of constructing a firm that is 
small, anti-bureaucratic, and steeply hierarchical. This allows a hedge fund manager to 
reign with little scrutiny or consequence for employment practices that privilege his or 
her interests. In other words, masculinity makes the high proportion of men in leadership 
positions and their excessive earnings appear natural and normal. 
Third, I find that the organizational logic of “flat” firms rationalizes and 
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constructs gender hierarchies. The “flat” organization is a discourse rather than a practice. 
As a discourse, it obscures the authority of the chief executive and legitimizes a firm 
structure that reinforces his or her power. The steep hierarchy and power imbalance 
found in flat organizations allows for the high incomes and tremendous wealth garnered 
in this industry, as hedge fund managers encounter limited checks and balances at their 
firms. By examining social inequality in a “flat” organization, I update theories of gender, 
racial, and class inequality in the workplace, which foreground fixed organizational 
structures, particularly large bureaucratic firms (Acker 1990, 2006). 
This dissertation finds that gender and race, as systems of inequality, allows for 
the concentration of economic resources among financial elites. While patrimonialism 
captures how gender and race underpin the social organization of the industry, 
hedgemonic masculinity is the dominant ideology that justifies this organization. This 
ideology naturalizes the gender and racial hierarchies present in this industry. This 
phenomenon is especially striking in people’s accounts of the aftermath of launching a 
hedge fund. 
 
THE AFTERMATH: WHO “WINS” AND WHO “LOSES”  
The aftermath of launching a hedge fund illuminates what is at stake when people take 
entrepreneurial risks in the hedge fund industry. To demonstrate my three major findings 
regarding patrimonialism, “flat” organizations, and hedgemonic masculinity, I examine 
three examples of hedge fund managers who spoke about the experience of closing a 
hedge fund. In one case, the manager sold his successful company in order to retire in his 
40s. In the other two examples, the hedge fund managers were forced to close their funds 
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after poor performance and investor withdrawals. In both of these cases, the former hedge 
fund managers struggled, both personally and professionally.  
 
Patrimonialism 
The first example demonstrates how the patrimonial structures of the financial services 
industry facilitate future success after founding a hedge fund. Over the course of his 
career, Vincent successfully rose to the top of an investment bank, launched his own 
firm, achieved financial security in his 40s, and returned to work at a large firm on his 
own terms. His career path serves as the hedgemonic ideal: Vincent earned enough 
money to retire, yet returned to work because he felt passionate about it.  
When I asked Vincent how he launched his own firm, he reflected, “It was 
completely opportunistic and I was just young enough to take risk. I mean I had kids but I 
was not that bright. I wasn’t as fearful as I should have been.” When I asked him to 
elaborate on what he meant, he said:  
Anytime you leave a cushy job. . . walk away from it and take the risk of starting 
something entrepreneurial, a lot of people would have said, “Don’t do it.” And a 
lot of people did. I attributed it to probably not having as much fear as I should 
have had. And we pulled it off. Knock on wood. I think if we tried that now, we 
would fail. But at that time, the stars aligned, the market environment was correct, 
there was plenty of liquidity out there, we were in a 20-year bull market, we were 
good at what we did, there weren’t that many obstacles and we blew it out. I don’t 
know if that can be done today. It would be a lot harder to do it today.  
Vincent described how he took risk and prevailed, upholding the hedgemonic ideal for a 
worker who invests in their future and succeeds. Despite his success, Vincent warned 
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others against following his path and launching a fund, reflecting the odds against a 
wager that most workers will fail to collect on. Leaving steady employment involved 
taking on considerable risk, which is something he expressed reservations about pursuing 
again. Looking back, he stressed that he would be much more hesitant to take on that 
kind of risk, which he attributed to how his perspective has changed throughout his career 
and to the current investment environment.  
In his early 40s, Vincent sold his firm with $200 billion in assets under 
management and retired to spend more time with his family. After a couple of years, he 
returned to work. He explained that decision: “I made a fair amount of money. I was too 
young, but thought I could possibly do it. And it was fun for six months, but pretty boring 
after that. I wasn’t ready for the blue-haired lady boards. I love all that stuff, but I was 
just too young.” While Vincent anticipated that early retirement would be a time of 
leisure and status, he found himself volunteering on charity boards (what he calls the 
“blue-haired lady boards”) a sharp contrast to the status afforded to him as a hedge fund 
manager. These boards were gender-typed feminine and elderly, which was his cue that 
he needed to reclaim his tie to hedgemonic masculinity by reestablishing his career. 
Vincent found a job through his previous client networks. He identified a need for 
an experienced generalist at an investment bank with a highly specialized and young 
staff. He identified the importance of his social capital: “I had made a lot of connections 
while running a business. I knew lots of constituents in the equation.” Vincent recalled 
his “pitch” to the bank: “So what I sold in was that I can be the adult in the room on any 
conversation, any subject matter, any part of the business of an investment bank or asset 
management.” By “sold in,” Vincent referred to how he identified a need at the firm and 
pitched the job to management. The job function did not exist until he presented it to the 
firm. As such, Vincent upheld a new norm for job seekers to actively produce demand for 
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their employment by branding themselves as products (Vallas and Cummins 2015). His 
previous success as an entrepreneur allowed him to negotiate an upper-level role: “I was 
able to negotiate a senior relationship manager kind of role within a business. I was the 
senior statesman.”  
After making it to the top in his career, Vincent could demand the terms of his 
new position. He recounted how he “had a couple conditions,” which he said, “shows you 
that I’m a man of conviction.” Vincent recalled, “I had no more ego left. I didn’t feel the 
need to rise in the ranks of a bank again. I wanted a job. Money was tertiary. I knew I 
could make money. I’ve always made money. I could just come in and be a rainmaker 
[attract investors].” After earning enough money to retire and rising in the ranks in 
investment banking, Vincent said he has nothing left to prove, i.e., “no more ego left.” 
Yet setting the terms of his employment empowered Vincent to feel like “a man of 
conviction.” In this context, he used the term conviction—a firmly held belief—to refer 
to his own self-esteem and bargaining power.  
Like other workers with large networks, Vincent described how his social 
connections provided a safety net during the financial crisis of 2008. Vincent began his 
new job in January of 2008. By September, the investment bank started to lay people off. 
Even though Vincent was a new employee and had a high salary, he was not laid off 
because as he recalled:  
As things deteriorated, me as an individual became more important to them. I 
could be helpful in a lot of situations they never saw before, especially dealing 
with investors. I had a Rolodex, so I was able to help with keeping liquidity in the 
bank for a while, when it should not have been there, from some large institutions.  
Vincent explained how his individual social networks—which he called a “Rolodex”—
provided the bank with access to capital during a liquidity crisis. “Keeping liquidity in 
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the banks” is a reference to his ability to access and mobilize his networks of lucrative 
investors, both high-net-worth individuals and contacts at institutions.  
Taking the professional risks necessary to launch a fund requires careful financial 
and professional planning to ensure one has investors and employment to fall back on. 
The vast networks that Vincent had amassed before and after launching his own hedge 
fund provided him with a safety net both after he sold his firm and during the financial 
crisis. Vincent demonstrates how patrimonial structures in this industry extend beyond 
familial ties. Relationships of exchange built on trust and loyalty underpin the 
relationships within and among financial institutions.   
 
The “Flat” Organization 
A second example demonstrates how a “flat” organization does not start the 
founders off on an equal footing in their future endeavors. While recent startup founders 
spoke with excitement about the prospect of financial success, several people grimly 
described the aftermath of launching a hedge fund that eventually failed. Farrah, a white 
woman of Middle Eastern descent with over 20 years of experience in the industry, 
warned, “it is a big mistake for people to leave a big firm and go to any small firm, any 
small hedge fund, unless they’ve made so much money that they don’t need another job. 
That’s when you should go.” According to Farrah, entrepreneurship is not the path to 
success, but rather the next step after one succeeds in building a large financial and social 
safety net.  
After five years of successfully running a small firm, performance dropped, and 
Farrah’s fund went under. Farrah and her co-founders were equal partners according to 
their titles, yet their different job functions impacted the options available to each partner 
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after closing down the fund (refer to Chapter 6). While Farrah’s colleagues on the 
investment management side of the business were able to manage their own money, she 
struggled to find a position at a level comparable to that at her firm. Instead, she settled 
for a less senior position at another smaller firm. Then the 2008 financial crisis hit, and 
Farrah had a series of short-term jobs in small, struggling firms.  
Farrah recounted: “That’s probably the mistake I made. Even though we did well 
for five years, we didn’t make enough that I would never have to work again. And so for 
me, it’s been a struggle, because . . . I went to a small [firm] and then I became unwan 
[she catches herself] not as marketable.” She described how closing the doors on her 
hedge fund brought on a deep depression, even suicidal thoughts, that returned when 
subsequent firms imploded.  
Farrah lamented how if she had Ivy League credentials or wealthy family ties, she 
would be more marketable. Instead, Farrah grew up in the South and was the first in her 
family to graduate from college, a local state school. Without an elite background, Farrah 
took a 50 percent pay cut to start over in a less senior role at an investment bank. When I 
asked if she would found a hedge fund again, she responded, “No. Would I go to a 
startup? Never.” 
Without an elite background or sufficient money and training to manage her own 
investments, Farrah did not have the same success as her former hedge fund partners. 
Instead, she scrambled to find a position of equal standing to her previous role as a hedge 
fund partner and co-founder. Small, “flat” organizations offer limited options for people 
at the top of the organizational hierarchy. Farrah’s case demonstrates how although a 
hedge fund founder may “wear multiple hats,” the position may not prepare them for 
future employment because they advance too far up the hierarchy to easily find another 
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position. This is especially true for those who do not manage investments, which tend to 
be more male-dominant positions. 
 
Hedgemonic Masculinity 
A third example demonstrates what is at stake even for elite men in taking the 
risks associated with striving to achieve the ideals for hedgemonic masculinity. Cynthia, 
who founded a hedge fund with her friend Bert, also recalled the painful aftermath of 
closing it down. Over several years, Cynthia and Bert raised over $100 million, yet they 
needed $500 million to have a “critical mass” to support their investment strategy. She 
reflected on how this was during the Dot-Com Bubble of the 90s: If her firm had survived 
the crash in 2001, she thought, they would have outperformed the market. However, they 
had to return investor funds before their long-term investment strategy played out.  
As Cynthia recounted the aftermath of this for her and her business partner, she 
slowed down and said:  
Unfortunately, Bert, I didn’t even know, he had a really bad drinking habit—I 
mean I knew but I didn’t. He one day got drunk—this was after we closed the 
fund—on a bottle of vodka, went to his roof, and jumped right off. It was horrible. 
It still breaks my heart. Because his whole identity was around it [the hedge fund]. 
And if we had just hung on, we’d be making a bazillion. 
Cynthia’s former partner committed suicide after they shut down their hedge fund, which 
she attributed to his sense of identity in being a hedge fund manager.  
When I asked Cynthia to elaborate on how Bert’s identity became wrapped up in 
the business, she responded: 
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Your identity? I’m a hedge fund manager! A hedge fund manager is like, “I’ve 
got money. I’m smart. I’m an elite. I’ve got huge clients. I’m like the Vanderbilts. 
I’m the anointed.” There is really a lot of pride in the hedge fund business. And 
everybody was like friends of hedge fund managers. Because it was so clubby. It 
was fun though. So yeah, your identity was really tied into it. But that I think was 
true of any guy in this business. Definitely.  
Bert’s suicide reflects the fragility of hedgemonic masculinity. While hedgemonic 
masculinity confers high status, this status is contingent on success and blurs the 
boundaries between professional failures and personal shortcomings, because one’s work 
is deeply tied to one’s identity. When a hedge fund manger fails, his or her friends and 
family are often directly impacted, since it is common for investor funds to be sourced 
through personal ties.  
The long-term outcomes for each hedge fund manager depended on their social 
networks. For Vincent, and Brian in Chapter 6, male-dominated networks cultivated 
through trust and loyalty provided a safety net that enabled them to achieve comparable 
success in the future. For Bert, it appears that the pressure of failing in front of his 
personal and professional networks sparked a deep depression, which reflects the painful 
consequences of complying with an ideology of hedgemonic masculinity that confers a 
tenuous and fleeting status. Meanwhile, Cynthia transitioned into running her own hedge 
fund consulting firm, and Farrah never regained the same level of status in her career, 
which she attributed to not having the markers of high socio-economic status, specifically 
elite social and cultural capital. 
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CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LITERATURE  
The findings from this dissertation make three primary contributions to previous 
research. First, scholars have attributed the high incomes in finance to an ideology of 
risk: The high professional risks justify the high rewards (Ho 2009). Yet, I find that 
gender and race are central to this ideology, and I demonstrate how gender and race are 
embedded in the social organization of the financial services industry. The dominant 
discourses and ideologies that legitimize the employment insecurity and high earnings in 
finance simultaneously justify and naturalize a gendered and racialized social hierarchy.  
Second, I build on previous research on gender and racial inequality in the 
financial services industry by showing how these discriminatory practices are part of a 
broader structural system of patrimonialism. This helps to account for how and why the 
“old boys’ club” in finance persists from one generation to the next.  
Third, this dissertation contributes to scholarship on economic inequality. A 
closer examination of the hedge fund industry reveals how the interactions, beliefs, and 
organizational context of this industry consolidate financial resources among an elite 
group of predominantly white men. By applying the theory of patrimonialism to this 
context, I demonstrate how gender and race influence the social organization of the 
industry and, therefore, impact the distribution of access to opportunities, rewards, and 
resources.  
Patrimonialism provides insight into how gender and race, as forms of social 
inequality, are part of industry-wide mechanisms that allow earnings to grow and wealth 
to be consolidated in this industry. Whereas previous research often emphasizes the role 
of either income or wealth to understand the growth and durability of the “1 percent” 
(Harrington 2016), I examine the relationship between income and wealth in one 
industry. I find that the social processes within the workplaces of elite earners accounts 
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for why high incomes may lead to the accumulation of wealth for some people but not for 
others.  
The implications of these findings for inequality also pertain to studies of the U.S. 
and global elite. Previous research has contradictory findings on solidarity among elites. 
Mark Mizruchi (2013) identifies a socially and politically fragmented U.S. elite, while 
others attribute rising income and wealth to concentrated elite networks on a national and 
global scale (DiPrete, Eirich, and Pittinsky 2010; Harrington 2016; Kim, Kogut, and 
Yang 2015). A study of local elites finds that the most influential feature a high level of 
cohesion and less gender, racial, and class segregation (Cornwell and Dokshin 2014).  
Focusing on one industry, however, reveals an interconnected—and potentially 
politically mobilized—financial elite where patrimonial structures engender relationships 
among white men and facilitate gender, racial, and class segregation, especially among 
the most influential members. This dissertation finds that gender and race, largely omitted 
from research on widening income and wealth inequality, facilitate the concentration of 
economic resources among the working rich.  
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This dissertation expands on the research on wealthy elites by examining 
mechanisms generating contemporary patrimonial structures in the U.S. financial sector; 
however, it does not examine the implications for the U.S. government. Future research 
might investigate the following broader political ramifications. First, hedge funds have a 
long history of collapsing currencies—as in the case of George Soros who “broke the 
Bank of England” by short-selling the British pound—and of causing international 
financial crises like those in Asia in the late 1990s (see Pitluck 2014). Second, the ties 
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between government officials and Wall Street warrant additional investigation. Notable 
examples of politicians associated with Goldman Sachs include former Treasury 
Secretary Henry Paulson, former Head of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
Arthur Levitt, and former House Majority Leader Dick Gephardt. This trend extends to 
hedge funds as well. After Ben Bernanke completed his second term as Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve, he was appointed senior advisor to Citadel, a $25 billion hedge fund. 
Bernanke’s predecessor, Alan Greenspan, has also worked as a consultant for several 
hedge funds. The revolving door between finance and the state persists today. 
Third, hedge funds managers have become increasingly intertwined in 
international affairs. For example, hedge fund creditors led by billionaire Paul Singer of 
Elliott Management mobilized legal interventions to reclaim over nearly $100 billion of 
bonds lost in the 2001 Argentine default (Merle 2016). Singer targeted Argentine 
government assets, foreign exchange reserves, and prominent politicians’ personal assets. 
In 2012, Singer seized an Argentine naval vessel to hold as collateral for the sovereign 
debt through an injunction made in the superior court of Ghana, where the vessel had 
landed (the ship was quickly released after intervention by the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea). The U.S. Supreme Court ruling on behalf of the credit holders 
prompted a second Argentine default in 2014. Argentine President at the time, Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner, accused the hedge funds of extortion of government funds.  
These cases demonstrate the need for additional research to examine the broader 
implications of patrimonial networks within finance for the U.S. government and other 
political systems worldwide. More research is needed on the consequences of patrimonial 
allegiances for state regulation and for economic crisis and instability. A related line of 
research might examine other organizations engaging in familial or proto-familial 
patrimonial practices, perhaps in the nonprofit sector or even within government entities.  
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CONCLUSION 
Patrimonialism reveals how gendered and racialized hiring, grooming, and 
seeding practices are crucial mechanisms restricting access to resources in the financial 
sector. This helps to explain why the top one percent is predominantly white and male 
(Keister 2014). The fortitude of patrimonial structures, like those on Wall Street, 
maintains elite white men’s claim to resources and further entrenches inequality among 
future generations.  
Growth in the hedge fund industry suggests a shift towards smaller firms funded 
through trust-based networks. The anti-bureaucratic sentiment espoused in the discourse 
of “flat” organizations, the contrarian ideals reflected in hedgemonic masculinity, and the 
system of patrimonialism that organizes the industry are all responses to the risk and 
uncertainty that characterize contemporary financial markets. In contexts of heightened 
risk and uncertainty, people place their trust in stronger social ties, which justifies and 
naturalizes excluding others from the riches provided in this industry.  
This leads me to believe that the social factors leading to the low numbers of 
women and minority men are not only indicative of how gender, race, and gender 
influence how people establish trust. This dissertation concerns a broader problem than 
the forces that prevent women and minority men from accessing the riches of the “1 
percent.” Rather, I argue that the arguably excessive incomes and wealth in this industry 
are the product of homogenous, patrimonial structures that establish and legitimize the 
domination of elite white men. This helps to account for the financial sector’s role in 
recent trends in widening economic inequality. I hope that recognizing this will enable 
people to imagine alternatives that allow for a more fair and equitable distribution of 
resources in society. 
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Appendix 
Name Age Gender Race/Ethnicity Education Job Function 
Albert 46 Man White PhD Investment 
Alyssa 25 Woman White BS Investment 
Amanda 33 Woman White BS Sales 
Ana 42 Woman White BA/BS Sales 
Andrew 39 Man White JD Sales 
Bob 47 Man White MBA Investment 
Bradley 26 Man White BS Investment 
Brian 54 Man White MBA Investment 
Craig 46 Man White PhD Investment 
Cynthia 59 Woman  White BA  Sales 
Deborah 53 Woman White PhD Investment 
Dennis 64 Man White BA Service Provider 
Diane 53 Woman  White BA Investment 
Emily 46 Woman White MIS  Sales 
Eric 38 Man White MBA Support 
Erica 31 Woman White BS Sales 
Farrah 48 Woman White/Middle Eastern BS Sales 
Fernando 32 Man Hispanic MBA Investment 
Giovanni 44 Man White MBA Service Provider 
Gita 39 Woman Asian MBA Investment 
Jamie 33 Man Mixed Race JD Investment 
Jay 34 Man Hispanic MS Investment 
Jeffrey 52 Man White BA/BS Investment 
Jennifer 45 Woman White MBA Sales 
Jerry 26 Man Hispanic BS Investment 
Julie 32 Woman  Asian BA  Investment 
Justin 47 Man White MBA Investment 
Karen 44 Woman White MBA Investment 
Ken 49 Man White BSBA Investment 
Kristen 34 Woman White BA/BS Sales 
Lisa 37 Woman Asian MBA Investment 
Manny 40 Man Hispanic BS Investment 
Margaret 29 Woman Asian BS Investment 
Matthew 43 Man Black BS Investment 
 
 
 
 
 
 183 
 
Name Age Gender Race/Ethnicity Education Job Function 
Matthew 43 Man Black BS Investment 
Melissa 28 Woman White BS Sales 
Michelle 43 Woman White BSBA Sales 
Natalya 38 Woman White PhD Sales 
Nicole 27 Woman White BSBA Investment 
Regina 37 Woman White MBA Service Provider 
Sasha 31 Woman Black BS Sales 
Scott 44 Man White JD Sales 
Sebastian 33 Man White BA Sales 
Steven 33 Man Asian BS Investment 
Vincent 54 Man White JD Investment 
William 54 Man White PhD Contractor 
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